Innovation in manufacturing from product variety and labor productivity growth to economic development in Chile by Lauterbach, R.
  
 
Innovation in manufacturing from product variety and
labor productivity growth to economic development in
Chile
Citation for published version (APA):
Lauterbach, R. (2012). Innovation in manufacturing from product variety and labor productivity growth to
economic development in Chile. Maastricht: Datawyse / Universitaire Pers Maastricht.
Document status and date:
Published: 01/01/2012
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Please check the document version of this publication:
• A submitted manuscript is the version of the article upon submission and before peer-review. There can
be important differences between the submitted version and the official published version of record.
People interested in the research are advised to contact the author for the final version of the publication,
or visit the DOI to the publisher's website.
• The final author version and the galley proof are versions of the publication after peer review.
• The final published version features the final layout of the paper including the volume, issue and page
numbers.
Link to publication
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these
rights.
• Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
• You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
• You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
If the publication is distributed under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the “Taverne” license above,
please follow below link for the End User Agreement:
www.umlib.nl/taverne-license
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at:
repository@maastrichtuniversity.nl
providing details and we will investigate your claim.
Download date: 04 Dec. 2019
 
Innovation in 
Manufacturing,  
From Product Variety and Labor 
Productivity Growth to Economic 
Development in Chile 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Copyright R Lauterbach, Maastricht 2012 
ISBN 978 94 6159 184 5 
Published by Universitaire Pers Maastricht 
Printed in The Netherlands by Datawyse Maastricht  
 
 
Innovation in Manufacturing 
From Product Variety and Labor Productivity 
Growth to Economic Development in Chile 
 
 
 
DISSERTATION 
 
to obtain the degree of doctor at Maastricht University, 
on the authority of the Rector Magnificus Prof. Dr. L.L.G. Soete, 
in accordance with the decision of the Board of Deans, 
to be defended in public on Tuesday December 4th 2012 at 10:00 hours 
 
 
 
by 
 
Rodolfo Lauterbach 
  
UNIVERSITAIRE
PERS MAASTRICHT
P
M
 
 
Supervisor: 
Prof. Dr. Jacques Mairesse 
Prof. Dr. Bronwyn Hall 
 
Assesment Committee: 
Prof. Dr. Pierre Mohnen (chair) 
Prof. Dr. Jose Miguel Benavente (Universidad Adolfo Ibañez) 
Prof. Dr. Can Huang 
 
 
v 
Acknowledgements 
 
This project would not have been feasible without the participation of all the 
people who made me believe it possible. On the way to my doctorate studies, 
there were many people who challenged, encouraged and inspired me. I would not 
have achieved my PhD in Economics without the love and support of my family. 
The perseverance of my mother and the hard working example of my father made 
me become an economist on the first place. My wife has provided me with the 
inspiration to pursue what I want in my life and my son has taught me about the 
things that truly matter.  
The two people who truly made my graduation possible were Bronwyn Hall 
and Jacques Mairesse. To them my gratitude is endless. I owe them for their 
wisdom and their patience but also for challenging me to use my best qualities and 
struggle against my weaknesses during these four years of research. They 
supported me in every moment and not only shared the joy of my small 
achievements but also recognized my mistakes with honesty.  
My experience as a researcher would not have been the same without the 
passion for empirical economics that I learned at the Economics and Business 
Faculty of the University of Chile. I had the fortune to be a student of Jose Miguel 
Benavente in a research environment that opened my mind in a way I did not 
expect. I was invited to collaborate in the research of Manuel Agosin and Ricardo 
Paredes, to both of whom I am grateful for teaching me discipline and research 
methods. My research at Intelis Centre for Innovation and Entrepreneurial studies 
greatly benefited from the interaction with Jocelyn Olivari, Cintia Külzer, Pablo 
Hernandez, Jose Zubizarreta, Gustavo Crespi, Jose Luis Contreras, Jose Luis 
Lima, Claudio Bravo, Roberto Alvarez, Andres Zahler, Oscar Landerreche and 
Jorge Katz.  
Since my arrival to Maastricht, I have enjoyed unprecedented hospitality from 
its inhabitants. Having the fortune of coexisting with people from the community 
of the United Nations has made my days in Maastricht an experience that I will 
never forget. My first year in The Netherlands was spent on the company of Iman 
Rajabzadeh and Ying Zhang, with whom I shared experiences that expanded the 
reach of my understanding. In the surroundings of my classmates from the United 
Nations University Maastricht Economic and Social Research Center on 
Innovation and Technology (UNU-MERIT) I learned some of the most 
important aspects of teamwork and friendship. Many thanks to my co-workers 
and friends Lilia Stubrin, Asel Doranova, Flavia Carvalho, Nico Rasters, Luciana 
Marins, Ezequiel Tacsir, Daniel Vertesy, Shuan SadreGhazi, Conrad Schmidt-
Bens, Muhammad Shafique, Tina Saebi, Lina Sonne, Semih Akçomak, Nora 
Engel, Luciana Cingolani, Cheng Ong, Salih Cevikarslan, Jun Hou, Alexis 
Habiyaremye, Ibrahim Bolat, Anant Kamath, Baseer A. Qazi, Bilal Mirza, Zakaria 
vi 
Babutsidze, Sergey Filippov, Kirsten Wiebe, and Than Le Phuoc. At the United 
Nations University (UNU), they taught me how to be a PhD researcher. 
While conducting the data analysis that was part of this research, I had the 
chance to work with Sabien Dobbelaere, who shared a tremendous amount of 
knowledge with me. Thanks to her for showing me the way toward truly careful 
data analysis. During my PhD, I had the priviledge of learning economics and 
innovation policy from various professors. Pierre Mohnen, Bart Verspagen, Luc 
Soete, Robin Cowan, Adam Szirmai, Théophile Azomahou, and Anthony Arundel 
are some of the best team leaders I have ever seen. They have helped develop the 
real knowledge that makes possible the mission of the UNU. 
During the past four years, the UNU-MERIT community has been 
enlightened by the minds of researchers including Michiko Iizuka, Jojo Jacob, 
Ionara Costa, Can Huang, Mulu Gebreeyesus, Micheline Goedhuys, Maha 
Ahmed, Rossitza Rousseva, and many others who contributed their research to 
the common prosperity goals of the United Nations. I am indebted to Samyukta 
Bhupatiraju, François Lafond, Alejandro Lavopa, Hibret Maemir, Daniel Opolot, 
Tatevik Poghosyan, Giorgio Triulzi, Jennifer Taborda, Andrea Medina, Charlotte 
Guillard, Ilire Agimi, Simone Sasso, Craig Loschmann, Andrea Franco-Correa, 
Francesca Guadagno, and many others who have more recently joined the PhD 
program at the Economics and Policy Studies of Technical Change. They fill our 
workspace and environment with challenging ideas and sincere emotions. Without 
them, I would not believe that it is possible to make this planet a better place to 
share with everyone. 
The joint PhD program from Maastricht University and UNU-MERIT would 
not be the same in the absence of Eveline in de Braek, who was always there to 
care for the problems of each student, Eric Engelen, who organized and cared for 
our building and workspace, Herman Pijpers and Mourik Jan Heupink, who built 
and sustained our informatics system, and Ad Notten, who maintains and updates 
an unprecedentedly specialized library on Innovation and Technical Change.  
During these four years of research, I have traveled to Paris on repeated 
occasions as a visiting researcher to Centre de Recherche en Èconomie et 
Statistique (CREST) that is part of the French National Statistical and Economic 
Studies Office (INSEE). I am grateful to Nadine Guedj, Paul-antoine Chevalier, 
Maxime To, Yilin Wu, Caroline Paunov, and Eduardo Rodriguez, who welcomed 
me to France and shared their moments with me. Many thanks also to Anja 
Schmiele, Diego Ubfal, Alessandro Maffioli, Lucas Navarro, Jaan Masso, and 
many others who participated in the MEIDE conferences in Maastricht, Rio do 
Janeiro, and Tartu. 
Part of my research was also done at the University of California at Berkeley 
(UCB), where I greatly benefited from knowledge spillovers from many people. 
Many thanks to Chantal Toledo, Gianmarco León, Jessica Rider, Anna Spurlock, 
Alex Solís, Charles Séguin, Di Zeng, and Catie Almirall from the Agricultural and 
Resource Economics (ARE) Department for making me feel like one more of 
vii 
your outstanding PhD cohort. Thanks to Francois Gerard, Mauricio Larrain, Willa 
Friedman, Issi Romen, Omar Nayeem, Josh Hausman, James Zuberi, Miguel 
Almunia, Carlos Noton, Rosario Macera, and Gabriel Chodorow-Reich from the 
Economics Department of UCB for sharing their knowledge, their workspace, 
and their friendship with me.  
My PhD research was funded by the United Nations and my research-related 
travel was supported by the European Commission Research and Innovation 7th 
Framework Program on Science and Technology. Intelis Centre at the 
Department of Economics of the University of Chile has given me access to 
valuable data to carry out this research. The surveys that have been used for most 
of this study have been carried out by the Chilean statistical office, Instituto 
Nacional de Estadisticas (INE). 
  
viii 
 Table of Contents 
Introduction and Motivation .............................................................................. 1 
Chapter 1 Democratic Institutions, Industrial Development, and 
Economic Growth in Chile 5 
1.1 Introduction ........................................................................................... 6 
1.2 Towards the Establishment of a Dependable Democracy .............. 7 
1.3 Institutions, Industrial Development, and Growth in Chile ......... 10 
1.3.1 Economic Growth in the Past Three Decades 10 
1.3.2 Recent Economic Development Experience in Chile 14 
1.3.3 Education Effort and Education Quality 19 
1.3.4 R&D and the National Innovation System 20 
1.3.5 Dutch Disease, the Role of Copper and Exports on Chilean 
Development 25 
1.3.6 Productivity, Industrial Policy, Economic Sectors and 
Convergence 30 
1.4 Policy Recommendations ................................................................... 36 
1.4.1 Chilean Strengths that have Supported Growth and 
Development 36 
1.4.2 Weaknesses and Challenges for Future Development 38 
1.4.3 Recommendations for Modern Economic Growth in Chile 39 
1.5 Concluding Remarks ........................................................................... 42 
References ........................................................................................................... 44 
Chapter 2 Cooperation on Innovative Investments: The Role of 
Information Flows 49 
2.1 Introduction ......................................................................................... 50 
2.2 Previous Literature on R&D Cooperation Determinants .............. 51 
2.3 Knowledge Spillovers Econometric Model ..................................... 53 
2.4 Chilean Fourth Innovation Survey Data .......................................... 56 
2.5 Estimation Results ............................................................................... 60 
2.5.1 Preliminary Probit Regressions 60 
2.5.2 Two-Step Endogeneity Test Results 62 
2.5.1 CML with Instrumental Variables Results 62 
2.6 Concluding Remarks ........................................................................... 65 
References ........................................................................................................... 67 
Chapter 3 Product Innovation, Price Growth, and Labor Productivity 69 
3.1 Introduction ......................................................................................... 70 
3.2 Previous Literature on Production Function Estimation .............. 71 
3.3 Productivity and Innovation Empirical Strategy ............................. 75 
3.4 Chilean Manufacturing Industry Data .............................................. 78 
3.4.1 A Measure of Product Innovation 78 
3.4.2 Correlation between the Main Product Innovation Indicators 85 
 ix 
3.4.3 Correlation between New Price Growth and Innovation 
Indicators 86 
3.4.4 Basic Descriptive Statistics 88 
3.5 Estimation Results ............................................................................... 91 
3.5.1 OLS Preliminary Estimates 91 
3.5.1 Instrumental Variable Estimates 95 
3.5.2 Products Added or Dropped and the Proportion of 
Innovative Sales 98 
3.6 Concluding Remarks ......................................................................... 108 
References ......................................................................................................... 110 
Chapter 4 Markup and Rent Sharing in Manufacturing: New Evidence 
from Chilean Firms 113 
4.1 Introduction ....................................................................................... 114 
4.2 Previous Literature ............................................................................ 115 
4.2.1 The Empirical Study of Market Power 115 
4.2.2 Market Power and Rent Distribution 116 
4.2.3 Mark-up and Rent sharing in the Manufacturing Industry 117 
4.2.4 Managerial Efforts, Innovation, and Market Power 119 
4.3 Markup and Rent Sharing Econometric Model ............................ 120 
4.3.1 Markup of Prices over Marginal Costs 120 
4.3.2 Labor Force Market Power 122 
4.4 Chilean Manufacturing Industry Data ............................................ 124 
4.5 Estimation Strategy ........................................................................... 131 
4.6 Estimation Results ............................................................................. 132 
4.6.1 Manufacturing Level Results 132 
4.6.2 Industry Level Analysis 137 
4.7 Concluding Remarks ......................................................................... 150 
References ......................................................................................................... 152 
Final Conclusion .............................................................................................. 157 
Appendix 1 Statistics of Growth and Development in Chile .................... 161 
Appendix 2 R&D Cooperation Determinants Model Variable 
Definitions ........................................................................................................ 169 
Appendix 3 Chilean Survey Data on Manufacturing and Innovation ...... 171 
A3.1 Introduction to the Data 171 
A3.2 Panel Data from Different Surveys 172 
A3.3 Creation of a Firm-Level Panel Database 174 
A3.4 Measurement of Book Value of Capital 175 
A3.5 Generating Production Function Variables 175 
A3.6 Basic Data Cleaning 176 
A3.7 Summary of Main Variables and Production Variables 
Definitions 176 
A3.8 Preliminary Panel Data Production Function Regression 179 
x 
Appendix 4 Firm-Level Price Growth .......................................................... 181 
A4.1 Constructing Firm-level Price Growth Rates 181 
A4.2 Computation of the Industry-level Price Index 184 
A4.3 Correlation between Firm and Industry-level Price Changes 186 
A4.4 Deflated Output and Input Variables at Firm and Industry-
level 187 
A4.5 Using Industry-level and Firm-level Output Deflators 187 
A4.6 Input Deflators 190 
Appendix 5 Computation of Product Innovation Variables ..................... 193 
Appendix 6 Innovation and Productivity with Constant Returns ............ 196 
Curriculum Vitae .............................................................................................. 203 
UNU-MERIT Dissertation Series ................................................................. 205 
 
  
xi 
  List of Figures 
 
Figure 1.1 Yearly Total GDP and GDP growth in Chile (1980-2010) .................... 13 
Figure 1.2 Average Per Capita Income and GINI Index in Chile (1980-2010)...... 15 
Figure 1.3 Interest Rate, Inflation Rate and Unemployment Rate in Chile (1980-
2010) ................................................................................................................................. 16 
Figure 1.4 Chilean Consolidated Public Debt (1990-2008) ....................................... 17 
Figure 1.5 Labor market Development Indicators in Chile (1980-2010) ................ 18 
Figure 1.6 Development Indicators in Chile (1980-2010) ......................................... 19 
Figure 1.7 Education Expenditure in Chile (1990-2008) ........................................... 20 
Figure 1.8 Manufactured Exports, Copper Exports and GDP in Chile (1980-2010)
 ........................................................................................................................................... 27 
Figure 3.1 Histogram of Number of Product Added ................................................ 83 
Figure 3.2 Histogram of Number of Products Dropped .......................................... 83 
Figure 3.3 Histogram of Added Products Share on Sales ......................................... 84 
Figure 3.4 Histogram of Dropped Products Share on Sales over 2 years. .............. 85 
Figure 3.5 Correlation of New Price and Innovation Variables with 4th Innovation 
Survey (IS) Product and Process Innovation .............................................................. 89 
Figure A4.1 Firm-level Deflated Output and INE ISIC Rev.2 3-digit Deflated 
Output ........................................................................................................................... 190 
  
xii 
   List of Tables 
 
Table 1.1 EIU Democracy Index 2010 .......................................................................... 9 
Table 1.10 Sector Shares on Chilean Exports 1996-2007 ......................................... 29 
Table 1.11 Evolution of Aggregate TFP Growth in Chile 1981-2003..................... 31 
Table 1.12 TFP Growth in Chilean Economic Sectors 1996-2001.......................... 31 
Table 1.13 Productive Structures of Chilean Regions in 2000 .................................. 34 
Table 1.14 Per capita GDP PPP across Regions of Chile (constant 2005 US$) .... 35 
Table 1.15 Sector Shares in Value Added, the Chilean Productive Structure 2003-
2007 ................................................................................................................................... 35 
Table 1.2 GDP and GDP per capita in Chile 1974-2011 .......................................... 12 
Table 1.3 Decade Average GDP per capita Growth of Selected Country Groups 
1981-2009 ......................................................................................................................... 14 
Table 1.4 Standard Deviation of GDP per capita Growth of Selected Countries 
1981-2009 ......................................................................................................................... 14 
Table 1.5 Patents Filed under the Patent Co-operation Treaty (PCT) 2003-2008 . 22 
Table 1.6 R&D Spending across Selected Countries (Percentage of Total GDP) . 23 
Table 1.7 Productive Composition of Chile 1980-2007 ............................................ 24 
Table 1.8 Evolution from 2005 to 2007 of Technological Innovation by 
Economic Sector ............................................................................................................. 25 
Table 1.8 Participation of Metallic Mining Sector in Total Exports (% of year 
value) ................................................................................................................................. 26 
Table 1.9 Exports and Imports of Goods and Services, Chile 1970-2009 .............. 28 
Table 2.1 Fourth Chilean Innovation Survey Basic Sample Statistics...................... 57 
Table 2.2 Descriptive Statistics ...................................................................................... 57 
Table 2.3 Correlation Matrix of Cooperation with Different Partners .................... 59 
Table 2.4 Correlation Matrix of the Dependent Variable with the Main 
Explanatory Variables ..................................................................................................... 59 
Table 2.5 Results of Probit Preliminary Regressions ................................................. 61 
Table 2.6 Testing for Endogeneity, Results of 2SCML ............................................. 63 
Table 2.7 Results of CML with Instrumental Variables ............................................. 64 
Table 3.1 Number of Products Added and Dropped over a Single-year Period .. 79, 
80 
Table 3.10 IV regressions with Constant Returns to Scale ....................................... 97 
Table 3.11 OLS regressions with Products Added and Products Dropped ........... 99 
Table 3.12 OLS regressions with Number of Products Added ............................. 101 
Table 3.13 OLS regressions with Number of Products Dropped ........................ 102 
Table 3.14 OLS regressions with Products Added and Dropped Sales Proportions
 ........................................................................................................................................ 103 
Table 3.15 OLS regressions, with Products Added Sales Proportion .................. 104 
Table 3.16 OLS regressions with Products Dropped Sales Proportion ............... 105 
Table 3.17 OLS regressions with Four Product Innovation Dummies ................ 107 
Table 3.2 Number of Products Added and Dropped over a Two-year Period ...... 82 
Table 3.3 Correlation Matrix of Product Innovation Variables ................................ 86 
Table 3.4 Correlations between Innovation Survey Product and Process 
Innovation, Product Innovation Indicators and Firm-level price growth .............. 87 
Table 3.5 Descriptive Statistics of Main Variables ..................................................... 90 
xiii 
Table 3.6 Correlation Matrix of Main Variables in First Differences ...................... 90 
Table 3.7 OLS Production Function regressions with Non-Constant Returns to 
Scale .................................................................................................................................. 93 
Table 3.8 OLS Production Function regressions assuming Constant Returns to 
Scale .................................................................................................................................. 94 
Table 3.9 IV regressions with Non-Constant Returns to Scale ................................ 96 
Table 4.1 Number of Observations by Industrial Sector ....................................... 124 
Table 4.10 Basic Metal, Fabricated Metal Products, Machinery and Equipment 
Industries ....................................................................................................................... 130 
Table 4.11 All Manufacturing Industries Estimates with Constant Returns to Scale
 ........................................................................................................................................ 134 
Table 4.12 All Manufacturing Industries Estimates with Non-Constant Returns to 
Scale ............................................................................................................................... 136 
Table 4.13 Manufacture of Food, Beverages and Tobacco Industries Estimates 138 
Table 4.14 Textile, Wearing Apparel and Leather Industries Estimates .............. 140 
Table 4.15 Wood, Wood Products and Furniture Industries Estimates .............. 141 
Table 4.16 Paper and Paper Products, Printing and Publishing Industries 
Estimates ....................................................................................................................... 143 
Table 4.17 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical, petroleum, coal, rubber and 
plastic products ............................................................................................................. 144 
Table 4.18 Non-metallic Mineral Products and Other Manufacturing Industries 
Estimates ....................................................................................................................... 145 
Table 4.19 Basic Metal, Fabricated Metal Products, Machinery and Equipment 
Industries Estimates ..................................................................................................... 146 
Table 4.2 Unbalanced Panel Summary ...................................................................... 125 
Table 4.20 Summary of Seven Industrial Sectors OLS Estimates in Levels ........ 148 
Table 4.21 Summary of Seven Industrial Sectors GMM SYS Estimates ............. 149 
Table 4.3 All Manufacturing Industries Descriptive Statistics ............................... 125 
Table 4.4 Manufacture of Food, Beverages and Tobacco Industries ................... 126 
Table 4.5 Textile, Wearing Apparel and Leather Industries Descriptive Statistics
 ........................................................................................................................................ 127 
Table 4.6 Manufacture of Wood and Wood Products and Furniture Industries 
Descriptive Statistics .................................................................................................... 128 
Table 4.7 Manufacture of Paper and Paper Products, Printing and Publishing 
Industries ....................................................................................................................... 128 
Table 4.8 Chemicals and Chemical Petroleum, Coal, Rubber and Plastic Products 
Industries ....................................................................................................................... 129 
Table 4.9 Non-metallic Mineral Products and Other Manufacturing Industries 130 
Table A1.1 Yearly total GDP and GDP growth in Chile 1960-2009 ................... 161 
Table A1.2 Average Per capita Income and GINI Index in Chile 1980-2009 .... 162 
Table A1.3 Interest Rate, Inflation Rate and Unemployment rate in Chile (1980-
2009) .............................................................................................................................. 163 
Table A1.4 Chilean Consolidated Public Debt (1990-2008) .................................. 164 
Table A1.5 Labor Market Development Indicators in Chile (1980-2009) ........... 165 
Table A1.6 Development Indicators in Chile 1980-2009 ....................................... 166 
Table A1.7 Education Expenditure in Chile 1990-2008 (% of current GDP) .... 167 
xiv 
Table A1.8 Manufacture Exports, Copper Exports and GDP in Chile (1980-2009)
 ........................................................................................................................................ 168 
Table A3.1 Number of Observations in Firm-level and Product-firm level Data
 ........................................................................................................................................ 174 
Table A3.2 Average Industry-level Yearly Growth of Capital Book Value ......... 175 
Table A3.3 Average Industry-level Yearly Capital Investment .............................. 175 
Table A3.4 Descriptive Statistics of Basic Production Variables .......................... 177 
Table A3.5 Descriptive Statistics of Basic Production Variables Expressed in 
Ratios ............................................................................................................................. 178 
Table A3.6 Preliminar Productivity Regressions using Nominal Sales and Inputs
 ........................................................................................................................................ 180 
Table A4.1 Descriptive Statistics of Product-level data Coverage over Total Sales
 ........................................................................................................................................ 182 
Table A4.2 Descriptive Statistics of Firm-level Price Growth Rates .................... 184 
Table A4.3 Industry-level (ISIC Rev. 2) Price Growth Rates at 2, 3 and 4-digit 
level ................................................................................................................................ 185 
Table A4.4 Correlation of Firm-level Price Growth Rates and Industry-level 
Inflation Rates .............................................................................................................. 186 
Table A4.5 Comparison between Firm-level Deflated Output ............................. 188 
Table A4.6 Comparison between 2, 3 and 4-digit Industry-level Deflated Output
 ........................................................................................................................................ 189 
Table A4.7 Estimated Price Growth for Individual Inputs ................................... 191 
Table A4.8 Descriptive Statistics of Deflated Input Variables .............................. 192 
Table A5.1 Descriptive Statistics of Product Innovation Indicators .................... 194 
Table A6.1 Ordinary Least Square estimation with Number of Products Added 
and Dropped and constant returns to scale.............................................................. 196 
Table A6.2 Instrumental Variable estimation with Number of Products Added 
and Dropped and constant returns to scale.............................................................. 197 
Table A6.3 Ordinary Least Square estimation with Number of Products Added 
and constant returns to scale ...................................................................................... 198 
Table A6.4 Instrumental Variable estimation with Number of Products Added 
and constant returns to scale ...................................................................................... 199 
Table A6.5 Ordinary Least Square estimation with Number of Products Dropped 
and constant returns to scale ...................................................................................... 200 
Table A6.6 Instrumental Variable estimation with Number of Products Dropped 
and constant returns to scale ...................................................................................... 201 
 
 
1 
I N T R O D U C T I O N  A N D  M O T I V A T I O N  
 
 
As a result of the current economic situation in Chile where it seems that a full 
employment phenomenon is taking place, economists have awakened their interest in 
productivity. This work starts from the basis that manufacturing is one of the main 
engines for exports and thus economic growth. Therefore the main target of this book is 
to study productivity dynamics in the manufacturing sector giving specific attention to 
the innovative process, the effects of the introduction of new products and the labor and 
final product market outcomes and their relation with labor productivity growth. 
The manufacturing industry is the manifestation of the level of technology and 
knowledge of a country. Manufacturing may be defined as the capacity to change 
materials into goods that are later transformed into consumption and ultimately into 
welfare. Improving market efficiency and increasing productivity in the manufacturing 
industry is therefore an objective of the social planner in her search for economic growth 
and development. The case of Chilean industry is of specific interest because it is a 
relatively successful experience, in which natural resources such as copper have been 
extracted, promoting economic growth and positive current account balances. A share of 
these revenues is being invested in knowledge, infrastructure, and financial assets. This 
work is also based on the idea that growth in the long term cannot be based on the 
extraction of exhaustible natural resources but requires a more diversified industrial 
production.  
Measuring productivity dynamics in the manufacturing industry is important because 
productivity reflects the effects of all the forces of economic life: technical progress, 
accumulation of productive factors, managerial inputs and the institutional trend of the 
economy. Even though it represents a relatively small proportion of the economy, the 
manufacturing sector provides basic goods such as elaborated materials, electronics, 
foods, and medicines that are indispensable for the generation of value added and growth 
in all sectors of the economy. In the context of goods that are essential for life, such as 
food, economists have been interested for decades in understanding productivity growth 
and how it is affected by the uses of inputs and knowledge, as well as by market 
conditions. 
Understanding production growth and market outcomes in the manufacturing sector 
is relevant also because industrial production has embedded in humans the knowledge 
and the ability to build and transform materials. From the construction of buildings to 
small utensils and electronic equipment, a great deal of cultural knowledge and creativity 
has been transmitted through the production of manufactures.   
Introduction and motivation 
Different approaches have been used since the 1970s to measure the role of 
innovation, own R&D, and R&D spillovers as sources of knowledge affecting 
productivity at the firm-level. When the level of knowledge available in an economy 
increases, the industry improves its productivity. Achieving high productivity should also 
be understood from a long-term perspective, since what we ultimately care about is 
sustainable economic growth. Increasing knowledge may also expand the variety of 
products in the manufacturing industry. The case of Chile is highly interesting from the 
long-term perspective because its industry is based on the extraction of exhaustible 
natural resources. When natural resources are exhausted, a diversified manufacturing 
industry may lead to further economic success if the necessary investment in diversified 
knowledge and infrastructure has been previously made.  
The Chilean economy has recently been distinguished as a relatively successful case 
of rapid growth. The main factors contributing to this success have been its democratic 
institutions, foreign trade based on copper exports, and macroeconomic stability. The 
first chapter of this work analyzes the economic growth and development that has taken 
place in Chile during the past three decades. The Chilean economy is studied in light of 
data collected by several national and international organizations, including the Chilean 
Statistical Office (INE), the Central Bank of Chile, the World Bank, and the OECD. An 
evaluation and international comparison of the recent success of Chilean democracy is 
made. This work proposes that international trade based on manufacture and export 
diversification, increasing human capital through public investment in education, and 
innovative activities, which imply R&D investment, are some of the aspects that can 
contribute to sustainable economic growth for the coming decades. 
The second chapter studies the determinants of R&D cooperation among innovative 
firms using data from the th4  version of the Chilean Innovation Survey, which covered 
the years 2003 and 2004. The empirical model applied in this work defines the probability 
of R&D cooperation for the innovating firms as a function of the technology of 
information flows. The findings show that firms that have declared in surveys that they 
benefit from incoming information spillovers, those that have declared that they benefit 
from cost-risk sharing, and those that make use of legal protection of their knowledge are 
more likely to commit to R&D agreements with other firms, such as consultants, 
universities, competitors, and customers. Firm size also affects positively and significantly 
the probability of cooperating among Chilean firms. Among the factors that are 
associated with a smaller probability of engaging in R&D agreements are lack of 
information and firms’ perception of the ease with which their own inventions could be 
imitated by others. Information flows seem to have a larger impact on cooperation with 
universities and consulting agents. After finding that incoming spillovers are endogenous, 
the empirical estimations used the industry-level data about incoming spillovers and basic 
nature of R&D as instrumental variables in the context of a conditional maximum 
likelihood estimation method. 
The third chapter of this thesis develops a set of new measures for firm-level 
product innovation based on product-firm-level information. It then evaluates the impact 
of innovation on manufacturing productivity at the firm level. Because the absence of 
2
Introduction and motivation 
3 
individual firm data on price growth was one of the main restrictions on the empirical 
study of production functions in previous work, this work also takes advantage of price 
information at the level of products within firms. The problem of absent price data 
occurs when observed nominal output growth cannot be separated into unobserved real 
production growth and price changes. This chapter develops a new strategy to estimate 
annual firm-level price growth and product innovation indicators. It uses a panel 
containing detailed firm-level and product-firm level information provided by the Chilean 
Statistical Office (INE) for the period 1996-2003.  It compares different ways in which 
firm-level price data may be incorporated into the econometrics of production.  The 
findings show that incorporating new products is associated with productivity growth 
while dropping products is related to decreases in productivity, probably due to the 
rigidity of the labor market. It also finds that estimating a production function using 
nominal or real output makes very little difference to the estimated input and scale 
elasticities. 
This fourth and last chapter estimates price-cost markups and workers’ bargaining 
power using input elasticities and shares of input cost over sales. Real output and 
productivity growth were calculated using firm-level price information, thanks to new 
product-firm level data from the Chilean manufacturing industry between 1996 and 2003. 
The Chilean manufacturing industry was divided and compared across seven sectors. The 
Paper, Printing, and Publishing industry was found to have the lowest mark-ups, 
measured by the estimations in levels, followed by the Textile industry. The Food and 
Beverages industry appears to have the highest average mark-up of price over marginal 
cost and also the highest extent of rent sharing between workers and firm owners. The 
Textile industry was found to be the sector where workers get the smallest share of rents. 
In general, firm rents are distributed between capital owners and employees, allowing for 
different labor market outcomes across sectors of the manufacturing industry.  This 
analysis also found that deflating output at the firm level or at the industry level does not 
change the estimated parameters significantly, even though some differences may be 
found in the estimated standard deviations.  
In summary, using the experience of the Chilean economy and its manufacturing 
industry, this work considers the manufacturing industry as the main source of providing 
an economy with physical goods and capacity to transform materials into consumption 
and welfare. It proposes that diversification of manufactures and the development of 
knowledge-based industries constitute a sustainable path toward economic development 
and growth. One of the main objectives of this study is to estimate the manufacturing 
production function using real output instead of nominal or industry-level deflated 
output as proxies. Using estimated production function input elasticities, this study 
measures average manufacturing mark-ups of output price over marginal cost and rent 
sharing between workers and firm owners. Additionally, the estimation of R&D 
cooperation determinants allows disentangling part of the incentive mechanisms that 
operate in the process of developing knowledge.  
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Abstract 
 This chapter studies the main forces that have driven economic growth and 
development in Chile since in the past three decades. The recent experience and the 
present of the Chilean economy are reviewed using several datasets that facilitate 
comparison to other countries around the world. The effects of reestablishing democracy 
in 1990 are evaluated. In the economics literature during the past decades, Chile has been 
characterized as an open and growing country. However, determining how it can 
continue on the same path requires study and discussion. Democratic institutions, foreign 
trade, and macroeconomic stability counted among the main advantages that helped to 
achieve growth in previous decades. Diversification of manufactures and exports, 
increasing human capital, innovative activities (implying R&D investment) and domestic 
reinvestment of mining industry revenues are among the biggest challenges for the 
following decades.  
Chapter 1 
1.1 Introduction 
This work analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of the economic growth and 
development process of Chile. The main objective is to evaluate the opportunities and 
threats that the economy faces for the coming decades, giving special attention to the 
importance of knowledge creation and to industry composition in domestic production. 
A distinction is made between the forces that drove past growth and the forces that may 
lead growth in the future. This work evaluates the Chilean economy as a whole, with 
special attention to macroeconomic characteristics that can be compared throughout the 
Latin American region and with other countries around the world. Two main questions 
are discussed. The first of them is what are the forces that have determined the recent 
high economic growth and strong development performance in Chile? The second 
question is what are the forces on which we should now rely on for continuing this 
process in the future? 
From the starting point of the Chilean economy during the past three decades, we 
propose a future development strategy based on an open economy that can innovate to 
take advantage of its strengths and diversify its risks. We base these proposals on the 
ideas of several experts who have previously published work analyzing Chilean 
macroeconomics, social development, institutions, innovation, educational systems, and 
export diversification. 
International data comparisons may allow a comparative analysis of a country in 
terms of institutional value, innovation capacity, economic development, and GDP 
growth. Nevertheless it may be a difficult or impossible task to evaluate objectively the 
level of well-being of an entire society. This paper uses local data from the Central Bank 
of Chile and the National Institute of Statistics as well as data collected by international 
organizations like the World Bank to compare measures of well-being and GDP growth, 
as well as innovation efforts, financial stability and development measures. With this 
material, and in the light of previous literature, the Chilean case is viewed in perspective 
and compared with other countries around the world. 
Institutions play a big role in growth and development. The extent to which a 
democratic system is in place determines how much the population’s needs are addressed 
in public policy. Even though Chile has been evaluated positively in terms of its 
democratic institutions, it is important to give ongoing attention to this essential aspect of 
the economy. 
Exports have been one of the main engines of growth in Chile. However, Chile has 
focused on the production of copper, which represents more than 50% of exports, while 
knowledge-intensive goods do not represent a significant share of Chilean exports. The 
extent to which the growing income from copper exports has affected the exchange rate 
and the fact that the copper industry has absorbed a huge amount of human capital 
complicate the emergence and growth of other exporting industries. This situation has 
been compared to the Dutch Disease phenomena that occurred in the sixties’ after the 
discovery of huge natural gas reserves in the Northern Seas of Holland. If economic 
stability is desirable for growth, it is important to analyze the sector composition of the 
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Chilean manufacturing industry and the extent to which Chilean export markets may be 
vulnerable to foreign and local shocks. For a small and open economy that is based on 
the extraction of natural resources developing a comparative advantage in manufacturing 
can constitute a powerful and sustained engine of growth for the future. Appropriate 
diversification of product and export markets may lead to sustained economic growth if a 
dynamic industrial sector can compete in foreign markets. Thus, sector composition of 
industry must be carefully studied by the social planner in order to promote private 
development.  
The Chilean government has recently exerted major effort to promote local 
innovation through a series of programs offering research grants, R&D subsidies, and 
seed capital to attract entrepreneurs. Nevertheless, a comprehensive National Innovation 
System for Market Competition was not in place until 2006. Previous literature has 
analyzed the impact of some of these programs on local research efforts in Latin America 
and around the world.1 Innovation expenditures in Chile are the lowest of the OECD. 
Innovation is an essential factor in economic development, especially for a country that is 
trying to diversify its export markets. Even though total educational spending has greatly 
increased in the past two decades, the quality of education varies a good deal across 
income levels. A high-quality educational system is one of the main challenges for the 
near future and possibly the main factor that will contribute to a more equal income 
distribution. 
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 discuses the fact that Chile 
reformulated its democracy in 1989 and compares the Chilean case to other countries 
around the world. Section 3 analyzes the economic performance of Chile in the past 
three decades, including development issues, the national innovation system, educational 
efforts, and the sector composition of manufactures and exports. Section 4 discusses 
some of the strengths and weaknesses of Chile’s recent economic performance. Section 5 
mentions policy recommendations based on previous literature and international 
organizations’ reports. Section 6 concludes and discusses possible ideas for further 
research on development and growth in the Latin American context. 
1.2 Towards the Establishment of a Dependable Democracy 
This section analyzes the evolution of Chilean democracy over the past few decades. 
It follows relevant variables over time and compares those variables with other countries. 
A democratic state has a government that represents the will of all its citizens instead of 
using coercion to impose the visions of a few. The work by the Economist Intelligence 
Unit2 (EIU) in 2010 measured the extent to which democratic principles are applied at 
the level of countries. But we must be aware that we cannot observe in an objective way 
                                              
1 See, for example, Benavente, Crespi, and Maffioli (2007) or Lach (2001). 
2 The Economist Intelligence Unit is an independent business within The Economist Group where The Economist 
2 The Economist Intelligence Unit is an independent business within The Economist Group where The Economist 
Magazine is also included. 
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some of the most important aspects of democracy, such as the extent to which decisions 
are made in the best interests of the represented population or whether basic human 
rights are respected. 
After 17 years of a military government, presidential elections were held in Chile in 
1989. In 1990, the military gave up power in a peaceful process, with no further political 
violence. From that time, the country has enjoyed a stable and widespread state of peace. 
Basic human rights have been respected by the state and a number of legal proceedings 
were conducted to clarify and to punish some of the previous government’s crimes, 
although most of them were forgiven. Since democracy was reestablished, no person has 
been executed, and the death penalty was legally abolished during the nineties. Violence 
and crime persist, as in most other countries, and vary across regions, generating fears 
that affect people in different ways.3 Nevertheless, it is clear that in the past two decades 
the Chilean population has lived relatively free of concerns about terrorism and war. 
Chile has chosen to step aside from global violence and to focus its public policy on 
growth, development, and income distribution. 
Chile has not engaged in foreign armed conflict in many decades. Nevertheless, a 
high investment in trained military institutions and defensive equipment has been made 
in the past decades due to a regulation imposed by the military government that forces a 
share of copper revenues to be allocated to armed forces investment. However, there is 
also very low concern that armed conflict will reach the region, because the country 
enjoys relatively good relations with its neighbor countries. 
Table 1.1 shows the results of the EIU index that ranks countries in terms of the 
success of their democracies. Chile has been evaluated on this international democracy 
index and was ranked 34th on a group of 167 countries. The study was conducted by the 
EIU in 2010. Two versions of the same study were done in 2006 and 2008, showing 
similar results. All three reports from the Economist Intelligence Unit are divided into 
five categories for analysis.  
In general terms, Chile appears to be a relatively successful case, but it was classified 
by the index as a “flawed democracy.” It is outstanding in terms of “electoral process and 
pluralism,” “functioning of government,” and “civil liberties.” In terms of “political 
participation,” the Chilean democracy still has some flaws. Once an adult is registered for 
voting, participation in all elections becomes mandatory; this is not considered valid as a 
high participation rate under the EIU index. As a result, Chile gets a 0 score on this 
important aspect of the index. Because voluntary voting was legislated in 2012, the 
Chilean democracy will probably have a higher score on the next version of the EIU 
Democracy Index. Furthermore, women’s participation in Congress is low and, as a 
result, Chile gets an even poorer score in terms of political participation. Another aspect 
that, according to the EIU, keeps Chile as a flawed rather than a full democracy is its 
“democratic culture.” Public opinion surveys show that a large part of the population 
would prefer a strong government, even if that would mean they would enjoy less 
                                              
3 A program through which crime can be reduced to improve the most important mission of a democratic 
government was evaluated in the paper by Benavente, Contreras, Melo and Montero (2010). 
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freedom. This reflects the controversy and division during the Chilean experience with a 
military government in the seventies and eighties; the conservative political model 
imposed during that era was not democratic but it allowed reasonable prosperity to those 
who did not oppose it. 
Northern European countries (Norway, Iceland, Denmark, and Sweden) appear to 
have the most successful democracies in the world. Some very high scores are also seen 
in other European countries, as well as New Zealand, Australia, Canada, and the US. 
Most of the developed nations but also some developing and fast-growing countries 
appear to be ranked high. 
These international comparisons are not able to consider the fact that some highly 
ranked countries suffer from war and from restriction of civil liberties. These acts may be 
conducted under military secrecy and cannot be considered easily in an international 
index. These countries are defined as democratic according to the information filled on a 
general form by an international news agency. They are also considered developed in 
accordance with a measure of GDP per capita and other straightforward variables, 
regardless of whether basic human rights are respected by the state authority.  
 
Table 1.1 EIU Democracy Index 2010 
Rank Overall Score 
Elections and 
Pluralism 
Functioning 
Government 
Political 
Participation 
Political 
culture 
Civil 
Liberties 
Norway 1 9.8 10 9.64 10 9.38 10 
Iceland 2 9.65 10 9.64 8.89 10 9.71 
Denmark 3 9.52 10 9.64 8.89 9.38 9.71 
Sweden 4 9.5 9.58 9.64 8.89 9.38 10 
New Zealand 5 9.26 10 9.29 8.89 8.13 10 
Australia 6 9.22 10 8.93 7.78 9.38 10 
Finland 7 9.19 10 9.64 7.22 9.38 9.71 
Switzerland 8 9.09 9.58 9.29 7.78 9.38 9.41 
Canada 9 9.08 9.58 9.29 7.78 8.75 10 
Netherlands 10 8.99 9.58 8.93 8.89 8.13 9.41 
Luxembourg 11 8.88 10 9.29 6.67 8.75 9.71 
Ireland 12 8.79 9.58 7.86 7.78 8.75 10 
Austria 13 8.49 9.58 7.86 7.78 8.13 9.12 
Germany 14 8.38 9.58 7.86 7.22 8.13 9.12 
Malta 15 8.28 9.17 8.21 5.56 8.75 9.71 
Czech Republic 16 8.19 9.58 7.14 6.67 8.13 9.41 
US 17 8.18 9.17 7.86 7.22 8.13 8.53 
Spain 18 8.16 9.58 8.21 6.11 7.5 9.41 
UK 19 8.16 9.58 7.86 6.11 8.13 9.12 
South Korea 20 8.11 9.17 7.86 7.22 7.5 8.82 
Uruguay 21 8.1 10 8.57 4.44 7.5 10 
Japan 22 8.08 9.17 8.21 6.11 7.5 9.41 
Belgium 23 8.05 9.58 8.21 5.56 7.5 9.41 
Mauritius 24 8.04 9.17 8.21 5 8.13 9.71 
Costa Rica 24 8.04 9.58 8.21 6.11 6.88 9.41 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit (2010). 
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Table 1.1 (Continued) EIU Democracy Index 2010 
 Rank 
Overall 
Score 
Elections and 
Pluralism 
Functioning 
Government 
Political 
Participation 
Political 
Culture 
Civil 
Liberties 
 Portugal 26 8.02 9.58 7.5 6.11 7.5 9.41 
Cape Verde 27 7.94 9.17 7.86 6.67 6.88 9.12 
Greece 28 7.92 9.58 6.43 6.67 7.5 9.41 
Italy 29 7.83 9.58 6.79 6.11 8.13 8.53 
South Africa 30 7.79 8.75 8.21 7.22 6.25 8.53 
France 31 7.77 9.58 7.14 6.11 7.5 8.53 
Slovenia 32 7.69 9.58 7.14 6.67 6.25 8.82 
Estonia 33 7.68 9.58 7.5 5 7.5 8.82 
Chile 34 7.67 9.58 8.57 3.89 6.88 9.41 
Botswana 35 7.63 9.17 7.14 5.56 6.88 9.41 
Taiwan 36 7.52 9.58 7.14 5.56 5.63 9.71 
Israel 37 7.48 8.75 7.5 8.33 7.5 5.29 
Slovakia 38 7.35 9.58 7.5 5.56 5 9.12 
Cyprus 39 7.29 9.17 6.43 6.11 5.63 9.12 
India 40 7.28 9.58 8.57 4.44 4.38 9.41 
Lithuania 41 7.24 9.58 5.71 5.56 6.25 9.12 
Timor-Leste 42 7.22 8.67 6.79 5.56 6.88 8.24 
Hungary 43 7.21 9.58 6.07 5 6.88 8.53 
Jamaica 43 7.21 9.17 6.79 5 6.25 8.82 
Trinidad and Tobago 45 7.16 9.58 7.14 6.11 5 7.94 
Panama 46 7.15 9.58 6.79 5.56 5 8.82 
Brazil 47 7.12 9.58 7.5 5 4.38 9.12 
Poland 48 7.05 9.58 6.07 6.11 4.38 9.12 
Latvia 48 7.05 9.58 5.36 5.56 5.63 9.12 
Mexico 50 6.93 8.75 7.14 6.11 5 7.65 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit (2010). 
 
Basic respect for human rights through the enforcement of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights should be taken into account when evaluating a country’s 
democracy, but this is not defined as essential to the EIU index. In this regard, since 1990 
Chile has complied with the United Nations foundational act signed in San Francisco in 
1945 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted in 1948.4 
1.3 Institutions, Industrial Development, and Growth in Chile 
1.3.1 Economic Growth in the Past Three Decades 
In Chile, even before the seventies, foreign investors slowly developed a copper 
industry to extract the mining resources that exist underground in the Andes Mountains. 
In the late sixties and early seventies, governments developed widespread agrarian 
reforms, imposed many economic regulations, and fixed commodity prices, generating 
confusion that later led to armed rivalry among social classes.  The copper industry was 
                                              
4 See United Nations (1948) for the full text of this international agreement. 
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confusion that later led to armed rivalry among social classes.  The copper industry was 
nationalized in 1971 with the intention of directing the profits from non-renewable 
mineral resources to the state as their only legal owner. 
After a military coup d’état in 1973, the executive power started undoing the socialist 
reforms in order to reestablish a capitalist economy. The government initiated free-
market economic policies, including deregulation of business and privatization of state-
owned firms. To accomplish these objectives, the government abolished the minimum 
wage, removed artificially lowered commodity prices, eliminated trade union rights, 
privatized the pension system, privatized state-owned industries and banks, and lowered 
taxes on income and profits. The copper industry was also partially privatized in this 
process, resulting in a large flow of foreign investment to the private industry of copper 
extraction. 
Table 1.2 is based on World Development Indicators data published by World Bank 
(2012). The data in Table 1.2 compares the path of total GDP with per capita GDP as 
well as their growth rates in Chile from 1980 to 2011. In late 1981 a foreign crisis 
triggered the massive exit of foreign capitals from the Chilean financial system. An 
internal crisis developed in which domestic product was strongly reduced in 1982 and 
1983. After this crisis the economy entered a path of rapid growth that lasted at least until 
1998, when Asian markets affected Chilean domestic financial system again, this time 
having much milder effects but still resulting in negative GDP growth in 1999. After 
2000 growth rates have been positive and persistent but of smaller magnitude that on the 
previous periods. 
In an attempt to control inflation during the late 1970s, the Chilean government 
took several steps that, by 1982, led the country into the worst financial crisis of the past 
decades. These steps included fixing the exchange rate and removing barriers to capital 
mobility. At the same time, domestic interest rates were liberalized. The result was a huge 
increase in external private debt, which at the moment was much cheaper than domestic 
loans. Nevertheless, the fixed exchange rate became unsustainable when external capital 
was removed from the region, starting in 1981. Banks went into bankruptcy and had to 
be bought by the state, while many firms and individuals were not able to honor their 
loan payments, which increased at the same time that a huge devaluation took place. The 
1981 international financial crisis may have been one of the reasons for the reforms that 
led to the current path of sustained GDP growth in Chile. 
Chile regained its democracy at the end of the 1980s. During the eighties, Chilean 
exports of mining products resulted in healthy current account balances and high levels 
of economic growth. The renewed democracy and the growing exports were 
accompanied by a very responsible monetary policy. The success of lowering inflation 
rates during the nineties is attributable mainly to the independence of the Central Bank 
authority, which was granted by constitutional law in December 1989. The main result of 
this law was a controlled inflation, as well as a reasonable floating band for the exchange 
rate. Another aspect of the new democratic government was a conservative and careful 
fiscal policy oriented to social spending as well as to stability and growth.  
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Table 1.2 GDP and GDP per capita in Chile 1974-2011  
Year GDP (constant 2000 US$) 
GDP growth 
(annual %) 
GDP per 
capita 
(constant 
2000 US$) 
GDP per 
capita 
growth 
(annual %) 
1980 27,950,035,375 8.15 2,500 6.60 
1981 29,274,115,494 4.74 2,580 3.17 
1982 26,252,080,505 -10.32 2,277 -11.71 
1983 25,258,026,490 -3.79 2,156 -5.32 
1984 27,271,935,216 7.97 2,290 6.22 
1985 29,213,486,581 7.12 2,413 5.36 
1986 30,848,376,502 5.60 2,506 3.85 
1987 32,882,584,739 6.59 2,627 4.82 
1988 35,286,696,752 7.31 2,771 5.50 
1989 39,013,086,690 10.56 3,011 8.66 
1990 40,455,626,742 3.70 3,068 1.88 
1991 43,679,935,489 7.97 3,253 6.03 
1992 49,042,927,669 12.28 3,585 10.23 
1993 52,469,207,193 6.99 3,767 5.06 
1994 55,464,212,029 5.71 3,913 3.88 
1995 61,358,713,993 10.63 4,258 8.83 
1996 65,907,537,053 7.41 4,505 5.79 
1997 70,261,111,897 6.61 4,735 5.10 
1998 72,531,163,202 3.23 4,823 1.86 
1999 71,979,306,357 -0.76 4,726 -2.01 
2000 75,210,511,780 4.49 4,878 3.21 
2001 77,750,400,228 3.38 4,983 2.16 
2002 79,448,554,863 2.18 5,033 1.02 
2003 82,560,485,563 3.92 5,173 2.77 
2004 87,548,035,975 6.04 5,427 4.91 
2005 91,287,855,656 4.27 5,600 3.19 
2006 96,486,092,629 5.69 5,859 4.62 
2007 101,465,571,562 5.16 6,100 4.12 
2008 104,806,280,194 3.29 6,240 2.29 
2009 103,720,034,589 -1.04 6,117 -1.97 
2010 110,041,983,987 6.10 6,430 5.12 
2011 116,631,547,327 5.99 6,754 5.03 
Source: World Bank (2012). 
 
With an average per capita GDP growth of 4.8% per year, the 1990s were by far the 
fastest-growing decade in the history of Chile.  This was true even though GDP growth 
was almost zero in 1998 and 1999 as a result of an international financial crisis. In the last 
decade, growth has been a sustained characteristic of the Chilean economy. After more 
than 20 years of democracy and high rates of growth, it is important to study these 
phenomena in order to learn the lessons that will allow the country to continue its 
development in the future. 
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Figure 1.1 uses data from the World Bank (2012) and contrasts the total annual GDP 
with GDP growth in Chile, expressed in constant 2000 US dollars. In the middle of the 
1980s, there clearly appears to be a change, with a tendency toward higher rates of 
growth and lower instability. The size of the Chilean economy grew from $24 billion in 
1980 to $116 billion in 2011, expressed in constant US$ for the year 2000. The economy 
grew at high rates during the 1990s, and even though by the end of the decade it 
staggered for two years, the first decade of the twenty-first century also came along with 
positive rates of growth.  
 
Figure 1.1 Yearly Total GDP and GDP growth in Chile (1980-2011)
 
 
 
 
In summary, after a deep financial crisis in 1981 caused by an unsustainable exchange 
rate, in the middle of the 1980s Chile emerged as the fastest growing country in Latin 
America during a decade that had almost no GDP per capita growth for most of the 
region’s countries. Starting in the second half of the 1980s, the Chilean economy initiated 
a sustained growth path that continues to the present, with growth rates that surpassed 
10% in 1989, 1992 and 1995. 
Table 1.3 contains data from the World Bank (2010) and shows per capita real GDP 
growth rates, summarized from 1970 to 2009. During the seventies, per capita growth of 
the Chilean economy was relatively poor compared to the Latin American average and 
also low compared to per capita GDP growth of Asia, Europe and North America. After 
1983, Chile became a much faster-growing country than the average of its neighbors and 
was actually much closer to the pattern developed by the fast-growing Asian countries. 
The nineties were by far the decade in which Chile's GDP per capita grew the most. With 
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an annual average growth rate of 4.8%, the Chilean economy expanded more than twice 
as much as Europe and North America and three times the average growth of Latin 
America and the world. 
 
Table 1.3 Decade Average GDP per capita Growth of Selected Country Groups 1981-
2009  
  1981-1990 1991-2000 2001-2009 
Chile 2.24 4.80 2.51 
Latin America & Caribbean -0.71 1.59 1.81 
East Asia & Pacific 3.57 1.90 2.63 
European Union 2.14 2.02 0.89 
North America 2.23 2.17 0.62 
World 1.49 1.42 1.17 
Source: Author's calculation using World Bank (2010) data. 
 
When comparing the growth paths of different countries and regions, it is important 
not only to analyze how much an economy can grow but also how stable this process can 
be. Volatility rates of GDP growth may reflect the ability of an economy to interact with 
exogenous shocks. Low volatility implies an ability to prevent internal financial crises and 
low growth rate periods. Table 1.4 shows that volatility rates were relatively high in 1982, 
as an international financial crisis caught the country with a rigid exchange rate that 
became unsustainable and that ended in an exchange rate adjustment that drove down 
consumption and moved unemployment up to more than 27%. In relation to other 
regions of the world, volatility rates in Chile became much lower in the past two decades. 
It is clear from Tables 1.3 and 1.4 that, after the return of the state of law and democracy 
in 1989, Chile achieved its highest per capita GDP growth and its lowest GDP volatility 
rates, showing a better performance than most of the other countries of its region and 
catching up fast with respect to the developed world. 
 
Table 1.4 Standard Deviation of GDP per capita Growth of Selected Countries 1981-
2009  
  1981-1990 1991-2000 2001-2009 
Chile 6.14 3.45 2.21 
Latin America & Caribbean 2.09 1.54 3.01 
East Asia & Pacific 1.17 1.58 1.85 
European Union 1.16 1.30 2.21 
North America 2.34 1.58 1.86 
World 1.28 0.95 1.90 
Source: Author's calculation using World Bank (2010) data. 
1.3.2 Recent Economic Development Experience in Chile  
Countries are typically classified as developed, developing, or underdeveloped 
according to a measure of per capita GDP that simplifies most of the complexities and 
subjectivity of measuring the level of well-being and development. Some other variables 
that we present here may be useful to evaluate the evolution of Chilean economic 
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development, distinguishing which advances come along with GDP growth and which 
do not.  Figures 1.2 and 1.3 identify the paths of some variables that are related to this 
fast growth process.  
Figure 1.2 shows the level of per capita GDP in terms of purchasing power parity 
and a measure of income inequality.  Per capita GDP has persistently increased, and 
reached levels over US$13,000 in 2009. Income distribution inequality has also 
diminished simultaneously with this growth process but still remains at a high level. 
Greater equality in income distribution is essential to achieve a long-term stable 
democracy and a high level of development for the twenty-first century. 
 
 
 
Figure 1.3 shows the evolution of interest, inflation and unemployment rates in the 
past decades. Interest rates have decreased as a result of better-developed financial 
systems. Inflation rates converged during the nineties and by 1998 were at the levels of a 
healthy and stable economy. Lower interest rates imply an easier access to capital and a 
healthy financial system, while controlled inflation rates widen the use of currency and 
allow agents to adjust their future expectations. But adequate financial and monetary 
policy are only part of the elements that allow economic growth. Economists are usually 
also concerned with employment levels, not only from the perspective of providing 
economic opportunities for every agent but also from the point of view of efficiency. 
Unemployment decreased during the nineties but showed a sudden increase at the 
end of the decade, responding to the impact of an international financial crisis. 
Unemployment rates have also been relatively high, reaching almost 10% during the first 
                                              
5 More detail about the data used to draw Figures 1.2 through 1.8 can be found in Appendix 1. 
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decade of the twenty-first century. Some economists would argue that the high 
unemployment rates are due to regulations that have decreased labor market flexibility in 
the Chilean economy.6 
 
Figure 1.3 Interest Rate, Inflation Rate, and Unemployment Rate in Chile (1980-2010) 
 
 
One of the public policies that have contributed to economic stability in Chile is the 
decreasing level of public debt. A country’s public debt path over time is the result of 
yearly fiscal balances. When a specific level of structural surplus is embraced as the target 
of the fiscal rule, a desired path for public debt is being designed. The optimal path 
depends on two factors: intergenerational transfers and sustainability. Accumulation of 
debt increases the risk of a financial crisis and also compromises the possibility of 
incurring further deficit. In contrast, reducing the level of debt is equivalent to a wealth 
transfer to future generations, which could also be done by investing in loans to improve 
human capital and future production capacities. 
When designing an optimal fiscal rule, policy makers must consider that international 
financial markets are less tolerant of public debt in developing than in developed 
economies. In Chile, the fiscal rule of a 1% structural surplus is applied to the central 
government. This rule means that the government should spend as if the country was 
producing up to its structural capacity every year and generating a surplus equivalent to 
1% of the structural GDP. When national production decreases due to a temporary 
financial crisis, the rule should result in public deficit. When production increases over 
the structural capacity due to a higher value of the exported commodity, the rule should 
                                              
6 See, for example, the analysis by Albagli, Garcia, and Restrepo (2005). 
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result in a surplus higher than 1% of actual GDP. (Public enterprises are excluded from 
this rule because they have independent management linked to their own objectives and 
are not used as instruments of fiscal policy.) Under this fiscal rule, once other factors 
influencing fiscal accounts are considered, such as social security liabilities and state 
guarantees for infrastructure contracts, the consolidated balance is close to zero. The 
result is that the consolidated public debt is constant in the medium term. 
The levels of Chilean public debt may be seen in Figure 1.4. In practical terms, 
public structural surplus of “1% of GDP” means that the transitory incomes from 
copper extraction are not taken as current income but rather as a non-permanent positive 
flow that must be administered conservatively, with its spending accounted for over a 
reasonable period of time. Therefore, Chile presents a negative public debt of nearly 15% 
of GDP in 2007 and 24% of GDP in 2008. At the present moment, when a financial 
crisis due to over-spending by rich economies threatens to stagnate growth in most of the 
developing world, Chile is likely to stand in a relatively protected position with respect to 
the world economy. This data also shows the strength of Chilean democracy and the 
importance of learning lessons from the developed world but not copying its weaknesses. 
There are some common patterns that can be observed throughout the world as 
countries develop. As specialization occurs in varied areas of knowledge, a population 
tends to group in cities rather than in rural areas. A modern and efficient society also 
offers women and men a similar chance of developing higher human capital and 
participating equally in the labor force.  
 
Figure 1.4 Chilean Consolidated Public Debt (1990-2008)  
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Figure 1.5 summarizes these concepts. In keeping with the first trend, the percentage 
of urban population has increased. People are moving to the cities. More than one third 
of the population is concentrated in Santiago (located in the central Metropolitan region). 
Female labor participation has also increased at a slow but relatively constant rate. This 
variable is related not only to improvements in social integration but also to economic 
growth because it expands the total labor available for production, stimulating per capita 
GDP growth. Enrollment in secondary education has risen to over 90% in 2009 and the 
proportion of women enrolled in higher education in 2009 was higher than the number 
of men. 
As development takes place, family planning becomes accessible for everyone and 
fertility rates stabilize in a way that allows a population to stop growing. In a developing 
society that takes good care of its members, life expectancy should increase over time as a 
result of better and more accessible health care. In a similar way, in a society that is 
incrementally achieving economic development access to communication technologies 
should expand.  
 
Figure 1.5 Labor Market Development Indicators in Chile (1980-2010) 
  
 
Figure 1.6 shows indicators of these developments in Chile. Fertility rate decreased 
from 2.7 children per woman in 1980 to less than one child per woman in 2003.  
Similarly life expectancy at birth was situated at around 70 years in 1980 and it has 
increased to almost 80 years in 2009, following a worldwide tendency that goes along 
with advances in health care and medicine. Finally, mobile phones have fully penetrated 
the Chilean market, with almost one phone per person in 2009, while internet 
connections are growing quickly. 
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Figure 1.6 Development Indicators in Chile (1980-2010) 
 
1.3.3 Education Effort and Education Quality 
The amount of state effort in education is an essential factor in determining income 
distribution and creating equal opportunity. Education is the key to accessing the 
knowledge that allows people to take active part in the transformation of markets and 
production processes. Figure 1.7 shows data on education expenditure collected and 
published by the Chilean Ministry of Education. In the past 20 years, the total 
expenditure on education in Chile as a percentage of GDP has increased from 3.9% to 
6.9%. According to MINEDUC (2010) the public effort in education represented almost 
19% of total government expenditures in 2008.  However, most of the increase in the 
percentage of GDP allocated to education is not due to a government effort but to 
private effort.  
The implications of the shift from public schools to privately subsidized education 
are analyzed in the paper by Paredes and Pinto (2009). They showed that public school 
enrollment decreased 13% from 2000 to 2006 while voucher schools increased their 
enrollment by 38% in the same period. They conclude that, because private voucher 
schools provide on average better education quality than public schools, it is likely that 
increases in income result in a demand-side substitution of public school education for 
private voucher school education. They also argued that, because public schools are 
decentralized and managed by municipalities, it is likely that some local municipal 
administrations opt for giving more support to private schools and lower priority to 
public schools. 
Manzi et al. (2008) evaluate the quality of Chilean school education in an 
international context using the results of the Chilean Education Quality Measuring 
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System (SIMCE) national census, the International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS) and the 
Program for International Student Assessment (PISA). They studied the fact that, among 
the three main kinds of schools that exist in Chile, there is a persistent and significant 
difference in education quality. Private schools perform the best. Private that are publicly 
subsidized (voucher schools) obtain lower scores in the quality measures. Students from 
public schools obtain on average the lowest scores on learning tests. They found that in 
Chile most of the between-school variance in education quality is explained by individual 
and school socioeconomic factors. Nevertheless, according to the results of PISA 2000 
and PISA 2006, overall educational quality in Chile has increased. 
 
Figure 1.7 Education Expenditure in Chile (1990-2008) 
 
 
Access to higher education and greater educational quality has been widely discussed 
in Aequalis (2011). A group of 100 Chilean academics contributed to this book and 
developed concrete policy proposals in order to improve quality and universal access to 
higher education. Policy recommendations include the creation of new administrative 
units within the state that can promote quality and monitor the actions of higher 
education institutions. The forum also proposed to modify selection tests and a 
redefinition of professional-academic degree and license structures. Finally, the forum 
concludes that a better system can only be achieved by investing more resources and it 
proposes some specific areas for increases in the educational budget. 
1.3.4 R&D and the National Innovation System 
From an economic production perspective, education is a system to transfer 
knowledge to younger generations so that they can continue and enlarge the present 
production capacities. The acquisition of new knowledge is also very important for an 
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economy that is open to competitive international markets. In order to provide a better 
understanding of the innovation system and the requirements of knowledge creation for 
the Chilean economy, a book published by Chile Innova (2005) gathered expert opinions 
and analyzed different innovation funds in Chile. The effect of these efforts and 
investments on innovation activities in Chile is analyzed by Benavente (2006). His work 
was intended to gather and publish information that could guide a national policy for 
innovation and new technologies. He discussed the importance of innovation activities 
for economic growth and analyzed why and how the state should have a role in 
promoting R&D activities and innovations. Later, Aninat et al. (2010) expressed concerns 
about how appropriate are the existing incentives in the public and private sectors, when 
the main objective of the social planner is to develop new technologies that expand 
productivity in a way that benefits the whole economy. 
Benavente et al. (2009) describe how the Chilean National Innovation System has 
developed over the past two decades. A National Innovation System, organizing and 
encompassing all or most of the state efforts to promote R&D, did not effectively exist in 
Chile before 2006. After 1990, some support was given to innovative firms through the 
Ministry of Economics, but these state efforts were neither initiated by a centralized 
process nor targeted to specific areas of development. Only after 2000 were some 
incentives directed to specific areas such as biotechnology, cleaner production, and 
information technologies. In 2004, there were three major state agencies responsible for 
promoting innovation efforts in Chile. CONICYT was focused on scientific research and 
the development of specialized human capital. CORFO implemented innovation and 
entrepreneurship policy. The Ministry of Economics operated as a supervising entity 
through its Program of Development and Technological Innovation (PDIT), but its 
influence as a supervising agency was limited. As a consequence, state efforts to promote 
innovation were not organized into a National Innovation System with explicit, clear, and 
agreed-on goals.  
In 2005, some major steps changed this decentralized innovation policy. The first 
was legislation imposing a royalty tax on the mining industry, based on the provision in 
the Chilean constitution that all non-renewable mining resources are the property of the 
state. The second was the creation of the Innovation for Competitiveness Fund (FIC) 
that uses the resources collected by the mining royalty tax. This law also stipulated a 
National Strategy for Innovation and Competitiveness and created a National Council of 
Innovation for Competitiveness (CNIC). By late 2005, CNIC was created with a 12-year 
target horizon that made it less linked with the political cycle. In 2006, FIC was initiated 
to fund initiatives to improve Chilean competitiveness in accordance with the National 
Innovation System. 
Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) legislation is another factor related to innovation. 
Patents and IPRs can promote inventions and innovations, but nevertheless restrict the 
contemporaneous transfer of technological knowledge. Therefore, careful analysis must 
be exercised in the design and modification of IPR legislation. A recent work by Cimoli 
et al (2011) showed that all cases of economies successfully “catching up” happened in 
the absence of IPRs. International patent applications are often used as an indicator of 
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technological innovation within a region, because they represent innovation outputs that 
are completely new to the market and can be granted a patent.  The Patent Co-operation 
Treaty (PCT) registered almost 150,000 patent applications in 2008.  
Table 1.5 shows that the number of Chilean patents filed under the PCT has 
increased but remains a very small number in relation to other countries. The total 
number of patents filed by Chilean organizations grew from 13 in 2003 to 47 in 2008. 
While most of the world patent applications are filed in OECD countries, the United 
States, the European Union, Japan, and the United Kingdom are those with the largest 
number of yearly patent applications. China increased the number of patent applications 
by nearly 400% from 2003 to 2008, which is consistent with an expansion of 
technological knowledge that has boosted their recent high levels of GDP growth. 
 
Table 1.5 Patents Filed under the Patent Co-operation Treaty (PCT) 2003-2008 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Chile 13 24 27 25 40 47 
Australia 1,898 2,046 2,093 2,070 2,029 1,791 
Belgium 835 973 1,018 1,096 1,160 1,040 
Canada 2,325 2,494 2,789 3,011 3,010 2,525 
France 5,308 5,922 6,360 6,489 6,787 6,712 
Germany 15,012 15,967 16,728 17,591 18,639 16,311 
Hungary 175 190 196 202 245 206 
Japan 19,352 24,187 26,156 26,731 27,749 27,019 
Korea 3,389 4,248 5,207 6,436 7,239 7,034 
Mexico 135 158 188 204 211 205 
Netherlands 3,057 3,214 3,387 3,571 3,551 3,461 
New Zealand 363 386 369 399 387 302 
Spain 866 1,162 1,295 1,395 1,524 1,539 
Switzerland 1,743 1,974 2,071 2,146 2,454 2,196 
Turkey 119 188 257 326 374 362 
United Kingdom 5,912 5,958 5,976 6,555 6,386 5,672 
United States 42,187 45,565 49,338 52,442 49,818 42,470 
China 1,703 2,336 3,856 5,245 6,462 6,792 
India 952 932 1,087 1,187 1,293 1,248 
EU27 Total 39,850 42,829 45,291 48,416 50,439 46,146 
OECD Total 113,279 126,299 136,245 144,806 146,420 132,341 
World 118,596 132,359 144,383 154,848 159,328 144,944 
Source: OECD (2011) 
 
Looking at Research and Development (R&D) efforts, Table 1.6 shows research and 
development spending as a percentage of GDP for a number of countries. The average 
R&D investment in OECD countries is around 2.2% of GDP.  Table 1.6 shows that 
Chile has the lowest rate of OECD countries. Between 2003 and 2008, the lowest R&D 
investment in Chile took place in 2005 and was only 0.23% of GDP. The highest R&D 
investment made by Chile was 0.4% of GDP in 2008. France, Germany, Japan, South 
Korea, and the United States are among the countries with the highest R&D investment 
as a share of GDP. Other Latin American countries, such as Brazil with nearly 1% of 
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GDP dedicated to R&D and Mexico with 0.4% of GDP spent on R&D, have relatively 
low innovative investments but still outperform Chile in terms of their innovation efforts. 
 
Table 1.6 R&D Spending across Selected Countries (Percentage of Total GDP) 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Chile 0.28 0.31 0.23 0.25 0.33 0.40 
Australia 1.78 2.06 
Belgium 1.88 1.86 1.83 1.86 1.9 1.92 
Brazil 0.96 0.9 0.97 1 1.1 1.13 
Canada 2.04 2.07 2.05 1.97 1.9 1.84 
France 2.17 2.15 2.1 2.1 2.04 2.02 
Germany 2.52 2.49 2.49 2.53 2.53 
Hungary 0.93 0.87 0.94 1 0.97 
Japan 3.2 3.17 3.32 3.4 3.44 
Korea 2.49 2.68 2.79 3.01 3.21 
Mexico 0.4 0.4 0.41 0.39 0.37 
Netherlands 1.76 1.81 1.79 1.78 1.71 
New Zealand 1.19 1.16 1.21 
Russian Federation 1.28 1.15 1.07 1.07 1.12 1.03 
South Africa 0.8 0.86 0.92 0.95 
Spain 1.05 1.06 1.12 1.2 1.27 1.35 
Switzerland 2.9 
Turkey 0.48 0.52 0.59 0.58 0.72 
United Kingdom 1.75 1.69 1.73 1.76 1.82 1.88 
United States 2.61 2.54 2.57 2.61 2.66 2.77 
China 1.13 1.23 1.34 1.42 1.44 
India 0.8 0.79 0.84 0.88 0.87 0.88 
EU27 Total 1.75 1.73 1.74 1.76 1.77 
OECD Total 2.2 2.17 2.21 2.24 2.28 
Source: for Chile, Ministerio de Economia (2009, 2010); for all other countries OECD (2010). 
 
Investment in R&D and knowledge creation clearly has been left aside in the recent 
development of the Chilean economy. In a country that is small and largely dependent on 
the export of mineral commodities, it is very important to promote innovation activities 
that will help the economy be sustainable in the future. If newer technologies are 
developed for production of a wider variety of manufactured exports, growth can be less 
dependent on the price of copper and the amount extracted, and can be sustainable 
without reliance on this exhaustible resource. 
As economies grow and educational systems allow a larger variety of labor 
specialization patterns, societies show a change in the shares of labor allocated to the 
main three economic activities: agriculture, industry, and services. As labor productivity 
increases, the share of employment working in agriculture is first reduced to increase the 
share of labor dedicated to industry. In further stages of development, we expect an 
increase in the share of people working in services and a decline of the share working in 
both industry and agriculture. Table 1.7 shows the evolution of the shares of employment 
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dedicated to different activities in Chile. In the past 20 years, the share of people working 
in agriculture has gradually decreased, while the share of the labor force working in 
services has increased. 
 
Table 1.7 Productive Composition of Chile 1980-2007 
Chile Employment in services Employment in industry Employment in agriculture 
Year (% of total employment) (% of total employment) (% of total employment) 
1980 59.8 23.7 16.3 
1981 60.7 23.7 15.5 
1982 65.4 18.2 16.2 
1983 66 18.1 15.8 
1984 63.7 20.2 16 
1985 59.6 20.2 20.2 
1986 58.2 21.2 20.6 
1987 56 23 20.9 
1988 54.8 24.9 20.3 
1989 54.1 26.5 19.4 
1990 55.5 25.2 19.3 
1991 54.6 26.3 19.1 
1992 55.5 26.5 18 
1993 56.2 27.2 16.6 
1994 57.7 26.1 16.2 
1995 58.2 26.1 15.7 
1996 58 26.6 15.4 
1997 58.3 27.3 14.4 
1998 60 25.5 14.4 
1999 62.1 23.4 14.4 
2000 62.2 23.4 14.4 
2001 62.5 23.9 13.6 
2002 67.2 22.1 10.7 
2003 63 23.4 13.6 
2004 63 23.6 13.4 
2005 63.9 23 13.2 
2006 63.9 23.3 12.8 
2007 64.3 23.4 12.3 
Source: World Bank 2010. 
 
In different economic sectors the use of knowledge for production varies. 
Innovation of products and processes occur in different intensities across sectors and 
evolves in a particular way for each economic activity. For the effects of this research it 
becomes especially relevant to understand the sectorial taxonomy of knowledge 
allocations comparing the knowledge dynamics in natural resource based sectors, 
manufacturing industry and service sectors. Table 1.8 shows the percentage of firms that 
performed technological innovations across economic sectors according to the 2005 and 
2007 Chilean Innovation Surveys. The Mining Industry performed less product 
innovations than the average of the Chilean economy but much more process 
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innovations than the average Chilean firm. The Manufacturing Industry performs above 
the average in both product and process innovations according to 2005 and 2007 
Innovation Surveys. Agriculture, Fishing and Financial Services are the sectors with the 
lowest levels of Technological Innovations in the economy. 
 
Table 1.8 Evolution from 2005 to 2007 of Technological Innovation by Economic Sector 
(% of firms)  
2005 Survey 2007 Survey 
Economic Sectors / Kind of Innovation Product Process Total Product Process Total 
Agriculture 22,8 25,3 27,9 10,9 18,9 20,8 
Fishing 17,0 19,7 21,3 6,8 8,8 13,0 
Mining 18,8 56,3 57,8 10,6 36,2 36,2 
Manufacturing 27,6 35,0 38,3 20,2 26,4 29,0 
Electricity, Gas, Water 22,7 46,7 48,0 10,8 33,8 33,8 
Construction 23,5 25,2 29,7 17,9 21,4 27,2 
Transport and Communications 34,5 26,3 35,6 11,6 11,8 14,8 
Financial Services 28,9 24,3 29,6 12,3 13,3 15,4 
Real estate, Informatics, R&D 28,7 28,7 32,3 45,5 41,1 51,0 
Teaching 46,1 30,2 50,7 
Social Services and Health 30,3 33,4 39,1 23,7 25,7 34,9 
Other Services (in 2007 includes Teaching) 46,3 20,1 51,7 20,9 19,1 24,7 
Total 27,3 28,2 33,3 16,2 19,9 23,7 
Source: Ministerio de Economía (2009) 
1.3.5 Dutch Disease, the Role of Copper and Exports on Chilean 
Development 
Economists usually see the recent Chilean experience as a case of a successful 
economy moving toward development faster than other countries in the same region. It 
is true that institutions have become stronger, that democracy allows organizing the 
country in the best interest of its people, and that the moderated economic model 
developed in recent decades has allowed the existence of private incentives and the 
redistributive role of the state. Nevertheless, the main industry supporting growth has not 
been the manufacture of innovative products but the extraction of mining resources. If 
we are interested in sustainability, we should be aware not only of the Chilean 
dependence on copper but also whether the profits of this sector are being used for 
building up industrial capacity that will last beyond the extraction of the non-renewable 
resource. 
The concept of “Dutch Disease” was first used by The Economist magazine to 
describe the situation generated by the discovery of natural gas in the Northern Seas of 
Holland during the 1960’s. The Dutch Government and a group of private firms moved 
rapidly into the newly discovered resource generating large profits in a relatively short 
period of time. Nevertheless the abundance of foreign currency affected the terms of 
trade making all other Dutch exports less competitive. The result was a decline in the 
production of all other export oriented manufacturing industries. The fact that 
international prices of Copper have been increasing since the eighties in addition to large 
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investments that have accumulated in Chile during the past three decades implies that 
Chile is now one of the countries affected by the Dutch Disease. Giarda and 
Landerretche (2011) analyzed this problem and measured the impact of the terms of 
trade in different Chilean exporting industries. They found Agriculture, Food, Fishing, 
Paper and Chemicals among the industries that have lost growth potential as a result of 
becoming less competitive in relation to the worsening terms of trade. 
Table 1.8 shows the participation of the mining sector in total exports in Chile from 
2000 to 2009.  All mining as a share of exports has increased during the past ten years 
and was near 60% in 2009. The great importance of copper for Chilean trade is clear 
from this table. The annual variation in the share of copper in total exports depends on 
three factors. First is the exogenous change in copper price determined by international 
markets based on a demand-supply interaction. Secondly, this variation depends on the 
level of extraction, which increases with time due to the increase of known reserves, 
investment, and improvements in extraction efficiency. Third, the share of copper in total 
exports depends negatively on the growth of non-mineral goods exports.  
In the past decade, the importance of copper in total exports has increased because 
of a high commodity price, accompanied by an increase on copper extraction, mainly by 
private companies, but also by the publicly owned company CODELCO. 
 
Table 1.8 Share of Metallic Mining Sector in Total Exports (% of year value) 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Total Mining 43.6 41.0 40.0 41.5 53.1 56.7 65.1 65.6 61.2 57.7 
Copper 37.9 35.5 34.1 35.4 45.2 44.5 56.8 56.3 52.2 50.2 
Molybdenum 1.0 1.1 1.4 1.8 4.6 8.7 5.1 6.0 5.2 2.6 
Gold 1.8 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.1 1.7 
Iron 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.8 1.1 
Iodine 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.7 
Silver 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.6 0.8 0.6 0.6 
Other 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 0.9 0.9 0.6 0.5 0.8 0.8 
Source: Central Bank of Chile (2010), except copper. Cochilco (2009), copper. 
 
Growth has been due not only to mining, because exports of non-mineral goods 
have also grown, as we see in figure 1.8. The idea that manufactured exports are highly 
correlated with GDP growth is explained by Agosin (1999) and Agosin and Bravo-Ortega 
(2007). Figure 1.8 shows that, in the case of Chile, GDP is not only correlated with 
manufactured exports but also with copper exports. In fact, it seems to be that adding up 
the rates of growth of manufactured and mining exports would yield an approximate 
GDP growth rate. The Chilean economy is highly vulnerable because it is dependent on a 
single commodity that represents almost 50% of total exports. If these resources are not 
administered properly, the economy could end up in a situation where the reliance on a 
natural resource damages the capacity to develop other industries. 
 
  
26
Democratic Institutions, Industrial Development and Economic Growth in Chile 
27 
Figure 1.8 Manufactured Exports, Copper Exports and GDP in Chile (1980-2010)  
 
 
Agosin (2009) developed a model in which evidence could be found to support the 
idea that widening the comparative advantage by exporting a larger variety of products is 
one of the main forces that explain GDP growth. According to Agosin (1999), it is very 
clear that the expansion of Chilean manufactures and exports, which began in the mid-
1970s but took on a decisive role in development as from the mid-1980s, was one of the 
most important factors contributing to the growth of the Chilean economy during the 
past three decades. 
Nevertheless, the next stage of export-oriented development will be much more 
difficult than the previous one. To maintain high GDP growth rates, Chile now needs to 
diversify manufactures. Chile needs to go beyond copper and develop industries capable 
of manufacturing goods that incorporate a high level of value added and that are not all 
as sensitive as copper to international demand shocks. Exporting a wisely designed basket 
of goods would mean that, when demand for some exports diminishes, demand for other 
exports increases or at least is not reduced as much, resulting in a relatively stable 
exchange rate. 
According to the model of Agosin (2009), non-mining manufactured exports are one 
of the main drivers of development based on international trade. The experience of 
several Asian countries in previous decades shows that, when value added from 
diversified manufactured products is placed into international markets, employment and 
productivity increase. For the study of Chilean economic growth and development, the 
structure of non-mining exports must be placed on the center of the academic discussion, 
not only from the point of view of private profit but also from a public policy 
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perspective. This table shows that the products exported most contain relatively low 
value added and technological knowledge.  
 
Table 1.9 Exports and Imports of Goods and Services, Chile 1970-2009 
Year Exports of goods and services (% of GDP) 
Imports of goods and 
services (% of GDP) 
1980 22.82 26.98 
1981 16.42 26.75 
1982 19.37 21.25 
1983 24.01 21.32 
1984 24.23 25.34 
1985 28.15 25.71 
1986 29.09 26.03 
1987 30.13 27.22 
1988 34.25 27.25 
1989 35.39 30.65 
1990 33.99 30.55 
1991 32.40 27.77 
1992 29.81 28.17 
1993 26.62 28.62 
1994 28.24 26.57 
1995 29.30 27.10 
1996 27.28 28.97 
1997 27.08 29.20 
1998 26.30 29.57 
1999 29.60 27.33 
2000 31.60 29.73 
2001 33.31 31.77 
2002 34.04 31.62 
2003 36.52 32.41 
2004 40.76 31.58 
2005 41.33 32.81 
2006 45.77 30.71 
2007 47.25 33.24 
2008 44.78 40.89 
2009 38.14 30.36 
Source: World Bank 2010 
 
The orientation of Chile to foreign trade and its evolution in the past decades is 
summarized in Table 1.9. Exports as a percentage of GDP increased from 23% in 1980 
to 45% in 2008. Imports also increased from 27% in 1980 to 41% in 2008. The balance 
of the current account has been increasingly positive in the past nine years. 
Table 1.10 describes the participation of different economic sectors in exports in 
Chile. Raw materials including copper accounted for 34.4% of exports in 2007, while 
simple manufactures based on a single material, including copper products, represented 
42.6% of exports in the same year. Food products including wine and seasonal fruits 
account for the third most important exporting sector, with 13.6% in 2007.  
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Chapter 1 
In summary, copper represents nearly half of total Chilean exports. The income 
resulting from this activity depends to a high extent on exogenous and unpredictable 
international price variations. These fluctuations have a large impact on the exchange 
rate, which in turn affects the competitiveness of Chilean firms. In order to achieve high 
rates of per capita GDP growth, as well as stability in the future, the expansion of 
production must be sustained by knowledge-intensive diversified exporting industries 
rather than on exhaustible natural resources. 
1.3.6 Productivity, Industrial Policy, Economic Sectors and C onvergence 
 
Economists have discussed about productivity growth and its sectorial composition 
during many decades. The work by Salter (1960) provided a framework and an empirical 
analysis of productivity growth in the United States. In a full-employment scenario like 
the one that happened after World War II, labor productivity growth became an essential 
part of the economic discussion. At different stages, governments have declared their 
intentions to raise productivity growth in the manufacturing industry. Nevertheless 
understanding the causes of productivity gains is the first necessary step in order to lead 
any successful policy to promote productivity growth. According to Salter (1960), 
“behind productivity lie all the dynamic forces of economic life: technical progress, 
accumulation, enterprise, and the institutional pattern of society.”  
The work by Katz (1969) analyzed productivity in the Argentine industry and gave a 
precedent of economic research and empirical analysis of Productivity in Latin American 
economies. According to his work there was a stage on the economy during the post-war 
period when productivity growth was driven by Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). He 
also showed that this situation happened in the absence of public policy to regulate 
capital flows, market power, employment, income distribution and generation of 
domestic industrial technology among others. This situation resembles the recent history 
of Chile in which the Copper Industry stands for FDI and detailed regulations to this 
industry and other related markets to advance in productivity growth are still missing. 
The paper by Leung et al (2008) discussed the relation of firm size and productivity 
growth among firms from Canada and the United States. They found a positive 
relationship between firm size and both labor productivity and TFP for both 
manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors. 
The work by Vergara and Rivero (2005) estimated a measure for Total Factor 
Productivity (TFP) growth in Chile from 1981 to 2003. Table 1.11 describes the 
evolution of aggregate TFP growth during this period. It appears that from the mid-
eighties to the mid-nineties aggregate productivity experienced growth to a large extent. 
This pattern was discontinued after the foreign financial crisis hit the Chilean markets in 
1998, even though GDP growth rates remained positive. In the period until 1995 the 
absence of accurate sectorial values of capital growth made the sectorial analysis hard to 
evaluate. Nevertheless from 1996 to 2001 Vergara and Rivero (2005) proposed a measure 
of Total Factor Productivity (TFP) growth that divided the economy in nine sectors and 
showed very interesting results from the point of view of this research. Table 1.12 
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contains the summary of their findings. Most of TFP growth is related to Agriculture and 
Mining while the Manufacturing Industry has a negative TFP growth between 1996 and 
2001. 
During the decades after the Great Depression, Latin American economies turned 
inward as protection from external crises. Katz (2001) shows that, in Chile during the 
seventies, the first effort was made to open the economy toward deregulation and foreign 
markets. This change in economic paradigm brought about great macro-, meso- and 
microeconomic changes. These pro-competitive structural reforms, in combination with 
international financial turbulence and volatility in the environment of the historical 
features of each Latin American economy, triggered a Schumpeterian episode of creative 
destruction that gave birth to the current technological and economic paradigm. 
 
Table 1.11 Evolution of Aggregate TFP Growth in Chile 1981-2003 
GDP 
Growth 
Contribution of 
Labor Capital TFP 
1981-1985 -0.7 2.3 0.3 -3.4 
1986-1990 6.7 2.6 2.2 1.9 
1991-1995 8.7 2.9 2.2 3.5 
1996-2000 4.2 1.2 2.8 0.2 
2000-2003 2.5 0.8 1.8 -0.1 
Source: Vergara and Rivero (2005) 
 
Table 1.12 TFP Growth in Chilean Economic Sectors 1996-2001 
GDP 
Growth 
Contribution of 
Labor Capital TFP 
Farming, forestry and fishing 4.12 -2.76 0.95 5.92 
Mining 8.09 -1.45 3.2 6.34 
Manufacturing Industry 1.51 -1.66 3.43 -0.26 
Electricity, gas and water 3.58 -1.79 4.19 1.18 
Construction -0.1 -1.64 2.98 -1.44 
Commerce restaurants and hotels 2.54 0.38 2.5 -0.34 
Transport and communications 6.78 2.1 5.22 -0.54 
Financial services 4.13 1.88 3.74 -1.49 
Non-financial Services 3.59 -0.37 1.51 2.45 
Source: Vergara and Rivero (2005) 
 
Katz (2001) describes how a new technological paradigm introduced a pattern of 
specialization that was biased in favor of low-knowledge industry with almost no R&D. 
Latin American economies found themselves trapped in low growth rates due to a 
stagnation of productivity. This last problem was explored by Cimoli and Katz (2002), 
who concluded that an institutionalism promoting innovation activities was an essential 
condition for faster productivity growth. In Chile, a National Innovation System was 
created in 2006 as a response to the call made by this and other studies to implement an 
Innovation Policy that could meet this challenge in an integrated way.  
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The idea of the state fostering a specific sector of the economy with the intention of 
promoting innovation and growth has been on the mind of industrial economists for a 
long time. A recent analysis of this practice was done by Aghion et al (2011), who took 
the experience of some European countries and compared it with other regions of the 
world. The work by Aghion et al (2011) found that, when state aid is focused on a 
particular industry, success depends largely on market competition in that particular 
industry. If the sector is competitive and the resources are made available to all the firms 
in the sector, then aid promotes growth and innovation. If, on the other hand, aid is 
given to a monopolistic firm or assigned to a closed subgroup of firms in a competitive 
market, then the impact is small or even inexistent. 
A case in which the state promoted an industry that later developed into a growing 
economic sector was the salmon industry in the south of Chile starting in the 1980s. 
Iizuka and Katz (2011) have documented the rise and decline of this industry in a 
situation described as the problem of the commons. 
Iizuka and Katz (2011) explained how the Chilean state originally put the 
administration of sea coastline water and terrain for the production of salmon into 
private hands. International demand for the commodity grew and the Chilean salmon 
industry registered 2-digit growth rates during two decades. In this case, clean sea water 
was a public good that no particular firm was willing to protect at its own cost. 
Eventually, pathogens contaminated the fish. In 2008, an outbreak of an infectious 
salmon anemia and the decreased quality of water overpopulated by salmon contributed 
to the massive deaths of salmon. As a result, the production of the industry decreased 
enormously.  
In response to situations such as this, there have been recent developments in the 
analysis of industrial policy that promotes environmentally friendly and sustainable 
growth. Acemoglu et al. (2012) developed a growth model with endogenous and directed 
technical change in which they introduced environmental constraints. Assuming the 
existence of “clean” and “dirty” inputs, they obtained several practical conclusions from 
the model.  
They found that, when inputs can be substituted, sustainable growth can be achieved 
by the use of temporary taxes and subsidies that redirect innovation efforts towards clean 
inputs. They showed that an optimal policy should include both carbon emission taxes 
and research subsidies but that carbon emission taxes should not be so high as to restrict 
the growth of efficient industries before alternative production methods can be 
developed. When intervention is not made timely to promote sustainable industry, the 
cost of introducing clean technologies will become much higher, as industries have 
already developed with dirty technologies. In this case, the transition will take a longer 
time and will include a period of slow growth. The salmon industry provides an example 
of what policy makers should be cautious with when promoting sustainable industries. 
The discussion of clean and dirty inputs in state-directed innovation efforts should be 
taken into account in the design of such policies. 
To promote production that can be traded internationally, it is important to focus on 
those sectors that use Chile’s advantages relative to other countries. Diaz, Meller and 
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Pardo (2002) conclude that the different regions of Chile are highly specialized in certain 
economic activities, and that these correspond to the sectors that lead their growth. In 
addition, they observed that there has been no important economic restructuring in the 
Chilean regions in recent decades (except for the southern region XII of Magallanes). 
Table 1.13 presents the main economic activities of each region of Chile during the 
nineties. Mining is prevalent, mainly copper, with other metallic extraction in the north 
(regions II, III and IV) and with oil extraction in the south (region XII). Agriculture is an 
important activity in several regions, mainly in the central and southern regions. 
Commerce, services, and industry are most developed in urban areas such as Santiago 
(Metropolitan Region) and Concepcion (region VIII). 
In the absence of proper incentives for developing other industries, it is likely that 
this structure will remain unchanged in the future, because the regional development of 
the economic sectors is related to the endowment of natural resources and conditions of 
infrastructure that are not likely to be changed in a short period of time. The sector 
structure of each region is probably an important determinant of the regional per capita 
product differences that may be explored in detail from the information offered in Table 
1.14. Per capita GDP apparently decreases over the 2003-2006 period but this effect is 
the result of the change in the Purchase Power Parity (PPP) adjustment factor we used, 
which went from 0.45 in 2003 to 0.69 in 2006.7 
In Chile, there is no clear tendency toward reduction of the inter-regional gaps in per 
capita GDP. The evidence does not show a process of long run regional convergence in 
Chile over recent decades. On the contrary, the evidence shows that, in the long run, 
regions tend to stay near the same relative per capita GDP levels. A possible explanation 
has to do with a relatively neutral industrial policy that has not been capable of 
developing new productions beyond those related to natural resources and low- 
knowledge industries. 
Reinforcing this situation, endowments of natural resources and infrastructure may 
drive national and foreign investments. According to Cimoli and Katz (2002), the 
technological paradigm that was created after 1970 in Latin America introduced a pattern 
of specialization that favored low-knowledge industries, and therefore the R&D efforts 
were low. 
The main disaggregation of the gross domestic product made by the Central Bank of 
Chile includes the following nine economic sectors: Farming, Forestry and Fishing 
(AGR), Mining (MIN), Manufacturing Industry (IND), Construction (CON), Electricity, 
Gas and Water (EGA), Transport and Communications  (TYC), Commerce, Restaurants 
and Hotels (COM), Financial Services (SFI), and non-Financial Services (SNF). 
  
                                              
7 PPP correction factors were obtained from World Development Indicators, World Bank (2010). 
Chapter 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
34
  
Ta
bl
e 
1.
13
 P
ro
du
ct
iv
e 
St
ru
ct
ur
es
 o
f C
hi
le
an
 R
eg
io
ns
 in
 2
00
0 
I 
II
 
II
I 
IV
 
V
 
V
I 
V
II
 
V
II
I 
IX
 
X
 
X
I 
X
II
 
RM
 
A
ll 
Fa
rm
in
g,
 F
or
es
try
 a
nd
 F
ish
in
g 
3.
5%
 
0.
6%
 
15
.9
%
 
24
.1
%
 
9.
9%
 
27
.5
%
 
28
.7
%
 
10
.5
%
 
17
.6
%
 
32
.6
%
 
26
.5
%
 
11
.0
%
 
2.
0%
 
8.
2%
 
M
in
in
g 
13
.5
%
 
64
.2
%
 
46
.0
%
 
17
.1
%
 
8.
9%
 
24
.0
%
 
0.
4%
 
0.
3%
 
0.
4%
 
0.
3%
 
8.
0%
 
17
.4
%
 
0.
7%
 
9.
5%
 
M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
In
du
st
ry
 
17
.8
%
 
5.
3%
 
1.
9%
 
10
.8
%
 
17
.6
%
 
10
.0
%
 
21
.7
%
 
34
.4
%
 
13
.4
%
 
12
.6
%
 
4.
1%
 
26
.8
%
 
17
.8
%
 
17
.3
%
 
Co
ns
tru
ct
io
n 
8.
2%
 
4.
8%
 
5.
2%
 
9.
4%
 
8.
1%
 
6.
3%
 
6.
1%
 
6.
9%
 
11
.0
%
 
8.
0%
 
8.
8%
 
3.
0%
 
5.
0%
 
6.
0%
 
E
le
ct
ric
ity
, G
as
 a
nd
 W
at
er
 
1.
8%
 
5.
9%
 
5.
8%
 
1.
7%
 
2.
3%
 
3.
6%
 
10
.2
%
 
4.
4%
 
1.
5%
 
3.
3%
 
1.
8%
 
0.
8%
 
1.
1%
 
2.
6%
 
Tr
an
sp
or
t a
nd
 C
om
m
un
ic
at
io
ns
 
7.
4%
 
5.
3%
 
3.
8%
 
6.
8%
 
17
.4
%
 
3.
8%
 
5.
2%
 
11
.2
%
 
8.
2%
 
7.
5%
 
11
.1
%
 
6.
5%
 
9.
8%
 
9.
3%
 
Co
m
m
er
ce
, R
es
ta
ur
an
ts
, H
ot
el
s 
30
.1
%
 
4.
0%
 
10
.8
%
 
12
.9
%
 
12
.7
%
 
11
.4
%
 
10
.7
%
 
10
.1
%
 
18
.7
%
 
13
.1
%
 
9.
8%
 
13
.7
%
 
26
.7
%
 
19
.4
%
 
Fi
na
nc
ial
 S
er
vi
ce
s 
5.
8%
 
3.
5%
 
3.
6%
 
6.
2%
 
7.
9%
 
5.
3%
 
6.
8%
 
8.
0%
 
10
.7
%
 
8.
2%
 
6.
3%
 
6.
8%
 
23
.7
%
 
15
.1
%
 
N
on
-F
in
an
ci
al 
Se
rv
ic
es
 
11
.9
%
 
6.
4%
 
7.
0%
 
11
.0
%
 
15
.2
%
 
8.
1%
 
10
.2
%
 
14
.2
%
 
18
.5
%
 
14
.4
%
 
23
.6
%
 
14
.0
%
 
13
.2
%
 
12
.6
%
 
To
ta
l R
eg
io
n 
10
0%
 
10
0%
 
10
0%
 
10
0%
 
10
0%
 
10
0%
 
10
0%
 
10
0%
 
10
0%
 
10
0%
 
10
0%
 
10
0%
 
10
0%
 
10
0%
 
So
ur
ce
: D
iaz
, M
el
le
r a
nd
 P
ar
do
 (2
00
2)
 
  
 
 
Democratic Institutions, Industrial Development and Economic Growth in Chile 
35 
Table 1.14 Per capita GDP PPP across Regions of Chile (constant 2005 US$) 
Region 2003 2004 2005 2006 
I 16,145 16,840 16,657 17,911 
II 26,488 27,655 28,199 29,024 
III 13,221 13,324 13,643 15,114 
IV 7,024 7,376 7,673 8,051 
V 9,772 10,367 10,877 11,664 
VI 8,816 9,603 10,166 10,539 
VII 7,179 7,594 8,234 8,831 
VIII 9,411 9,985 10,689 11,074 
IX 5,054 5,346 5,720 5,984 
X 7,922 8,472 8,769 9,141 
XI 12,286 13,044 14,601 14,191 
XII 20,726 20,589 21,497 22,596 
RM 13,012 13,847 14,681 15,394 
Source: Own calculations using Central Bank of Chile (2010) and World Bank (2010). 
 
Using this broad classification of economic sectors, Diaz and Meller (2004) made a 
convergence sector analysis in Chile, concluding that there are sectors that converge 
(CON, EGA, TYC, COM, SFI, SNF) and sectors that do not converge (MIN, AGR, 
IND). In addition, we can see from the sector analysis that a very significant part of the 
evolution in the differences of regional per capita GDP is due to unequal performances 
in the non-convergent sectors: Mining, Farming, Forestry and Fishing, and 
Manufacturing Industry. 
The general structure of value added across sectors is summarized in Table 1.15. 
Financial services, manufacturing industry, and non-financial services together account 
for about 50% of total value added, while construction represents approximately 13.3% 
of total value added. 
 
Table 1.15 Sector Shares in Value Added, the Chilean Productive Structure 2003-2007 
Year 
Farming, 
forestry 
and 
fishing 
Mining 
Manufac-
turing 
Industry 
Electrici-
ty, gas 
and water 
Cons-
truction 
Commerce 
restaurants 
and hotels 
Transport 
and 
communi-
cations 
Financial 
services 
Non-
financial 
Services 
2003 5.08% 8.89% 17.28% 3.01% 13.39% 10.19% 9.69% 15.74% 16.72% 
2004 5.33% 8.92% 17.47% 2.92% 13.03% 10.33% 9.67% 16.05% 16.29% 
2005 5.41% 8.12% 17.54% 2.85% 13.21% 10.62% 9.79% 16.49% 15.97% 
2006 5.28% 7.79% 17.43% 2.94% 13.12% 10.89% 9.99% 16.70% 15.84% 
2007 5.19% 7.71% 17.06% 2.51% 13.31% 11.07% 10.28% 17.18% 15.69% 
Source: Author’s calculations using data from Central Bank of Chile (2010) 
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1.4 Policy Recommendations 
1.4.1 Chilean Strengths that have Supported Growth and Development 
Barro (1991) provides a theoretical framework for analyzing the factors that 
contribute to modern economic growth. This type of analysis allows quantifying the 
effect of the factors that promote or slow down a growth process. This work has 
particular importance at the time of designing public policies for development. The 
expansion of an economy may be seen as a result of investments in capital and 
alternatively as an expansion or improvement of the labor force. The economy will also 
grow as a result of technological change that can increase total factor productivity, as has 
been well documented for the Chilean case in the work by Bitran and Gonzalez (2010). 
An inclusive analysis highlighting the strengths of the Chilean economy and 
explaining why these characteristics are likely to be some of the most important factors 
contributing to Chilean growth may be found in Schmidt-Hebbel (2006). His work 
mentions institutions, inflation control, exchange rate flotation scheme, international 
trade, fiscal policy, and financial liberalization as the main factors contributing to growth 
after 1990. He shows that recent growth was not due only to factor accumulation but 
also to productivity growth. Fuentes et al. (2006) made a more complete analysis of 
Chilean production factors and productivity growth, concluding that, even though TFP 
growth has behaved in a pro-cyclical way, it has contributed more than half of the 
economic growth in Chile after 1990.  The work carried out by De Gregorio (2007) 
summarizes the strengths of the Chilean economy. According to him, the most important 
strengths of the Chilean economy are its openness to international trade, macroeconomic 
stability, strong institutions, and a stable and deep financial sector. 
One of the most important characteristics accompanying Chilean economic growth 
has been the openness of the economy to the outside world. The importance of trade for 
the Chilean case has been described in Agosin (1999, 2009), where it has been shown that 
exports have driven Chilean growth to a large extent. His work shows that the Chilean 
economy progressively opened to international trade in the nineties and that commercial 
agreements since 1990 have increased the degree of commercial integration even more. 
Import tariffs have decreased from an average of around 9% in the middle of the 1990s 
to rates that range below 2% by the end of the decade. 
Besides the development of international product markets, Chile has opened 
financially and has eliminated most of the controls to capital flows. The exchange rate 
policy is based on a flotation scheme, coherent with the financial integration of a country 
that is small and open to international trade. Although the exchange flotation scheme has 
induced major fluctuations of the nominal exchange rate in the short term, this system 
has brought a greater degree of stability in the long term. 
The importance of macroeconomic stability in Chile during the past two decades has 
been extensively discussed by De Gregorio (2005, 2007). The scheme of policies and 
macroeconomic stability is important not only from the point of view of the economic 
cycle, but also from the point of view of growth potential. A system of macroeconomic 
policies that is responsible and coherent offers enormous benefits for growth and 
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development. This positive effect can be reflected in a healthy and more stable economy. 
Some of the greatest achievements in the case of Chile during the nineties had to do with 
the control of inflation and product volatility. Low and stable inflation promotes growth, 
allowing the economy to adjust prices without discouraging the use of money. A scheme 
of flexible inflation goals has consolidated in Chile during the nineties. This scheme was 
designed for a context in which it is desired to reduce simultaneously the costs of 
inflation deviations and the fluctuations of GDP. With respect to these aims, the Central 
Bank of Chile is committed credibly to an inflation goal using policies that assure a 
suitable balance between both concerns. 
Chilean fiscal policy in the past two decades has been characterized by its 
responsibility, in the sense of controlling public deficit in such a way that there exists 
dynamic efficiency in the public investment process. This way, public spending has been 
coherent with the permanent income. The transitory incomes produced by the 
fluctuations of the value of copper have been used to pay public debt and accumulate 
investment or saved to be spent over a longer period of time. Since 2000, this policy has 
become fortified by the use of the rule of 1% of structural GDP fiscal surplus.8 
Institutional strength is also a very important driver of growth. Chilean institutions 
are described by multinational organisms in a very positive way. Within the main Chilean 
institutions that have gone through profound modernization processes after 1990, we 
find the central bank authority, the judicial system, the tax system, and a democracy based 
on citizen participation and the state of law. There is no evidence that the institutional 
quality has deteriorated in recent years in perceivable magnitudes. On the contrary, there 
has been progress in institutional development, for example concerning transparency in 
the selection of public directives, the creation of the competition court, and the recent 
development of a public information law by which every citizen has the right to be 
provided with financial and performance information from every public agency that 
operates in Chile. 
A very important support for growth has been to maintain a deep and stable 
financial sector. The financial system has deepened during the past two decades. New 
instruments have emerged that have given medium- and low-income people access to 
stock markets and competitive savings interest rates. Part of this progress is due to the 
action of the state owned bank “Banco Estado” that allows every person 18 years of age 
or older with a tax identification number to have a current account with an ATM card. 
Capital market reforms, including those regulating corporate governance, have also 
increased the efficiency and capacity of capital markets. 
The financial system is an important tool that allows the efficient allocation of 
capital. Most of it is controlled by private owners who can contribute to improving 
efficiency as a result of their rent seeking process. Nevertheless, in Latin America, we 
have seen many situations in which the private banks have collapsed, risking the 
environment in which manufacturing firms operate. Therefore, a financial regulatory 
framework under government supervision is essential. 
                                              
8 Since 2000, this rule has the force of law, a sign of a relatively democratic political context. 
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1.4.2 Weaknesses and Challenges for Future Development 
One of the main disadvantages of Chile in terms of international competitiveness is 
the low level of innovation, as measured by innovation inputs and outputs. Research and 
Development expenditures are the lowest of the OECD. The Chilean government is 
studying how to stimulate R&D activities in order to increase innovation of products and 
processes. As shown in Table 1.5, there were less than 50 patent applications by Chilean 
firms under the Patent Co-operation Treaty in 2008. This indicates the number of 
innovations introduced that were new to the market. It is quite clear that Chile is a 
country that has obtained most of its productive knowledge by developing absorptive 
capacities and facilitating technology diffusion rather that developing novel processes 
within Chilean firms. 
The impact of innovation on economic growth has been widely discussed in the 
literature. The measurement of the innovative process, the importance of innovation, and 
the relation between innovation and productivity has been studied in Mairesse and 
Mohnen (2001), Crepon, Duguet and Mairesse (1998), and a rich literature that followed 
these studies. There is also evidence of a link between innovation and competitiveness 
(see Geroski 1995). The impact of innovation on employment in Chile has been 
discussed recently in Benavente and Lauterbach (2008) and positive and important rates 
of return to R&D in Chile have been found in Benavente, De Gregorio and Nuñez 
(2006). 
In addition to extending the public infrastructure in areas such as education, 
transport, and communications, it can be very effective to involve the private sector in 
the innovative process. To achieve this goal, several subsidies are being developed to 
promote R&D and entrepreneurship. Some of these programs are being funded with the 
recently created royalty tax on the extraction of non-renewable resources. These subsidies 
aim for the adoption and generation of technology on the part of private companies, 
universities, and research centers. 
While maintaining a liberal attitude towards foreign direct investment, the Chilean 
authorities do not make a great effort to attract multinational corporations with desirable 
technological or management assets and with access to markets for manufactures. A 
special effort could be made to avoid tax evasion by large enterprises, especially the larger 
multinational companies that in some cases try to use local natural resources to produce a 
benefit in foreign markets without paying taxes in the country of origin of those 
resources. A successful FDI policy could stimulate international transfer of knowledge in 
favor of Chile. This kind of policy may help develop innovation capabilities and stimulate 
private R&D investment. Association with Common Southern Market (MERCOSUR) 
could be important for attracting investment to the Chilean manufacturing sector in the 
near future. 
In both developed and developing countries, high quality education that is accessible 
to all populations is one of the most important ways to both achieve economic growth 
and decrease income inequality. Although Chile has appropriate levels of schooling, the 
quality of education is still deficient; see, for example, Paredes and Paredes (2007) or 
Paredes and Garcia (2008). Consequently, improving the quality of education provides 
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ample potential for gains in growth. Nevertheless, improvements in the quality of 
education normally have a lagged impact on growth, which will take a long time in 
materializing. 
Even though Chile has seen high levels of growth, one of the biggest challenges it 
faces in the following years is the high level of income inequality. Inequality is a very 
serious problem when the lowest income does not allow a family to cover basic 
necessities. Inequality also undermines the development of a more integrated society. 
Decreasing inequality is also important to maintain sustainable high rates of growth and 
economic efficiency. People in the lower income levels have smaller participation in the 
economy and contribute less than they would if they participated in higher productivity 
and better paid jobs. Inequality limits the chances of many economically active citizens 
with lower income to access productive jobs that can result in greater growth.  
Some authors have argued that flexibility in the labor market is needed to reduce 
unemployment and to promote growth and efficiency. Instead of forcing employers to 
pay high amounts of compensation when dismissing people from their jobs, 
unemployment insurance can be improved so that workers who lose their jobs can 
receive money to provide themselves the means to find a new job. Care should be 
exercised in the design of these policies because, when taken to an extreme, they may 
invert workers’ incentives. This may result in increasing unemployment rates to high 
levels, as occurred during previous decades in some European Union countries. 
In the same line of thought about giving the proper incentives to economic agents, 
De Gregorio (2007) proposed that the law of bankruptcy can be improved. In Chile, 
bankruptcy processes recover about 20% of the assets of bankrupt firms, while, in 
countries with better procedures, the rates of recovery reach to more than 50%, and in 
many cases they surpass 80%. A law of bankruptcy that allows investors high rates of 
recovery would facilitate the access of firms to financing. 
1.4.3 Recommendations for Modern Economic Growth in Chile 
The Central Bank of Chile performed a research project during 2004 on the 
economic growth of Chile. From this project arose several empirical and analytical works 
discussing the policies, perspectives, and challenges of economic growth in Chile. 
Fuentes and Schmidt-Hebbel (2004) summarized this research and identified four areas 
of policy recommendations. Their conclusions are also related to the findings of other 
authors in terms of the weaknesses and strengths of the Chilean economy. 
In the first place, the importance of educational quality is the central subject in 
Tokman (2005). This work addresses the importance of improving human capital levels 
in Chile as one of the driving engines of development. In addition, it suggests modifying 
government subsidies for public and private primary and secondary education; to 
improve university degree programs in pedagogy; to reinforce the evaluation of teachers 
as a common practice; and to increase state subsidies for the preschool education. This 
last aspect acquires high importance when considering the participation of women in the 
labor market, which in turn has high distributional consequences. Secondly, Benavente 
(2005) is based on the foundations of modern economic growth and aims at 
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demonstrating that long-run economic growth does not depend so much on the increase 
of productive factors but rather on the increase of productivity. His work studies the way 
in which it is possible to spur innovation and technological development through public 
policy. His study also includes a complete international comparative description in which 
the innovative effort of Chile is placed among other countries. The third subject has to 
do with the efficiency of the labor market. Albagli (2005) analyzed the rigidities of the 
Chilean labor market from a neoclassical point of view. He suggested replacing the 
present payments of indemnifications for dismissal based on years of service by an 
insurance system that pays a comparable amount of money to people who lose their jobs. 
He also proposed eliminating restrictions on part-time work and subsidizing day-care 
centers for the children of working mothers. Aguirre et al. (2004) suggested improving 
the efficiency of the public and private sectors, adopting enterprise practices, and 
performing evaluations in the government similar to those in the private sector. They also 
proposed modifying the law of bankruptcy; extending the reform of the judicial system; 
and improving the ongoing reform in the health sector. 
There is an ample range of reports issued by international institutions that describe 
Chilean economic development and make proposals to stimulate economic growth. The 
“Economic Survey of Chile by the Organization of Economic Cooperation and 
Development” (OECD, 2005) concentrates directly on the long-term challenges. The 
report identifies key areas for reforms that would have an important impact on economic 
growth. In regard to the educational system, it concludes that long-term gains would be 
obtained by improving human capital. The report indicates that this is the factor of 
weakest performance in Chile. Because the educational coverage in Chile is relatively 
high, the proposal consists of raising the present educational standards and improving the 
quality of the labor training programs. The second proposal is to promote competition 
for the network industries (electricity, telecommunications, and transport infrastructure). 
In relation to innovation and R&D, the report also proposes promoting of innovation 
based on efficient use of the mining tax revenue, assigning this revenue by means of 
competitive contests and in a transparent way. Finally, the OECD proposes to improve 
the efficiency of the labor markets, a subject in which it agrees with Albagli (2005). 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2005) also recognized the importance of 
increasing human capital to increase long-run growth rates. The quality of education is a 
persistent subject in the literature of development in Chile. The IMF report also discusses 
the importance of preschool education. It recommends improving the quality of primary 
and secondary education; improving the access of low-income students to higher 
education; and providing professors the right incentives through wage differentiation in 
accordance with their productivity. The IMF report also suggested developing innovation 
capabilities and flexibility for labor markets. 
The World Bank (World Bank, 2002) also encouraged a change in the present 
growth based on the accumulation of factors to growth founded on the increase of 
productivity. This perspective is shared by the OECD and diverse authors including 
Benavente (2005). In order to achieve this objective, the World Bank suggests policies 
that aim to increase the quality of human resources and knowledge, including adult 
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education as well as labor mobility. They also recommended improving the investment 
climate and reinforcing governmental modernization. 
A report by the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB, 2001) included a deep 
analysis of economic development in Chile. It proposes the development of 
competitiveness to increase the potential of growth in Chile. The competitiveness 
principle must be present in the development of policies that spur the adoption of clean 
technologies. Other general recommendations were a greater integration with 
international trade, infrastructure improvements, and development of human capital. 
The work by Agosin (1999) proposes that Chile should also reinvent development 
banks. Such banks should be designed to provide long-term credit at market interest rates 
to firms with good export projects but no access to private capital markets. These 
institutions could also be used to channel funds to loans for higher and technical 
education and for financing expenditure on applied research. Development banks do not 
need to intervene directly in the provision of loans for firms or individuals; they can 
function as second-tier banks, making credit lines available to private financial institutions 
for specific purposes. According to Agosin (1999) this is the most efficient way of 
supporting infant industries, and moreover it is not prohibited by the rules of the World 
Trade Organization. It could in fact become the main instrument for promoting specific 
sectors and activities. By providing long-term credit for new, non-traditional activities, 
development banks would help developing industries and would promote exports. This 
would stimulate long-term growth and give opportunities to small-scale entrepreneurs to 
achieve success, thus helping to reduce inequality. 
A recent approach by Aequalis (2011) argued that access to higher education should 
be equal for all persons in the society. It proposed policy recommendations to improve 
the quality of the Chilean higher education system, including the creation of new 
administrative state units to promote and monitor the actions of higher education 
institutions. This work proposed several measures to modify the selection of students and 
graduation systems. Aequalis (2011) implied that there is a great need to invest more state 
resources in higher education. 
Chile and its citizens are rich in natural resources, can profit greatly from them, and 
can rely on them if they are used properly. Copper is the mineral that is currently allowing 
the country to have a positive current account balance. One century ago the saltpeter 
industry was providing a comparable commodity and causing a similar effect. This 
industry ended when a chemical substitute for saltpeter was invented. If Chileans manage 
to care for and conserve the natural resources that lie in their territory, they will most 
likely be able to allow future generations to enjoy this wealth. Mineral resources can be a 
sustainable advantage for the economy if their profits are reinvested in a way that allows 
alternate industries to develop and eventually replace mineral exports when mineral 
resources become exhausted or substituted by other commodities.  
Smart decisions must be made to re-invest the current revenues of the copper 
industry. All minerals in Chile are a public resource own and managed by the state, but 
private extraction of copper and other minerals is allowed. The practical application of 
the Chilean copper constitutional law relies on a series of laws that should reasonably 
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change over time in order to adapt to the evolving reality of the nation. In recent years, 
the share of copper extracted by the state-owned CODELCO has greatly decreased, and 
private extraction has increased, while the price of the commodity has greatly increased. 
As the value of copper increases in foreign markets, a larger share of the value of Chilean 
copper is being captured by private and foreign firms and a relatively smaller share is 
received by the state (COCHILCO, 2009). This poses a large challenge for Chilean 
society, especially for its politicians and economists.  
This is the reason that the mining royalty tax was legislated in 2005. The tax requires 
the largest mining companies to pay a tax of no more than 4.5% of the value of their 
sales, as compensation for the resource that they extract and commercialize. But the 
importance of this tax depends completely on how this revenue is spent by the state. A 
significant share of the revenue is being invested in the National Innovation Policy. 
Because copper is a non-renewable resource, the yields of this industry must be 
reinvested into other industries within the same economy. R&D, start-ups, infant 
industries, higher education, and knowledge transfers from abroad are examples of how 
to use this revenue wisely. When new industries boosted by copper revenues become 
independent and profitable, the natural resources will have been transformed into 
sustainable economic growth. 
1.5 Concluding Remarks 
A comprehensive analysis of the Chilean growth process and development 
performance has been made, considering the perspectives of several authors and 
international organizations. Data from different sources has been gathered to evaluate the 
arguments, not only in terms of growth and development but also in terms of other 
aspects such as exports, innovation and education, which are the most relevant 
determinants of the long-term growth path. 
Chile has developed an outstanding advantage with respect to most developed 
countries, building peaceful relations not only with its close neighbors but also with 
countries from other regions. At least since 1990, when democracy was reestablished, 
Chile has focused its foreign policy on trade, basing the solution to all international 
conflicts on international referees such as the UN and WTO. Chile has increasingly 
become safe, not only for doing business but also for its low risk of armed conflicts and 
the absence of deadly terrorist attacks. 
Even though Chile has been described as a country that has achieved a stable 
democracy, with an open economy, good macroeconomic policies, and reasonable 
institutional quality, challenges for the future remain. Innovations, public education, 
export market diversity, inequality of income, and allocation of mining exports revenue 
are some of the most important issues of which economists and politicians should take 
care in the near future. 
In many ways, Chilean policy since the second half of the seventies has adhered to 
the policies recommended by the Washington Consensus, both in its positive aspects, 
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such as macroeconomic stability, and its more negative aspects, such as the absence of a 
national innovation policy promoted by the state. A Chilean national innovation system 
was established only in 2006. As discussed in the literature, besides having good 
macroeconomic stability, credible institutions, and a deep financial sector, Chile has 
among its advantages for growth its openness to trade and international markets. This 
implies greater growth opportunities but it is not alone going to generate the growth 
potential that Chile needs for the future. Becoming internationally competitive in 
diversified manufactured goods and services requires innovation and the development of 
other strengths that were not needed for the export of primary commodities like copper. 
The most important challenge related to competitiveness for the Chilean economy in the 
near future is achieving structural differentiation in manufactured production and 
exports. 
The development of human capital and R&D investment appear without doubt as 
some of the most important aspects of development for the present and future. Both of 
these aspects are closely related and rely also on the creation of country and industry level 
absorptive capacities. Important aspects of this process are the development of improved 
business capabilities, the acquisition of information, greater applied research efforts by 
local firms, and improvements in the country’s ports, highways, and tunnels. In this 
context, the role of the government in providing the proper incentives to the private 
sector is crucial. 
Special attention must be given to the role of copper in the Chilean economy. 
Exogenous fluctuations in the price of this commodity have a huge impact on exchange 
rates, creating distortions in other markets and threatening the stability of other exporting 
industries. It is important that the state ensures that the profits of the mining industry, or 
at least a significant share of them, stay within the country and contribute to investment 
that will allow the creation and sustainable development of other industries. The need for 
more diversification of production and exports emerges as an important conclusion from 
the previous analysis. Stimulating industrial investment, facilitating the import of capital 
goods, improving the educational system, and promoting R&D appear to be some of the 
state’s most important roles for the next decades. 
  
Chapter 1 
References 
Aequalis (2011). “Propuestas para la Educacion Superior, Foro Aequalis y las 
Transformaciones Necesarias.” Edited by M. Jimenez de la Jara, F. Lagos Rojas and F. 
Duran del Fierro. Published by INACAP in Santiago. 
 
Acemoglu, D., Aghion, P., Bursztyn, L., Hemous, D. (2012). “The Environment and 
Directed Technical Change.” American Economic Review, 102(1): 131–66 
 
Aghion P., Dewatripont, M., Du, L., Harrison, A., and Legros, P. (2011). “Industrial 
Policy and Competition.” European Commission GRASP Project Working paper No 17. 
 
Agosin M. (2009). “Export diversification and growth in emerging economies.” Cepal 
Review, Vol. 97, pp. 115 - 131, Abril, 2009  
 
Agosin, M. and C. Bravo-Ortega (2007). “The Emergence of New Successful Export 
Activities in Latin America: The Case of Chile.” Department of Economics, Universidad 
de Chile. Working Paper Number 236, April 2007. 
 
Agosin, M. (1999). “Trade and Growth in Chile.” Cepal Review Vol. 68 August 1999. 
 
Aguirre, A., E. Albagli and D. Rappaport. (2004). “Eficiencia del sector público y 
crecimiento.” Manuscrito, Banco Central de Chile. 
 
Albagli, E. (2005). “Mercado laboral y crecimiento económico: Recomendaciones de 
política para Chile.” Estudios Públicos 99: 135-64. 
 
Albagli, E., Garcia, P., and Restrepo J. E. (2005). “Assessing the Flexibility of the Labor 
Market in Chile: an International Perspective.” Labor markets and Institutions, Edited by 
Jorge E. Restrepo and Andrea Tokman R. Santiago Chile, Central bank of Chile. 
 
Aninat, C., Benavente, J.M., Briones, I., Eyzaguirre, N., Navia, P., Olivari, J. (2010). “The 
Political Economy of Productivity: The Case of Chile.” Inter-American Development 
Bank, Working Papers Series No. IDB-WP-105 
 
Barro, R. (1991). “Economic Growth in a Cross-Section of Countries.” Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, Vol. 106, No. 2, pp. 407-443. 
 
Benavente, J.M. (2005). “Innovación Tecnológica en Chile: Dónde estamos y qué se 
puede hacer.” Economía Chilena 8(1): 53-74. 
 
44
Democratic Institutions, Industrial Development and Economic Growth in Chile 
45 
Benavente, J.M. (2006). “Antecedentes para el diseño de una Política Tecnológica 
Nacional.” Serie Documentos de Trabajo N 229. Departamento de Economía, 
Universidad de Chile. 
 
Benavente, J.M., De Gregorio, J., and  Nuñez, M. (2006). “Rates of Return for Industrial 
R&D in Chile,” Serie Documentos de Trabajo Número 220. Departamento de 
Economia, Universidad de Chile. 
 
Benavente, J.M., Crespi, G., and Maffioli, A. (2007). “The Impact of National Research 
Funds: An Evaluation of the Chilean FONDECYT.” Inter-American Development Bank 
Office of Evaluation and Oversight, OVE Working Paper: OVE/WP-03/07   
 
Benavente, J.M., Price, J.J., and Olivari, J. (2009). “Sistemas Públicos de Apoyo a la 
Innovación.” Economía y Administración  (157): 60-67. Junio-Julio. 
 
Benavente, J.M. and Lauterbach, R., (2008). “Technological Innovation and 
Employment: Complements or Substitutes?” The European Journal of Development 
Research  (vol 20, issue 2). 
 
Bitran E., and González, C.M. (2010). “Productividad Total de Factores, Crecimiento e 
Innovacion.” Documento de Referencia Consejo Nacional de Innovacion y Copetitividad 
CNIC. www.cnic.cl . 
 
Braun, J., Braun, I., Briones, I., and Diaz, J., (2000). “Economia Chilena 1810-1995, 
Estadisticas Historicas.” Instituto de Economia Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile. 
Working paper n 187. ISSN 0717-7593.  
 
Central Bank of Chile (2010). “Base de datos Estadisticos.” Gerencia de Informacion 
Estadistica, © Banco Central de Chile. 
 
Cimoli, M. and Katz, J. (2002) “Structural Reforms, Technological Gaps and Economic 
Development, A Latin American Perspective.” Cepal- Serie Desarrollo Productivo No 
129. 
 
Cimoli, M., Dosi, G., Mazzoleni, R., and Sampat, B. (2011). “Innovation, technical 
change and patents in the development process: A long term view.” LEM Papers Series 
2011/06, Laboratory of Economics and Management (LEM), Sant'Anna School of 
Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy. 
 
Chile Innova (2005). “Innovar en Chile, Programa de desarrollo e Innovacion tecnologica 
2001-2006.” Subsecretaría de Economía, Fomento y Reconstrucción, Ministerio de 
Economía 
Chapter 1 
Crepon, B., Duguet, E., and Mairesse, J., (1998). “Research, Innovation, and Productivity: 
an Econometric Analysis at the Firm Level.” NBER Working Papers number 6696. 
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. 
 
COCHILCO (2009). “Yearbook: Copper and Other Mineral Statistics.” Comision 
Chilena del Cobre, Gobierno de Chile. 
 
De Gregorio, J. (2005). “Crecimiento económico en Chile: Evidencia, fuentes y 
perspectivas.” Estudios Públicos 98: 19-86. 
 
De Gregorio, J. (2007). “Algunas Reflexiones sobre el Crecimiento Económico de Chile.” 
Economic Policy Papers N 20,, Central Bank of Chile. 
 
Díaz, R., Meller, P., and Pardo, A. (2002). “Análisis Económico-Descriptivo de las 
Regiones Chilenas.” Documentos de Trabajo nº 133, Centro de Economía Aplicada, 
Universidad de Chile.  
 
Díaz, R., and Meller, P. (2004). “Crecimiento Económico Regional Chile: Convergencia?” 
Documentos de Trabajo nº 180, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile. 
 
Economist Intelligence Unit (2010). “Democracy index 2010 Democracy in retreat.” The 
Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2010. 
 
Fuentes, R. and K. Schmidt-Hebbel. (2004). “Las bases del crecimiento económico de 
Chile: Resumen y conclusiones de un proyecto de investigación.” Manuscrito, Banco 
Central de Chile. 
 
Fuentes, R., M. Larraín y K. Schmidt-Hebbel. (2006). “Sources of Growth and Behavior 
of TFP in Chile.” Cuadernos de Economía, 41: 5-48. 
 
Geroski, P.A., (1995). “Innovation and Competitive Advantage.” OECD Economic 
Department Working Paper No. 159. OECD. 
 
Giarda, M., and Landerretche, O., (2011) “El Efecto Holandes en Chile: Heterogeneidad 
en Competitividad y Dinamica Macroeconomica”. Departamento de Economia, 
Universidad de Chile. Serie Documentos de Trabajo N 343, Santiago, Mayo de 2011. 
 
IADB. (2001). “Chile: Country Paper.” Washington, DC: Banco Interamericano de 
Desarrollo 
 
IMF. (2005). “Chile: Article IV Consultation -- Staff Report; Public Information Notice 
on the Executive Board Discussion; and Statement by the Executive Director for Chile.” 
IMF Country Report No. 05/315. Washington, DC International Monetary Fund. 
46
Democratic Institutions, Industrial Development and Economic Growth in Chile 
47 
 
Izuka,  M.,  and Katz,  J. (2011). “Natural Resource Industries, ‘Tragedy of the 
Commons’ and the Case of Chilean Salmon Farming.” International Journal of 
Institutions and Economies, Vol. 3, No. 2, July 2011, pp. 259-286 
 
Katz, J. (1969). “Production Functions, Foreign Investment and Growth, A Study based 
on the Argentine Manufacturing Sector 1946-1961”. North-Holland Publishing 
Company, Amsterdam-London. 
 
Katz, J. (2001). “Structural Reforms, Productivity and Technological Change in Latin 
America.” Cepal- Libros de la Cepal No 64. 
 
Lach, S. (2001). “Are the Public Subsidies to R&D Complement or Substitute to the 
Private R&D? The Israeli Empirical Evidence.” NBER Working Paper Series, 7943.  
 
Leung, D., Meh, C. and Terajima, Y. (2008) “Firm Size and Productivity” Bank of 
Canada Working Paper 2008-45 
 
Mairesse, J. and Mohnen, P. (2001). “To Be or Not To Be Innovative, An Exercise in 
Measurement.” NBER Working Papers 8644, National Bureau of Economic Research. 
 
Manzi, J., Strasser, K., San Martín, E., and Contreras, D. (2008). “Quality of Education in 
Chile.” Centro Medicion MIDE UC. 
 
MINEDUC (2010). “Indicadores de la Educación en Chile 2007-2008.” Departamento 
de Estudios y Desarrollo de la División de Planificación y Presupuesto,  ded.mineduc.cl. 
 
Ministerio de Economia (2009). “Informe 5ta Encuesta de Innovacion Tecnologica.” 
Division de Innovacion, Ministerio de economia de Chile. 
 
Ministerio de Economia (2010). “Resultados de las Encuestas de Innovación e I+D 
2007-2008.” Division de Innovacion, Ministerio de economia de Chile. 
 
OECD (2004). “Compendium of Patent Statistics.” OECD: Paris. 
 
OECD (2005). “OECD Economic Survey of Chile.” OECD, París. 
 
OECD (2010). “Factbook 2010: Economic, Environmental and Social Statistics.” 
OECD, Paris. 
 
OECD (2011). “Patents by main technology and by International Patent Classification 
(IPC).” OECD Patent Statistics (database).  
 
Chapter 1 
Paredes, R. and García, C. (2008). “Reducing the Educational Gap: Good Results in 
Vulnerable Groups.” Journal of Development Studies, Volume 46, Issue 3.  
 
Paredes, R.; Pinto, J.I. (2009). “¿El Fin de la Educación Pública en Chile?” Estudios de 
Economía, Santiago, v. 36, n. 1, jun.  2009.   
 
Salter, W.E.G, (1960). “Productivity and Technical Change”. The Syndics of Cambridge 
University Press, London. 
 
Schmidt-Hebbel, (2006). “El Crecimiento Economico de Chile.” Working Paper N 365, 
Central Bank of Chile. 
 
Tokman, A. (2005). “Diagnóstico y Propuestas para la Educación Chilena.” Economía 
Chilena 8(1): 53-74. 
 
United Nations (1948). “Universal Declaration of Human Rights.” G.A. res. 217A (III), 
U.N. Doc A/810 at 71 (1948).  
 
Vergara, R., and Rivero, R. (2006). "Productividad Sectorial en Chile: 1986-2001," Latin 
American Journal of Economics-formerly Cuadernos de Economía, Instituto de 
Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 43(127), pages 143-168. 
 
World Bank. (2002). “Country Assistance Strategy for Chile 2002-2006.” Washington, 
DC: World Bank. 
 
World Bank. (2005) “World Development Indicators.” Washington, DC: World Bank. 
 
World Bank. (2007). “World Development Indicators.” Washington, DC: World Bank. 
 
World Bank. (2010). “World Development Indicators.” Washington, DC: World Bank 
 
 
 
 
 
  
48
49 
 
Chapter 2 C O O P E R AT I O N  O N  
I N N O V A T I V E  I N V E S T M E N T S :  T H E  
R O L E  O F  I N F O R M A T I O N  F L O W S  
 
Abstract 
This chapter studies the determinants of R&D cooperation among innovative firms 
using data from the th4  Chilean Innovation Survey. It follows the empirical model 
developed by Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) in which cooperation is allowed to be a 
function of the technology of the information flows. Results show that incoming 
information spillovers, cost-risk sharing, use of legal protection, and firm size positively 
and significantly affect the probability of cooperation among Chilean firms, while lack of 
information about innovation has a negative impact on the same variable. In the 
empirical approach, information flows seem to have a larger impact than cooperation 
with universities and consulting agents. Endogeneity problems present in the model have 
been addressed using a two-stage conditional maximum likelihood test (2SCML) based 
on Rivers and Vuong (1988). After finding that incoming spillovers are endogenous, the 
model used the industry-level of incoming spillovers and basic nature of R&D as 
instrumental variables for the first stage estimates of incoming spillovers.  
  
Chapter 2 
2.1 Introduction 
The need to promote sustainable industries, with diversification of products that 
allows knowledge to accumulate and grow, has been one of the main ideas about Latin 
America that economists have discussed during the past decade.9 R&D activities have a 
very important impact on the development of new products and productive processes, as 
shown in Crepon, Duguet, and Mairesse (1995). When we study the innovative process 
of firms, it is very important to analyze not only the incentives for a firm to allocate 
financial resources to R&D but also how these innovative firms are able to share the 
knowledge and capacities of other organizations with the intention of together 
developing research activities that will later result in a process or product innovation.  
Cooperation in an innovative process is an efficient manner of developing innovative 
products and processes for various reasons. One reason is that cooperation may avoid 
duplicate innovative efforts by two or more firms. In particular, duplication can be 
avoided when cooperation takes place among competitors. Avoiding R&D duplication 
can lead to an important cost reduction for all firms participating in the cooperative 
process. Additionally, because of the possibility that the knowledge available in two 
organizations is complementary, cooperation may result in the development of a new 
process or product that would not have been possible with the information available to 
only one of the firms. However, more R&D collaboration does not necessarily lead to 
better innovation performance. R&D collaboration may present some disadvantages, 
such as risk of IP leakage, risk of management failure and high coordination cost. 
Cooperation may promote knowledge creation and diffusion and is therefore a 
phenomenon that should be studied in order to understand and promote development 
through innovation in Chile and Latin America.  
Following the paper by Cassiman and Veugelers (2002), this work uses a model that 
investigates the determinants of the likelihood of having cooperated with other firms on 
an innovative process. The possible endogeneity of the variables was tested using a two-
stage conditional maximum likelihood method. It was found that incoming spillovers is 
an endogenous factor; therefore, it was instrumented with industry-level incoming 
spillovers and basic nature of R&D.  A probit conditional maximum likelihood method 
with instrumental variables was applied in order to correct for the specification problem 
of the model caused by the endogenous variable detected in the first stage. 
This work uses a sample of 3,122 firms from the manufacturing and services sectors 
that replied to the Fourth Chilean Innovation Survey carried out in 2005 by the Chilean 
Statistical Office (INE). The survey refers to the innovative activities of firms from all 
Chilean regions during 2003 and 2004. 
We find that incoming spillovers affect the probability of cooperating positively and 
very significantly. This result has been robust in all the estimation procedures. Two 
factors that positively affect the probability of cooperating are the existence of legal 
                                              
9 This idea is developed in the work by Katz (2001). An analysis of the challenges and opportunities for industrial 
development in Latin America can be found also in Benavente et al (2007). 
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protection and an indicator of whether cost and risk sharing are perceived as a benefit. 
On the other side, lack of information negatively affects the probability of cooperating 
for innovative purposes, and this impact is very significant in all the estimations. Finally, 
larger firms cooperate significantly more than smaller firms, a finding that is also in 
accordance with the previous literature. 
The rest of this document is structured as follows. In section 2.2, we briefly 
comment on some conceptual antecedents and previous empirical findings. Section 2.3 
explains the econometric model. Section 2.4 refers to the data of the th4  Chilean 
Innovation Survey. Section 2.5 shows our main results and section 2.6 concludes. 
2.2 Previous Literature on R&D Cooperation Determinants  
The literature on R&D cooperation determinants focuses mainly on the importance 
of information flows to stimulate firms to engage or not in cooperative R&D activities. 
Recent empirical strategies have discussed a distinction between incoming information 
flows and outgoing information flows. These studies show how firms have more 
propensity to cooperate when they have enough absorptive capacity to receive and use 
external public knowledge, and when they can incorporate the knowledge generated by 
their own innovative activities. 
One of the most important inputs for a firm's innovative activities is knowledge. A 
firm that is capable of successfully incorporating information flows is probably more 
capable of, and willing to, engage in cooperative behavior for its innovative activities. On 
the other side, firms that can't incorporate the results of their innovative activities will 
tend not only to practice less cooperation but also to engage less in R&D activities. 
Laursen and Salter (2005) studied the link between the way firms search for new 
ideas with innovative performance. In order to better understand how firms draw 
knowledge from external sources they introduced the concepts of “external search 
breadth” and “external search depth”. They found that searching widely and deeply has 
an inverted U-shape relation with firm innovative performance. As firms search more 
widely and deeply they are more likely to have a better innovation performance. 
Nevertheless search can be expensive and laborious so after a tipping point is reached 
more breadth and depth affect innovation performance negatively. 
Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) developed a model in which they studied separately 
the effects of incoming spillovers and the ability to incorporate knowledge on the 
probability of participating in cooperative R&D agreements. They developed a very 
simple and intuitive empirical model and tested it using a sample of 411 firms. They used 
data from the Belgian Community Innovation Survey (CIS). They concluded that 
incoming spillovers and ability to incorporate knowledge have important and separately 
identifiable effects on R&D cooperation. Furthermore, they found differences in the size 
of the effect of these variables on cooperation with different types of partners. 
López (2004) used a similar approach to that developed by Cassiman and Veugelers 
(2002) and studied the determinants for R&D cooperation among Spanish manufacturing 
Chapter 2 
firms. Results showed a positive effect of the importance of external information sources 
and the ability of the firm to appropriate the returns from innovations on the probability 
of R&D cooperation. 
Mark and Graversen (2004) discussed the rationale for firms' choices of cooperative 
R&D partners, which can be public research institutions or private firms. They used 
micro data from the Danish Center for Studies in Research and Research Policy collected 
for the year 2001. The determinants for R&D cooperation included absorptive capacity 
and R&D time horizon. They found heterogeneity in the cooperation determinants for 
different kinds of partners. 
Atallah (2005) considered an R&D cooperation model with asymmetric firms. The 
study focused on cooperation among firms with different levels of efficiency. The results 
suggested that firms' preferences for choice of partners in cooperation depend on 
spillovers and on cost differences among firms. With low (high) spillovers, a firm prefers 
to cooperate with the most (least) efficient among the remaining firms. As the cost 
differential between firms increases, efficient (inefficient) firms prefer to cooperate with 
the most (least) efficient firm more often. 
Schmidt (2005) analyzed the determinants of R&D cooperation among German 
manufacturing firms. Using data from the Third Community Innovation Survey (CIS3), 
the paper focused on the effect of information flows over cooperation for R&D 
activities. He found a positive relationship between knowledge flows and cooperative 
activities. Moreover, evidence showed that firms with high intramural R&D budgets are 
more likely to cooperate with universities and research institutions than with suppliers 
and customers. 
Vencatachellum and Vesaevel (2006) studied the effects of spillovers on R&D 
cooperation using French data. They found that a firm which benefits from higher 
spillovers from its rivals is more likely to cooperate horizontally in R&D. Furthermore, 
the impact of incoming spillovers on R&D cooperation is positive and significant only 
when the spillovers are above a certain threshold. That is to say, the value and precision 
of the estimates increased with the information flows that firms reported receiving from 
their competitors. 
In Latin American countries some evidence has been gathered by economists in 
regard to the determinants of the probability of engaging in R&D cooperation 
agreements. Primi and Rovira (2011) made a comparison of R&D cooperation 
determinants among five Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and 
Uruguay). They found a small number of firms that engage in cooperative agreements 
and Chile is the country with the lowest rate of R&D cooperation (5.7%). In Chile, Brazil 
and Mexico firms tend to cooperate more with other firms (clients or suppliers) while in 
Argentina and Uruguay the preferred partners are S&T research centers and institutions. 
The paper by Alvarez, Benavente and Crespi (2010) discussed organizational change in 
Chile in relation to the economic cycle. They found that firms tend to engage more in 
R&D contracts during an economic crisis when final output demand is lower. Benavente 
and Contreras (2011) suggested that in Chile technical cooperation is inversely related 
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with firm size, probably because larger firms tend to vertically integrate their R&D 
activities. 
2.3 Knowledge Spillovers Econometric Model  
 The model used in this work is based on the idea that information flows are one of 
the most important aspects determining R&D cooperation. Cassimann and Veugelers 
(2002) separate information flows between those that come from outside and increase 
firm's knowledge, and those that come from the firm and allow other agents to benefit 
from the firm's experience and knowledge.  
Cooperation in the knowledge production process depends on the opportunities and 
risks associated with the cooperative strategy. It is expected that the more important the 
incoming knowledge flows or spillovers, the more likely it is that the firm will be able to 
benefit from R&D agreements. When public information sources are important for the 
firm's knowledge development, it is expected that the return to cooperating will be 
greater, because partners are more capable of transmitting useful information. 
Additionally, the level of ability to incorporate the knowledge that has been 
generated inside a firm or within a cooperation agreement could have a positive impact 
on the level of cooperation. Therefore, in our empirical model we consider a variable that 
measures the use of legal protection of knowledge, as declared by the firm, to capture this 
effect. When a firm is capable of protecting its knowledge by legal means, that is to say, 
when a firm has patents or know-how agreements, it may be more likely that it will 
cooperate.  
We also include other variables in the binary dependent variable model that may be 
likely to affect R&D cooperation agreements. Lack of information as a constraint for 
innovating is a variable that takes value 1 if lack of information is declared by the firm as 
an important restraint on innovating. If lack of information is important for innovative 
firms, that could mean that they do not have yet information about what is being done by 
competitors in their associated research topic, so they are not in a good position to 
cooperate with other firms or institutions. Thus, we expect this variable to affect the 
probability of cooperating in a negative way. 
We consider the possibility of sharing the risks and the costs of innovative activities 
when the risks and costs are high, as declared by the firms. When the costs and risks of 
innovative activities are perceived as high by the firms, it is more likely that they will tend 
to cooperate in order to produce process and product innovations in a less expensive 
way. This study has constructed a cost and risk sharing variable based on the following 
firm-level information: difficulty in finding sources of finance; high cost of innovating; 
perception of high risk; and too long a payback period for innovating activities. 
Finally, as shown in the previous empirical literature, firm size and R&D intensity 
may be R&D cooperation determinants. We have included the log of number of 
employees and its squared value, as well as R&D intensity and industry level of 
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cooperation, in order to control for size and unobservable industry level characteristics 
that may affect firms’ decision to cooperate with other firms or institutions. 
Under the assumption of no endogeneity problems, the model may be properly 
estimated as: 
 
ݕכ ൌ ߙ ൅ ݔߚ ൅ ߝݓ݅ݐ݄ߝ̱ܰሺͲǡͳሻ 
 
Where ݕכ is the expected value for a firm of choosing to have cooperation 
agreements, ܺ is a vector of independent variables, ߙǡ ߚ are parameters and ߝ is an error 
term. But the dependent variable is a latent variable and we do not observe ݕכ directly; 
instead we observe  ݕ as follows: 
 
ݕ ൌ ͳ݂݅ݕכ ൐ Ͳ 
ݕ ൌ Ͳ݂݅ݕכ ൑ Ͳ 
 
with y=1 if the firm chooses cooperates in R&D activities and 0 in other case. 
Because in our data the dependent variable R&D Cooperation is a binary variable taking 
only values 1 or 0, we need our econometric specification to be defined as a probit 
equation. The ܺ variables are incoming spillovers, easy imitation, lack of information, 
cost and risk sharing, legal protection, industry level, legal protection at industry level, 
R&D intensity, firm size (log of employees), and the square of firm size.
 
10 
As shown in previous literature, some of the variables included in this model may be 
endogenous. According to Cassiman and Veugelers (2002), incoming and outgoing 
information flows may be endogenous variables. Because firms that cooperate may also 
try to control information flows with their R&D agreements, the fact of cooperating may 
also be a determinant of the incoming information flows or spillovers. Moreover, an 
R&D agreement may also be used by firms to control the outgoing information flows to 
both partner firms and non-partner firms. 
Other studies, such as Veugelers (1997) and Colombo and Gerrone (1996), have 
found reasons to believe that R&D intensity may also be an endogenous regressor in this 
empirical model. We also consider these studies in this paper. Cost-risk has also been 
treated as an endogenous variable in Lopez (2004) because the effects of cooperating may 
also affect the degree to which firms consider the variables used to build this regressor to 
be obstacles to innovation. 
In order to approach the model in a more consistent way, we test for the presence of 
endogeneity. We perform a test on the four variables that have been referred to as 
endogenous in previous work that consider the determinants of R&D agreements. We 
first estimate the model using a two-stage conditional maximum likelihood method that 
has been described by Wooldrige (2002). This model, which was previously considered in 
Heckman and MaCurdy (1985) and Rivers and Vuong (1988), and has been used by a 
series of empirical studies, provides a simple way to test for the endogeneity of some of 
                                              
10 The detailed definition of each variable in the model can be found in Appendix 2. 
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the variables in the model. In the first step of this procedure, all the variables that are 
possibly endogenous are regressed one by one on all the variables that are assumed to be 
exogenous. The test is performed in the second step of this procedure, where we 
consider the residuals of each of the first step equations as independent variables of our 
main equation, which has R&D cooperation as dependent variable.  
We can now define a model that considers the presence of endogenous explanatory 
variables. We assume that the endogenous explanatory variables )( 2y  are a function of 
the other exogenous explanatory variables described in our previous equation )(X  and 
that they also depend on a set of instruments )(Z .  
Therefore, we can write the model as follows: 
 
ݕכ ൌ ߚଵݖଵ ൅ ߚଶݕଶ ൅ ݑଵ 
with:      ݕଶ ൌ ߚଷݖଵ ൅ ߚସݖଶ ൅ ݒଶ ൌ ߚହݖ ൅ ݒଶ 
 
where ݖଵ, ݖଶ are nku  and npu  matrices respectively while 2y  is a jnu  matrix. 
Then ߚଵ and ߚଷ are both ku1 , ߚସ is pu1 , ߚଶ is ju1 , and ߚହ  is a )(1 pk u vector. And 
we define that ݑଵ and ݒଶ have a joint normal distribution with a zero and finite positive 
covariance matrix: 
 
ȳ ൌ ൦
ɐ୳భଶ ෍ଵଶ
෍ଶଵ ෍ଶଶ
൪ 
 
We can write the normalization imposed by Wooldridge (2002): 
 
ߪ௨భଶ ൌ ܸܽݎሺݑଵሻ ൌ ͳ 
 
And under joint normality of ሺݑଵǡ ݒଶሻ, we can write  
 
ݑଵ ൌ ݒଶߠଵ ൅ ݁ଵ 
 
Where ߠଵ ൌ σ σݒଶݑଵିଵ௩మ௩మ  
 
Because of the joint normality of ሺݑଵǡ ݒଶሻ which implies that ݁ଵis also normally 
distributed with ܧሺ݁ଵሻ ൌ Ͳ and ܸܽݎሺ݁ଵሻ ൌ ܸܽݎሺݑଵሻ െ ߠଵᇱ σ ݒଶݒଶ ߠଵ ൌ ͳ െ
ߠଵᇱ σ ݒଶݒଶ ߠଵ, we can derive the following expression: 
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݂ሺݕǡ ݕଶȁݖሻ ൌ ሼȰሺݓ௜ሻሽ௬ሼͳ െ Ȱሺݓ௜ሻሽଵି௬ሺʹߨሻି
௠
ଶ ቚ෍ݒଶݒଶቚ
ିଵଶ ݁ݔ݌ ቊെͳʹ ሺݕଶ
െ ݖߚହሻ෍ ሺݕଶ െ ݖߚହሻԢ
ିଵ
௩మ௩మ
ቋ 
 
 
This way the log likelihood for observation ݅ is: 
 
ݕ௜݈݋݃Ȱሺݓ௜ሻ ൅ ሺͳ െ ݕ௜ሻ݈݋݃ሾͳ െ Ȱሺݓ௜ሻሿ െ
݊
ʹ ሺʹߨሻ െ
ͳ
ʹ ݈݋݃ ቚ෍ݒଶݒଶቚ
െ ͳʹ ቈሺݕ௜ଶ െ ݖ௜ߚହሻ෍ ሺݕ௜ଶ െ ݖ௜ߚହሻԢ
ିଵ
௩మ௩మ
቉ 
 
 
Where ݓ௜ ൌ ೥೔భഁభశ೤೔మഁమశሺ೤೔మష೥೔ഁఱሻഇభሺభషഇభᇲ σ ഇభሻೡమೡమ భ మΤ
 
 
And so we know that ݓ௜ depends on the parameters ሺߚଵǡ ߚଶǡ ߚହǡ ߠଵሻ. Summing the 
log likelihood across all ݅ and maximizing with respect to all parameters gives the MLEs 
of ሺߚଵǡ ߚଶǡ ߚହǡ σ ǡ௩మ௩మ ߠଵሻ. The estimate of ߠଵ is what Rivers and Vuong (1988) used to 
test for endogeneity of ݕଶ. 
2.4 Chilean Fourth Innovation Survey Data  
 The data used in this paper has been obtained from the Fourth Chilean Innovation 
Survey, collected by the National Institute of Statistics (INE) during the year 2005. The 
data refers to firm innovative activities during the years 2003 and 2004. 
Table 2.1 describes the database that has been used for this work. The sample is 
composed of 3,122 firms, of which 1,494 firms (48%) have reported that they innovated 
in the two-year period before the survey. The survey considered firms from the 
manufacturing, mining, energy, and services sectors. The most innovative enterprises in 
Chile are those from the mining sector, with 58% of innovative firms. The sector in 
which the smallest proportion of firms carries out some type of innovation is the services 
sector, with 43% of innovative firms. 
Of all innovating firms included in the sample, only 12.4% have cooperated with 
other firms in performing R&D activities. 106 firms cooperated with universities, 
representing 7.1% of innovating firms, while 96 firms cooperated with competitors, 
representing 6.2% of total innovative firms. The 93 firms that cooperated with consultant 
professionals represent 6.2% of innovative firms. Finally, the 166 firms that cooperate 
with customers represent 11% of innovating firms. 
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Table 2.1 Fourth Chilean Innovation Survey Basic Sample Statistics 
 All firms Innovating firms 
All Sample Firms  3,122 (100%) 1,494 (48%) 
 Manufacturing Firms  1,269 (41%) 640 (20%) 
Energy Firms 150 (5%) 72 (2%) 
Mining Firms  64 (2%) 37 (1%) 
Services Firms  1,412 (45%) 613 (20%) 
 Innovating but Not-Cooperating Firms   1,309 (42%) 
Innovating and Cooperating Firms  185 (6%) 
Firms Cooperating with Universities  106 (3%) 
Firms Cooperating with Competitors  93 (3%) 
Firms Cooperating with Consultants  93(3%) 
Firms Cooperating with Customers  166(5%) 
Note: Innovating and Cooperating Firms: percentage of firms that innovated and cooperated on innovative 
activities with any other agent (suppliers, clients, competitors, consultants, universities, research institutes). Firms 
Cooperating with Universities: number (percentage) firms that cooperated on innovative activities with 
universities. Firms Cooperating with Competitors: number (percentage) of firms that cooperated on innovative 
activities with competitors. Firms Cooperating with Consultants: number (percentage) of firms that cooperated 
on innovative activities with consultants. Firms Cooperation with Customers: number (percentage) of firms that 
cooperated on innovative activities with clients.  
 
Table 2.2 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Sample 
mean 
N=3,122 
Mean non- 
coopera-
ting firms 
N=1,309 
Mean 
coopera-
ting firms 
(N=185) 
Mean 
coopera-
tion with 
universities 
(N=106) 
Mean 
coopera-
tion with 
competitors 
(N=93) 
Mean 
coopera-
tion with 
consultants 
(N=93) 
Mean 
coopera-
tion with 
customers 
(N=166) 
 
 
 
Incoming 
Spillovers 0.655 0.653 0.686 0.707 0.741 0.752** 0.698 
Lack of Info 0.283 0.289 0.183** 0.160* 0.182** 0.150** 0.174** 
Cost-Risk 0.223 0.224 0.200 0.235 0.236 0.225 0.198 
Legal 
Protection 0.198 0.189 0.340** 0.405** 0.333** 0.408** 0.349** 
Employees 236 222 424* 460* 554* 539* 455* 
R&D 
Intensity 0.012 0.011 0.021** 0.032** 0.020 0.020 0.158 
Note: Cooperation: takes the value 1 if the firm has cooperated on innovative activities with any other agent 
(suppliers, clients, competitors, consultants, universities, research institutes) and 0 otherwise. Cooperation with 
Universities: takes the value 1 if the firm has cooperated on innovative activities universities and 0 otherwise. 
Cooperation with Competitors: takes the value 1 if the firm has cooperated on innovative activities with 
competitors and 0 otherwise. Cooperation with Consultants: takes the value 1 if the firm has cooperated on 
innovative activities consultants and 0 otherwise. Cooperation with Customers: takes the value 1 if the firm has 
cooperated on innovative activities with clients and 0 otherwise. Incoming Spillovers: takes values between 1 (low) 
and 4 (high) if innovation ideas are originated by professional conferences, exhibitions, meetings, and journals, and 0 
otherwise. Lack of Information: takes values between 1 (low importance) and 4 (high importance) when the lack 
of information is an obstacle for innovating and 0 otherwise. Cost-Risk: Sum of the scores of importance of the 
following declared obstacles to innovating (values between 0 (not relevant) and 4 (very important obstacle)): 
Difficulty in finding sources of finance; High cost of innovating; High risk perceived; Payback period too long. 
Rescaled between 0 (not relevant) and 1 (high). Legal Protection: takes the value 0 if the firm has no patents or 
know-how agreements and takes the value 1 otherwise. Employment: Log of number of employees of the firm. 
R&D Intensity: Ratio between intramural R&D expenditures and turnover. The difference in means between 
cooperating and non-cooperating firms that is significant at 5% is noted by **; at 10%, noted by *. 
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Table 2.2 presents the mean values of the most important variables of our model. 
Incoming Spillovers has a sample mean of 0.655 and is significantly higher for firms that 
cooperate with consulting professionals. Easy Imitation has a sample mean of 0.727 and 
presents no significant mean difference between cooperating and non-cooperating firms. 
Lack of Information has a sample mean of 0.283 and has a significantly lower mean value 
for firms that cooperate with any kind of partner. Cost-Risk has a sample mean of 0.223. 
This variable has a mean that is not significantly different between cooperating and non-
cooperating firms. Legal Protection has a sample mean of 0.198 and has a significantly 
higher mean value for firms that cooperate with any kind of partner. There are 236 
employees per firm on average. The number of employees is significantly higher for firms 
that cooperate, regardless of what kind of partner. R&D Intensity has a mean of 0.012 
for innovative firms and is significantly higher for firms that cooperate with at least one 
kind of partner and for firms that cooperate with universities. 
Table 2.3 contains the correlation matrix of different types of cooperation 
agreements. All kinds of cooperation are highly correlated. The highest correlation is 
between cooperation with Suppliers or Customers and Cooperation with Consultants 
while the lowest correlation level is between cooperation with Universities and 
cooperation with Competitors. 
Table 2.4 shows the correlation matrix of the dependent variable the main 
explanatory variables in the model. The detailed definition of each variable in the model 
can be found in Appendix 2. This first approach shows that R&D cooperation 
agreements are positively correlated with incoming spillovers and legal protection but 
negatively related with lack of information as declared by firms on the innovation survey. 
This is likely explained by the model developed by Cssiman and Veugelers (2002) in 
which incoming information flows stimulate cooperation while information losses relate 
to less R&D cooperation. R&D intensity and the basic nature of R&D also have positive 
correlations with cooperation agreements which is compatible to a system in which more 
R&D increases the probability of participating in R&D agreements. The industry level of 
cooperation has also a relatively high correlation with firm-level cooperation. Incoming 
spillovers has a negative but low correlation with lack of information and easy imitation, 
it relates positively to legal protection, size and basic nature of R&D. Legal protection 
relates negatively with easy imitation and positively with R&D intensity, export intensity 
and basic nature of R&D. Lack of information correlates positively with the perceived 
possibility to share elevated costs and risks and it relates negatively with easy imitation. 
Elevated perception of cost and risk associated with innovation investments is negatively 
correlated with easy imitation and firm size and positively correlated with R&D intensity 
and export intensity. Easy imitation correlates positively with firm size and export 
intensity and negatively with basic nature of R&D and R&D intensity. 
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2.5 Estimation Results 
2.5.1 Preliminary Probit Regressions 
Results shown in Table 2.5 suggest that there is evidence to believe that incoming 
information flows determine a greater likelihood of performing R&D cooperation within 
our sample. This result is robust for all regressions, no matter which kind of partner is 
being considered. The highest impact of incoming spillovers is on cooperation 
agreements with consultants and competitors. Cooperation with suppliers and customers 
and cooperation with universities seem to be affected in a smaller magnitude by the 
existence of incoming spillovers. 
The use legal protection affects positively and significantly the probability of 
engaging in R&D agreements. This is consistent with the empirical model previously 
specified. We have found that, for Chilean firms, the greatest impact of this variable is on 
cooperation with universities. 
Lack of Information affects negatively and significantly the probability of having 
R&D cooperation agreements inside of the Chilean firms. This parameter takes a higher 
absolute value when the dependent variable is cooperation with universities and 
cooperation with consultants. This result may be because firms that declare that they 
have a lack of information do not know what is being done by others in their research 
area. Thus, they are not prepared for cooperating with other firms on innovating 
activities. 
The Cost-Risk variable seems to affect cooperation agreements in a positive way. 
This result is consistent in all our specific-partner estimations but appears with a low 
significance in the regression that considers all kinds of cooperation together. The value 
of the parameter is higher for the dependent variables cooperation with competitors and  
cooperation with consultants. 
This specification also controls by Industry Level of Cooperation, Industry Level of 
Legal Protection, R&D Intensity during the period, Size, and Size Squared. All controls 
are always significant, except for R&D Intensity, which is only significant for cooperation 
with all partners and cooperation with universities. 
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Table 2.5 Results of Probit Preliminary Regressions11 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) 
Single Equation Cooperation Cooperation Cooperation Cooperation Cooperation 
 with any with with With with Suppliers 
Probit Estimates organization Universities Competitors Consultants or Customers 
Incoming Spillovers 0.042*** 0.025** 0.032*** 0.034*** 0.039*** 
 (0.016) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.015) 
Legal Protection 0.085*** 0.067*** 0.036** 0.049*** 0.082*** 
 (0.025) (0.020) (0.016) (0.017) (0.024) 
Lack of Info. 0 -0.035*** -0.022** -0.032*** -0.049*** 
 (0.017) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.015) 
Cost-Risk 0.034 0.035* 0.039** 0.034* 0.031 
 (0.024) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.023) 
Easy Imitation 0.012 0.014 0.015 0.017 0.015 
 (0.019) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.017) 
Industry Cooperation 1.406***     
 (0.262)     
Ind. Cooperation Univ.  1.163***    
  (0.222)    
Ind. Cooperation 
Comp.   1.212***   
   (0.209)   
Ind. Cooperation Cons.    1.140***  
    (0.207)  
Ind. Cooperation 
Vertical     1.333*** 
     (0.249) 
Ind. Legal Protection -0.252** -0.149* -0.171** -0.130* -0.203* 
 (0.127) (0.083) (0.081) (0.070) (0.108) 
R&D Intensity 0.226* 0.219*** 0.100 0.101 0.069 
 (0.130) (0.075) (0.085) (0.078) (0.136) 
Size -0.043** -0.016 -0.021** -0.027*** -0.037** 
 (0.019) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.017) 
Size squared 0.005*** 0.002 0.003** 0.003*** 0.004** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Log Likelihood -489.014 -314.526 -290.654 -288.947 -398.258 
ܲݎ݋ܾ ൐ ߯ଶ 85.35 90.07 72.96 87.42 71.61 
N 1463 1463 1463 1463 1463 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, ***significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, *significant at 10%. 
ܲݎ݋ܾ ൐ ߯ଶ refers to the Wald test of joint parameter significance. 
 
 
 
 
                                              
11 This set of regressions is reporting the marginal effects. 
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2.5.2 Two-Step Endogeneity Test Results  
We have used for our estimations a two-step endogeneity test that can be found in 
Heckman and MaCurdy (1985) and Rivers and Vuong (1988). This allows us to state the 
direction of the causality relationships for all the variables that we believe may be 
endogenously determined. In this case, we have tested the endogeneity of four of the 
independent variables included in our model. These variables are incoming spillovers, 
legal protection, R&D intensity, and cost-risk.  
In the first step of our test, we regress each of the allegedly endogenous regressors 
on all the assumed independent variables of the model. Then we use the predicted value 
of the latent variable in the second step of the estimation procedure. The second 
equation has R&D cooperation as dependent variable. It includes the residuals of each of 
the first step equations as regressors. We check the significance of these regressors in 
order to see if there are endogeneity problems. 
As shown in Table 2.6, we find that only Incoming Spillovers is endogenous for the 
regression of cooperation with all kinds of partners. Because some of the residuals may 
not be significant when included with other residuals, this test has also been performed 
for each potentially endogenous variable separately. The logic behind this test is that the 
residual of the regression that determines Incoming Spillovers affects significantly the 
probability of cooperation. The endogeneity tests for the regressions of cooperation with 
specific partners give the same result and therefore we have assumed the endogeneity of 
Incoming Spillovers in all our further estimations. The results of the final estimation 
procedure with instrumented incoming spillovers are documented in the following 
subsection.  
2.5.1 CML with Instrumental Variables Results  
Table 2.7 contains the instrumental variable results. The Conditional Maximum 
Likelihood method was used with a set of instrumental variables for incoming spillovers. 
The instruments that were used are industry level of incoming spillovers12, basic nature of 
R&D13 and export intensity14.  
Results show that the presence of incoming spillovers implies a higher probability of 
R&D cooperation. This result is seen on all regressions, independently of which kind of 
partner is being considered. Thus, we have reduced a negative bias of the incoming 
spillovers parameter related to endogeneity problems. The highest impact of incoming 
spillovers is on cooperation agreements with universities and consultants. Cooperation 
with suppliers and customers and cooperation with competitors seem to be affected at a 
smaller magnitude by the existence of incoming spillovers. 
Legal Protection affects positively and significantly the probability of engaging in 
R&D agreements. In accordance with the preliminary probit regressions, we have found 
that, for Chilean firms the greater impact of this variable is on cooperation with 
                                              
12 The correlation between Incoming Spillovers and Industry Level of Incoming Spillovers is 0.14 
13 The correlation between Incoming Spillovers and Basic Nature of R&D is 0.27 
14 The correlation between Incoming Spillovers and Export Intensity is 0.02 
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universities. We conclude that legal protection has a higher impact on cooperation with 
universities, consultants, and vertically related firms, compared to the impact it has on 
cooperation with competitors. 
 
Table 2.6 Testing for Endogeneity, Results of 2SCML 
Two Stages (a) (b) (c) 
Conditional ML Cooperation Cooperation Cooperation 
 with all Partners with all Partners with all Partners 
Incoming Spillovers 0.163** 0.163* 0.168* 
 (0.098) (0.098) (0.098) 
Lack of Info -0.447** -0.444*** -0.399*** 
 (0.176) (0.157) (0.169) 
Cost-Risk -0.023 -0.023 0.059 
 (0.194) (0.194) (0.177) 
Legal Protection 0.304** 0.305** 0.266** 
 (0.122) (0.120) (0.177) 
Easy Imitation 0.063 0.059 0.106 
 (0.152) (0.118) (0.146) 
Industry Cooperation 7.623*** 7.627*** 6.916 
 (1.579) (1.576) (1.409) 
R&D Intensity -4.362 -4.370 1.118 
 (5.277) (5.276) (0.732) 
Size -0.293*** -0.293*** -0.243** 
 (0.113) (0.112) (0.102) 
Size squared 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.027*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
T Incoming Spillovers 0.410** 0.410** 0.402** 
 (0.192) (0.192) (0.192) 
T Legal Protection -0.995 -0.997 -0.590 
 (0.807) (0.806) (0.711) 
T R&D Intensity 5.666 5.673  
 (5.403) (5.402)  
T Cost-Risk 0.026  0.042 
 (0.625)  (0.623) 
Constant -0.571 -0.563 -1.125* 
 (0.846) (0.825) (0.668) 
Log Likelihood -488.252 -488.253 -488.831 
ܲݎ݋ܾ ൐ ߯ଶ 86.87 86.87 85.71 
N 1463 1463 1463 
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis, ***significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, *significant at 10%. 
ܲݎ݋ܾ ൐ ߯ଶ refers to the Wald test of joint parameter significance. 
 
Lack of information affects negatively and significantly the probability of having 
R&D cooperation agreements among Chilean firms. As in the previous probit regressions 
from table 3, this parameter takes a relatively higher absolute value when the dependent 
variable is cooperation with consultants.  
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Table 2.7 Results of CML with Instrumental Variables 
Instrumental Variables 
Probit Estimates 
(a) 
Cooperation 
with any 
organization 
(b) 
Cooperation 
with 
Universities 
(c) 
Cooperation 
with 
Competitors 
(d) 
Cooperation 
with 
Consultants 
(e) 
Cooperation 
with Suppliers 
or Customers 
Incoming Spillovers 0.602** 1.000*** 0.813** 1.056*** 0.735*** 
 (0.273) (0.260) (0.318) (0.282) (0.285) 
Legal Protection 0.306*** 0.338*** 0.197 0.292** 0.338*** 
 (1.340) (0.123) (0.133) (0.128) (0.115) 
Lack of Info -0.302*** -0.366*** -0.272* -0.417*** -0.286** 
 (0.114) (0.142) (0.145) (0.154) (0.125) 
Cost-Risk 0.166 0.261** 0.328** 0.299** 0.201 
 (0.116) (0.131) (0.139) (0.138) (0.125) 
Easy Imitation 0.078 -0.008 0.009 0.231 0.009 
 (0.108) (0.129) (0.14) (0.141) (0.029) 
Industry Cooperation 6.448***     
 (1.340)     
Industry Cooperation Univ.  8.638***    
  (1.964)    
Ind. Cooperation Comp.   11.315***   
   (2.240)   
Ind. Cooperation Cons.    10.753***  
    (2.276)  
Ind. Cooperation Vertical     8.656*** 
     (2.021) 
R&D Intensity 1.111 1.799** 1.061 0.802 1.042 
 (0.720) (0.722) (0.897) (0.884) (0.766) 
Size -0.248** -0.183* -0.250** -0.332*** -0.227** 
 (0.100) (0.110) (0.112) (0.111) (0.104) 
Size squared 0.027*** 0.017 0.028*** 0.037*** 0.024** 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) 
Constant -1.590*** -2.152*** -2.218*** -2.158*** -1.886*** 
 (0.279) (0.301) (0.317) (0.310) (0.293) 
Log Likelihood -1452.901 -1275.436 -1254.715 -1251.228 -1361.570 
ܲݎ݋ܾ ൐ ߯ଶ 81.51 108.30 71.50 95.85 70.80 
N 1463 1463 1463 1463 1463 
Note: Conditional Maximum Likelihood Regression, standard errors in parentheses, ***significant at 1%, 
**significant at 5%, *significant at 10%. Incoming Spillovers was instrumented with Industry Level of Incoming 
Spillovers and Basic Nature of R&D. The instruments have 14% and 27% correlation with the instrumented 
variable, respectively. ܲݎ݋ܾ ൐ ߯ଶ refers to the Wald test of joint parameter significance. 
 
The Cost-Risk variable affects cooperation agreements in a positive way. This result 
is significant in all cases, with the exception of the regression in which the dependent 
variable is cooperation with all kinds of partners. Cost-Risk has a more intensive impact 
on cooperation with competitors and cooperation with consultants. 
In general, after controlling for the presence of endogeneity, we find that our results 
are robust and that the differences in the parameters with respect to the simple probit 
regressions are in accordance with the presence of a bias that has been successfully 
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addressed in the regressions shown in Table 2.7. This model also controls by industry 
level of cooperation, industry level of legal protection, R&D intensity during the period, 
size, and size squared.  
2.6 Concluding Remarks 
 This chapter presented the results of evaluating R&D cooperation determinants 
among Chilean firms during the years 2003-2004. The data used for this study was 
obtained from the Fourth Chilean Innovation Survey (2005). This data has the 
characteristic of distinguishing among different kind of R&D partners with which firms 
cooperate. The empirical model relates the probability of R&D cooperation to 
information flows and innovation restrictions among firms that have innovated. 
In order to take into account the existence of endogeneity problems in our 
preliminary probit regressions, the empirical model was estimated using Instrumental 
Variables and Conditional Maximum Likelihood Methods. Following previous literature 
on R&D cooperation determinants, we have also tested the existence of endogeneity on 
incoming and outgoing information flows and also on R&D intensity and cost-risk 
variables. Our findings show that incoming spillovers is the only endogenous regressor in 
the model. By instrumenting incoming spillovers with the industry average and with basic 
nature of R&D, we obtained a considerable reduction in the bias of the parameters 
produced by endogeneity problems. 
Results show that incoming spillovers determine a significantly greater probability of 
R&D cooperation. This is seen in all regressions, independently of which kind of partner 
is considered. Using Instrumental Variables increased the value of the incoming spillover 
parameter. Incoming information flows affect cooperation with universities and with 
consulting agents to a larger extent than they affect cooperation with competitors, 
suppliers, and customers.  
This finding shows that one important channel for promoting innovation is to 
improve access to information flows that are public but do not always find their way to 
the minds of those who can use them in innovation. Information spillover could be 
promoted through the collection and sharing of data relevant to markets, such as prices 
and product characteristics. Information flows are also stronger if the know-how in many 
industries can be made easily accessible to everyone who wants to learn.  
On the other side, legal protection has a higher effect on cooperation with 
universities and consultants but also effects cooperation along the vertical chain that 
connects the firm to suppliers and customers.  
Lack of Information impacts negatively and significantly the probability of having 
R&D cooperation agreements for the Chilean firms, while cost-risk seems to affect 
cooperation agreements in a positive way. This result is significant in most of our 
regressions.  
Our results add to the literature by confirming the main findings of Cassiman and 
Veugelers (2002) and the literature that follows. We find similar results using a larger 
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sample of 1463 innovating firms, even though our data is from a developing country in 
which overall R&D performance is lower than in the developed world.  
These empirical findings have important policy implications. In the first place, we 
conclude that facilitating public information flows should be a policy tool to promote 
innovation. Improvements in legal protection of knowledge may also have a positive 
impact on the level of cooperation among firms, by protecting property rights or patents 
for future inventions. 
Further work should consider evaluating these results using a panel of innovation 
surveys over a period of several years. Lagged variables could also be added as additional 
instruments for the endogenous explanatory variables if panel data was available.  
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Chapter 3 P R O D U C T  I N N O V A T I O N ,  
P R I C E  G R O W T H ,  A N D  L A B O R  
P R O D U C T I V I T Y  
 
Abstract 
This chapter develops a new measure for product innovation based on product-firm-
level information and evaluates the impact of innovation on manufacturing productivity 
at the firm level. The absence of individual firm data on price growth is one of the main 
restrictions of the empirical study of production functions. This problem occurs when 
observed nominal output growth cannot be separated into unobserved real production 
growth and price changes. We develop a novel strategy to estimate annual firm-level price 
growth and product innovation indicators. We use a panel containing detailed firm-level 
and product-firm level information provided by the Chilean Statistical Office (INE) for 
the period 1996-2003.  Following the work of Mairesse and Jaumandreu (2005) we 
compare the outcome of different ways in which firm-level price data may be 
incorporated in the econometrics of production. We find that incorporating new 
products is associated with productivity growth, while dropping products is related to 
decreases in productivity. We also find that estimating a production function using 
nominal or real output makes very little difference to the estimated input and scale 
elasticities. 
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3.1 Introduction 
Independently of how welfare is supposed to be distributed, economists are usually 
involved with the ideal of maximizing the benefits that may be obtained from a given 
flow or process. This paper studies empirically the maximization process in the 
manufacturing industry where firms choose optimally how to allocate production factors 
to different products across markets in order to maximize a utility function.  
The efficiency of labor in the manufacturing industry is a way to measure the level of 
success of the industry. When average labor productivity is increasing, a nation can 
produce the same value with less effort from its labor force. Otherwise, keeping the labor 
effort constant, it could produce a growing amount of value. Because economists are 
interested in achieving economic development for nations, this work will estimate 
average manufacturing productivity growth as a measure of how added welfare is growing 
and allowing further development to take place.  
When studying manufacturing production, innovation, and productivity, Chilean 
industry is of specific interest as a case of a small and open economy. Previous studies of 
growth in the context of the Chilean economy have pointed out the importance of 
manufactured exports and the widening of the comparative advantage as an engine of 
economic growth. In Chile, the extraction of non-renewable natural resources represents 
a high share of total exports. If the governing agents are interested in a sustainably 
growing economy, then an important share of mining industry revenues should be 
reinvested in knowledge, infrastructure, and physical capital.  
The main objective of this study is to understand the effect of innovations on 
productivity at the level of firms. With this objective in mind, we used product level data 
to develop several novel measures of product innovation, including the number of 
products added and dropped from production and the proportion of innovated sales at 
the firm-level. Using this new information, we estimated separated production functions 
with different product innovation measures to estimate the effect of innovation on 
productivity. 
An innovative feature of the present study is that we succeed in estimating 
productivity growth in real terms using an individual firm-level price deflator. We are 
aware that a large number of studies have already explored the relationship between 
knowledge, R&D investment, innovation, and productivity or firm success. Therefore, in 
this paper, we introduce new measures of product innovation based on product-firm 
level panel data that describes the product mix changes inside firms over a period of eight 
years. We also measure innovation in a way that is comparable with the Oslo Manual 
framework.  
There are two main possible sources of bias when we estimate production functions 
using firm-level data. On one side, a bias may arise from the fact that price levels are not 
observed and are likely to be correlated with the levels of output. The second bias is 
caused by the fact that inputs may be chosen simultaneously with output. This paper 
proposes a particularly innovative solution for the first bias by incorporating information 
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on prices into the productivity equations. However, if we assume that there is serial 
correlation between input choice and the residuals, then our parameters may still be 
considered biased, even though the first bias was accounted for and corrected. 
We compared production function estimation made with non-deflated, industry-level 
deflated, and firm-level deflated output. The main objective of this exercise was to 
evaluate whether the factor elasticity parameters and the scale elasticities are biased in the 
case of the production function estimation using non-deflated or industry level deflated 
output per employee measures. We estimated revenue and production functions in levels 
and in first differences using Ordinary Least Squares and Instrumental Variables. From 
these estimations, the evidence can be directly analyzed by comparing the regression 
parameters, coefficients, and significance levels. The assumption of constant returns to 
scale was also evaluated in a set of regressions.  
In this study, we have combined data from manufacturing industry surveys, 
innovation surveys, and manufacture products surveys. One of the advantages of 
merging different databases is that we can combine the information at the firm level with 
specific details on quantities and prices of products within firms and across markets. We 
analyze the evidence using an unbalanced panel of 2,439 firms that was provided by the 
Chilean Statistical Office (INE) for the period 1996-2003. From product-firm level data, 
we were able to construct a firm-level price growth variable and a set of product 
innovation indicator variables. This data was merged with the Annual Industrial Survey 
(ENIA) from which the rest of the production variables were obtained. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 contains a summary of the 
achievements, difficulties and challenges that may be found in the previous literature 
regarding the specification of the production function. Section 3 explains the empirical 
strategy and a simple model that allows comparing the estimation of production 
functions with and without individual firm-level prices. Section 4 gives details on the 
database that was used for this study. Results are shown in section 5, and section 6 
concludes. 
 
3.2 Previous Literature on Production Function Estimation 
The estimation of labor productivity functions in the manufacturing industry has 
been for many years a topic of interest for economists. One of the most fundamental 
econometric approaches was the well-known contribution of Cobb and Douglas (1928). 
The literature that follows has included a rich discussion focused on two main sources of 
bias that appear from the original functional form. The first source of bias arises from the 
correlation between observed input choices and unobserved productivity shocks. 
Marschak and Andrews (1944) proposed a two-equation model of producer behavior that 
contains a Cobb-Douglas production function and variable input demand functions.  
Griliches (1957) proposed a formal framework by which empirical researchers could at 
least have an idea of the sign and size of this specification bias on the estimated 
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parameters. His contribution was important for clarifying that the marginal productivity 
of observed inputs was biased upward by the omission of managerial input variables.  
A second source of bias arises because of the absence of data that reports the change 
of prices at the firm level. This problem was analyzed by Klette and Griliches (1996). 
They showed that a common price deflator across firms is likely to bias the estimations 
of the production function. This problem originates in manufacturing firms that operate 
in imperfectly competitive markets. When individual firms are capable of setting the price 
at a wider range, the firm-level dispersion of price growth makes it unreasonable to 
deflate sales using the industry average price growth. Non-deflated or industry average 
deflated production variables may lead to a downward bias in the scale parameters 
obtained from production function regressions. This bias is affected by the magnitude of 
the parameters and the amount of variation in the different shocks.  
The present paper offers an alternative method to empirically evaluate this 
theoretical model. If the estimates obtained using firm-level deflators are significantly 
different, that would support the theoretical model developed in Klette and Griliches 
(1996). On the other hand, and as the evidence found by Mairesse and Jaumandreu 
(2005) suggests, if there is no significant variation in the parameters when using deflated 
or non-deflated output, we could conclude that firm-level price dispersion is not large 
enough to generate a bias on the elasticity parameters when estimating labor productivity 
using non-deflated output as a proxy for real output.  
A famous contribution was made by Olley and Pakes (1996). They proposed a 
methodology by which they used investment as an instrument for input demand. Their 
method also considered the fact that some firms enter and exit the market as a result of 
their own levels of productivity causing a bias in the panel estimates.  
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where y , l  and k  stand for output, labor and capital while i  and a  stand for 
investment and firm age respectively. They define I  as a function of observables that 
allows controlling for unobservable productivity. Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) extended 
the previous model considering intermediate inputs to control for correlation between 
input levels and the unobserved firm-specific productivity process. They show an 
advantage of this extended model for the case in which the investment proxy has too few 
non-cero values. 
A significant contribution to the empirical methods for the estimation of production 
functions was made by Arellano and Bond (1991). They developed a model for the 
estimation of production functions by the generalized method of moments (GMM). For 
this purpose they used individual effects, lagged dependent variables, and no strictly 
exogenous variables in order to obtain the different distribution moments of the 
estimated functions. They also used specification tests that they could apply after 
estimating a GMM model. Their experiments were performed by using both generated 
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and real data. They proposed a test for serial correlation based on the GMM residuals as 
an alternative to Sargan tests of over-identifying restrictions and Haussman specification 
tests. The paper by Blundell and Bond (2000) proposed that first-differences GMM 
estimations are subject to large finite sample bias. Therefore they proposed a dynamic 
GMM specification that includes also the level moments as instruments. 
A survey of empirical work with a review of the methods and criticisms of 
production function estimation was made by Griliches and Mairesse (1998). Their work 
shows how the production function estimation shifted its focus from the use of macro 
aggregated data in the 1930s to industrial and firm-level data between the 1970s and 
1990s. They also summarized some of the most important contributions that were made 
to the production function estimation literature, showing why and how researchers have 
made continuous efforts to develop estimation methods that are robust to the 
simultaneity problem. A relatively recent and complete review of the production function 
estimation literature may be found in Ackerberg, Benkard, Berry, and Pakes (2005). 
In general the literature that refers to the empirical estimation of the production 
function has two limitations. The first is regarding the endogeneity of inputs which has 
been addressed with several methodologies summarized here. In second place the 
literature has found a problem in estimating the production function in the absence of 
firm-level price information that can allow distinguishing nominal output growth from 
real production increases. It is in this regard that the present chapter gives a contribution 
to the literature. We provide firm-level price growth with which our production function 
is based on real output instead of nominal output or industry-level deflated output 
growth. 
Taking the models and the empirical evidence of product level price dispersion into 
account, some attempts have been made to estimate production functions using firm-
level price growth to deflate output.  The first published paper that was able to control 
for firm-level price changes in the context of production functions estimation was 
Abbott (1991).  The computation of firm-level price change was made by observing 
directly the quantities of different cement varieties together with the data on shipments 
obtained from three years of the U.S. Census of Manufacturing. Among Abbott’s 
conclusions, he found that there exists real price variation across manufacturing 
producers that goes beyond product quality differences and is caused by local conditions 
in both the input and the output markets.   
Because lack of individual firm information on output prices is a major problem in 
the econometrics of production, Mairesse and Jaumandreu (2005) use Spanish data that 
includes a self-reported inflation index at the firm level. They developed a model to 
compare production function estimates using non-deflated output as well as industry-
level and firm-level deflated output. They found that different ways to deflate output do 
not make a significant difference in the results of their production function estimates. 
They conclude that there are other biases which are probably more important and may be 
due to other sources of specification errors.  
Taking advantage of the data, and following the results of the previous work, 
Jaumandreu and Mairesse (2006) then used French and Spanish data with firm-level 
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average price changes to formalize a system of equations in which output demand and 
input demands were taken into consideration at the same time that a production function 
was estimated.  
In a different approach, Foster, Haltiwagner, and Syverson (2008) used 11 groups of 
firms that produced “homogeneous goods” and computed the prices, dividing total sales 
by total physical output at the firm level. They found that there are important differences 
between revenue and physical productivity. They show that physical productivity is 
inversely related to price, while revenue productivity is positively correlated with price. 
They also found that young producers charge on average lower prices than incumbents. 
There are several research questions in which econometric studies with industrial 
surveys have been limited because of the absence of firm-level price growth or real 
output growth data. Based on a line of research started by Hall (1988), the studies by 
Crepon et al. (1999) and Dobbelaere and Mairesse (2008) estimated price–cost margins, 
scale economies, and workers’ bargaining power at the firm level.  Other work studied 
the impact of innovative sales and process innovation on employment and found a 
limitation in their models as well, because of having non-observed firm-level price 
dispersion. Some examples are Harrison et al. (2008), Benavente and Lauterbach (2008) 
and Hall et al. (2008). 
Different approaches have been used at least from the 1970s to measure the role of 
innovation, own R&D, and R&D spillovers as sources of knowledge of productivity at 
the firm level. The work by Mairesse and Mohnen (1994) and Hall, Mairesse, and 
Mohnen (2010) contain a complete review of previous work and empirical strategies that 
evaluated the impact of R&D investment on productivity. They concluded that increasing 
knowledge and higher levels of R&D investment are associated not only with labor 
productivity growth but also with expansions in the variety of products produced by the 
manufacturing industry.  
The paper of Crepon et al. (1998) used French manufacturing firms data and 
developed a structural model that explained productivity by innovation output, and 
innovation output by research investment. In their productivity equation they found that 
firm productivity correlates positively with a higher innovation output, even when 
controlling for the skill composition of labor as well as for physical capital intensity. 
Benavente (2006) studied this model using data from 488 Chilean firms. He found that 
the effects of innovative output over Chilean firms’ productivity are not significant at 
least contemporaneously.  
The work by Alvarez et al (2012) uses the same data to the one in the present paper 
to study the relation of Chilean firms’ product mix changes with productivity during the 
period 1996-2000. Their results suggest a positive and increasing impact of product mix 
changes on total factor productivity and labor productivity after two years of the 
introduction of product mix changes. 
The varied evidence in previous literature makes it interesting to use a group of new 
product innovation definitions to introduce firm-level productivity estimates. The present 
paper incorporates new innovation measures and firm-level price growth estimates that 
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provide much more accurate information on new products, old products, the proportion 
of innovative sales, and real output growth. 
 
3.3 Productivity and Innovation Empirical Strategy 
This research is focused on factor elasticities of the production function and on the 
effects of product innovation on productivity. We have created a new measure for 
product innovation based on the product-mix changes within firms across time. From 
product-firm level data, we observe which products are introduced and when they are 
introduced and dropped from firms’ production. We computed a set of variables that 
describe firms’ product-mix change behavior. From this information, we have also 
obtained the value in the present year of the proportion of sales that corresponds to the 
products that were introduced in the previous two years. Similarly, the proportion of 
sales of products that were dropped during the previous two years is represented by the 
share of total sales that these products had before being dropped. The model in this 
paper was used to test the productivity effects of product innovation in two different 
ways. First, it evaluated whether the behaviors of adding and dropping products over a 
period of two years have an impact on firms’ labor productivity. Secondly, the empirical 
strategy also tested the effects of the rate of innovative sales on firms’ labor productivity. 
While this paper evaluates the effects of innovation on productivity, these results are 
not directly comparable with previous studies that evaluate the effect of innovation on 
productivity. This is because innovation indicators in this paper were constructed based 
on product-firm level information and not on self-reported innovation levels. The 
correlation between the number of products added over a two-year period and product 
innovation level from the 4th Innovation Survey is approximately 0.2 for the year 2003. In 
this study, we measure the inclusion and exclusion of products and not the degree of 
innovativeness that these products represent for a firm. Furthermore, our measure of 
product innovation does not intend to define the degree of innovation of products that 
remain into the firm’s product mix but only those that were added or dropped during a 
specific period. Therefore, even though we focus on the measurement of innovation at 
the firm level, this approach actually evaluates the effects on productivity of the number 
of products that were added and dropped from the firm’s production function. 
Additionally, this research focuses on the difficulties that have been found in 
previous production function studies, and will apply a new empirical strategy based on 
the availability of product-firm level information to overcome some of these problems. 
The literature that focuses on the estimation of production functions has directed its 
attention to two main biases that arise from the estimation of a Cobb-Douglas 
production function.  
One source of bias that is potentially present in the estimation of production 
functions is related to the endogeneity that arises from the correlation between observed 
input choices and unobserved productivity shocks. Marschak and Andrews (1944) 
commented that this difficulty arises because the researcher can observe the levels of 
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inputs associated with a certain level of final output but he cannot see the market 
information and technological changes that are being taken into account by the manager 
who decides the input levels.  The identification of IV and GMM equations using valid 
instruments for the input levels is very difficult. To try to solve this problem, this paper 
considers the use of external instruments that account for inputs cost. An alternative that 
has been widely used in previous literature is the use of lagged values of the variables in 
first differences to instrument the equations in levels and lagged values of the variables in 
levels to include as instruments for the equations in first differences. 
The second source of bias in the estimation of the production function is associated 
with the fact that the level of prices is typically not observed and therefore a revenue 
function is used instead of a production function. In imperfectly competitive markets, a 
manager’s price decision is related to both market conditions and technological changes. 
Therefore, if imperfect competition is the predominant market structure in which firms 
operate, there is intra-industry price growth dispersion that reflects market power and 
differentiation of products within markets. In this context, ignoring firm-level price 
dispersion when there is a correlation between firms’ price behavior and their own input 
decision will result in biased input and scale elasticities estimates.  
The analysis in Klette and Griliches (1996) explains the bias that arises from the 
absence of firm-level prices in production functions. Following their idea, which is also 
explained in the work of Mairesse and Jaumandreu (2005), we assume that the 
production function is represented by a Cobb-Douglas function for every firm ݅ in each 
year t
t
. We can write an expression in the form of the standard (log) linear regression as 
follows, 
ݍ௜௧ ൌ ܽ௧ ൅ ߙ݇௜௧ ൅ ߚ݈௜௧ ൅ ߣ݅݊݊௜௧ ൅ ݑ௜௧      ݓ݅ݐ݄݅ ൌ ͳǡǥ ǡܰܽ݊݀ݐ ൌ ͳǡǥ ǡ ܶ   (1) 
where ݍǡ ݇ and ݈ are the levels of the values of output, capital and labor expressed in 
logs, ݅݊݊ contains information on the changes to the specific products made within the 
firm, ݑdenotes the error or disturbance term, ܽ௧ is the log of autonomous technical-
progress coefficients (or log average total factor productivity), and ߙǡ ߚ and ߤ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚ 
are the capital, labor, and scale elasticities, respectively. 
One of the essential assumptions for this model is that we use a real or volume 
measure of output at the individual firm level. As we usually lack firm information on the 
prices of output at the individual level, the real or volume value of output is 
approximated by the observed nominal output deflated by an industry average price 
growth index. Therefore, instead of estimating equation (1), what we estimate in this case 
is: 
ሺݕ௜௧ െ ݌ௌ௧ሻ ൌ ݍ௜௧ ൅ ሺ݌௜௧ െ ݌ௌ௧ሻ ൌ ܽ௧ ൅ ߙ݇௜௧ ൅ ߚ݈௜௧ ൅ ߣ݅݊݊௜௧ ൅ ݒ௜௧    (2) 
where ݌௜௧  and  ݌ௌ௧ are, respectively, the (log) price index of firm ݅ and the (log) price 
index of industry ܵ to which firm ݅ belongs. Equation (2) shows that the firm (log) price 
deviation from the industry (log) price is a part of the disturbance term:  
 ݒ௜௧ ൌ ሺ݌௜௧ െ ݌ௌ௧ሻ ൅ ݑ௜௧     (3) 
In summary there are two conditions under which the factor and scale elasticities will 
be biased. The first is that there must be significant output price dispersion within 
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industries. The second is that output prices must be significantly correlated with the level 
values of inputs. It can be shown that both input and scale elasticities will be 
underestimated under these conditions. The underestimation of production function 
parameters is inversely proportional to the markup and is larger for a smaller absolute 
price elasticity of demand.  
This study proposes a method to take into account this bias source using 
information on price levels and price growth at the level of firms. The empirical strategy 
is based on replicating traditional production function estimation with newly available 
data using firm-level price deflators instead of nominal output growth as a proxy for real 
output, or industry-level price deflators as a second best solution. One of the main 
objectives of this research is to measure the biases on the parameters produced by the 
unobserved within-sectors price dispersion. We want to test whether there are differences 
in the estimated parameters of input elasticities and scale economies using new price 
deflators that we can obtain at the firm level as well as at the three-digit industry level of 
disaggregation.  
There are nevertheless at least two cases in which not observing individual firms 
output prices becomes irrelevant. The first is the case in which demand price elasticity is 
very high, markup has a value near zero, and firms’ price dispersion is negligible. In this 
case, dispersion of price growth across firms would essentially reflect random 
measurement errors. This could be the case of a few highly competitive industries or also 
if we were considering the long run. The second case is one in which the correlation 
between real output growth and the change in prices is low relative to the relation 
between price change and other shocks. If the correlation between price change and 
output volume change is small, then the transmitted correlation between output prices 
and inputs will be also small.  
These estimations use OLS and IV methods as their main empirical strategies.  For 
our IV estimations, we rely on external instruments. That is to say, we prefer to 
instrument production factors with variables that reflect their respective costs rather 
using only past values of the same instrumented variables in levels or first differences. 
The main instruments used for materials, capital, and number of employees are the user 
cost of capital, the number of hours worked, and the value of wages paid. As an 
additional instrument, the first differences of intermediates per employee were used on 
the estimates in levels, while the levels of intermediates per employee were used on the 
first differences estimates. All equations were estimated in levels and in first differences. 
We also evaluate the imposition of constant returns to scale by excluding the number of 
employees from the equations.  
This work has the advantage of having information on firm capacity utilization rates 
to include in the regressions. Capacity utilization rates are usually ignored in this kind of 
study, and we believe this causes a serious source of bias in time-series-type estimates if 
the utilization rates are dispersed across sectors. In this paper, we use the log of total 
number of days worked during the year in order to consider capacity utilization in our 
estimated equations. The non-observable firm-level prices and capacity utilization rates 
produce similar biases but reflect different kinds of economic behaviors. Therefore, 
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taking both into consideration at the same time will allow us to assess the specific impact 
of the dispersion of output price changes without confusing this effect with the impact of 
the variability of capacity utilization. 
 
3.4 Chilean Manufacturing Industry Data 
The data used for this work corresponds to the Annual National Manufacturing 
Survey (ENIA) carried out by the Chilean Statistical Unit (INE). A group of firm-level 
and product firm-level datasets were combined to obtain an ideal dataset for production 
function estimation.15 In what follows, only the unbalanced panel of firms that reported 
both firm-level and product-firm level data is used. Observations with leaps and those 
that were observed less than three consecutive times over the 8-year period were deleted 
from the database. After merging the information from all databases, the result was an 
unbalanced panel of 8 periods from 1996 to 2003 that contains 2,439 plants and 15,839 
observations.  
 This section discusses the characteristics of the dataset, the variables that were 
created, and the basic statistics for all the estimating variables from the econometric 
model. In the first place, it describes how a set of product innovation indicators was 
defined based on the annual manufacturing industry survey data from ENIA that was 
provided from 1996 to 2003 at the level of products inside firms. Some correlation 
measures are offered afterward in order to compare the behavior of the new product 
innovation measures among themselves, as well as with data from the Fourth Chilean 
Innovation Survey. From yearly information about product prices inside each firm, it was 
possible to calculate firm-level average price growth in order to distinguish the difference 
between real output growth and nominal output growth. How these firm-level price 
growth measures were obtained is explained in Appendix 4. 
3.4.1 A Measure of Product Innovation 
Using as a starting point a product-level database that can be combined with the 
traditional industrial firm-level survey, we can provide yearly information on price growth 
and product innovation at the firm level. The product data has been provided by the 
Chilean National Institute of Statistics (INE) and was collected together with the 
National Annual Industrial Survey (ENIA) using an annex form (Formulario 3) that 
collected information on each product line inside firms. The original version of the 
product-firm level data contained 123,548 observations. Products were originally 
disaggregated using a seven-digit standard industry code.  
A preliminary analysis of the product-firm level data and an approximation of how 
product innovation can be estimated can be found in Appendix 5. In what follows, a 
description is given of how the innovation indicators were obtained based on the 
                                              
15 A detailed explanation of the origin of the Chilean industrial firm-level and product-firm level datasets and how 
they were handled and merged can be found in Appendix 3. 
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information provided at the product-firm level. Because we observe a panel of products 
within firms, we have information that shows whenever a product was added or dropped 
from a particular firm’s product mix. From the data at hand, we can think of several ways 
to approximate the concept of product innovation.  
Table 3.1 refers in detail to the number of products added and dropped during a 
one-year period.  A product is considered added in any given period t if it was not 
present in year t-1 but it is produced in year t. Similarly, a product is counted as dropped 
during a given period t if it is still produced in that year but not in the following year. In 
the first column, the total number of products is presented. In the balanced panel, the 
average number of products in year t is equivalent to the average number of products 
reported in t-1, minus the average number of products dropped in t-1, plus the number 
of products added in year t. In this table, the unbalanced panel is used, and therefore this 
relationship does not hold completely due to observations that enter or exit the sample. 
The number of products added by each firm is reported in the second column of Table 
3.1. This variable takes values from 0 to 32, has a mean value that is near 0.48, and is not 
observed during the first period of the sample.  
It is also possible that firms that drop products from their production could be those 
that are more likely to be innovative on average. To investigate this hypothesis, the third 
column of table 3.1 reports the total number of products dropped by each firm in every 
year, as defined above. This variable goes from 0 to 30, with a mean value of 0.36. 
A dummy was defined to take value 1 if the number of products added in a single 
year is greater than zero and 0 in other case. This dummy cannot be observed for the year 
1996 because we have no data on the goods produced in 1995. Around 20% of the 
observations reported adding products over a single year period. 
 
Table 3.1 Number of Products Added and Dropped over a Single-year Period 
year stats 
(1) 
Number 
of 
Products 
(2) 
Number 
of 
Products 
Added 
(3) 
Number 
of Prod. 
Dropped 
(4) 
Added 
Prod. 
Dummy 
(5) 
Dropped 
Prod 
Dummy 
(6) 
Share in 
Sales 
Prod. 
Added 
(7) 
Share in 
Sales 
Prod. 
Dropped 
1996 mean 2.81 . 0.30 . 0.19 . 0.05 
N=1,897 Sd 2.71 . 0.83 . 0.39 . 0.17 
 median 2 . 0 . 0 . 0 
 min 1 . 0 . 0 . 0 
 max 23 . 8 . 1 . 1 
1997 mean 2.75 0.42 0.23 0.23 0.15 0.12 0.05 
N=2,045 Sd 2.60 1.04 0.72 0.42 0.35 0.30 0.18 
 median 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 min 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 max 24 13 11 1 1 1 1 
Note: (1) is the total number of products produced in each year, (2) is total number of products added in current 
year, (3) is total number of products dropped in current year, (4) is a dummy with value one if one or more products 
were added in current year, (5) is a dummy with value one if one or more products were dropped in current year, (6) 
is share in current sales of product added in current year (t), (7) is share in (t-1) sales of produce dropped during  
current year (t). (N) is the number of observations in each period. 
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Table 3.1 (Continued) Number of Products Added and Dropped over a Single-year 
year stats 
(1) 
Number 
of 
Products 
(2) 
Number 
of 
Products 
Added 
(3) 
Number 
of Prod. 
Dropped 
(4) 
Added 
Prod. 
Dummy 
(5) 
Dropped 
Prod 
Dummy 
(6) 
Share in 
Sales 
Prod. 
Added 
(7) 
Share in 
Sales 
Prod. 
Dropped 
1998 mean 2.75 0.31 0.27 0.19 0.16 0.08 0.06 
N=2,117 Sd 2.61 0.87 0.88 0.39 0.37 0.25 0.20 
 median 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 min 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 max 25 9 23 1 1 1 1 
1999 mean 2.73 0.25 0.32 0.14 0.17 0.05 0.09 
N=2,077 Sd 2.59 0.75 0.99 0.35 0.37 0.18 0.27 
 median 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 min 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 max 25 8 11 1 1 1 1 
2000 mean 2.85 0.44 0.50 0.21 0.19 0.11 0.09 
N=2,059 Sd 2.90 1.55 1.74 0.40 0.39 0.28 0.26 
 median 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 min 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 max 32 32 30 1 1 1 1 
2001 mean 3.33 1.04 0.41 0.32 0.15 0.16 0.08 
N=2,071 Sd 3.90 2.91 1.61 0.46 0.36 0.31 0.25 
 median 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 min 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 max 30 30 27 1 1 1 1 
2002 mean 3.53 0.46 0.50 0.15 0.17 0.04 0.09 
N=1,915 Sd 4.20 1.91 1.84 0.36 0.38 0.15 0.28 
 median 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 min 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 max 30 26 23 1 1 1 1 
2003 mean 3.72 0.43 . 0.15 . 0.04 . 
N=1,658 Sd 4.51 1.79 . 0.36 . 0.14 . 
 median 2 0 . 0 . 0 . 
 min 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 
 max 30 28 . 1 . 1 . 
Total 
 
mean 3.04 0.48 0.36 0.20 0.17 0.09 0.07 
Sd 3.32 1.71 1.31 0.40 0.37 0.25 0.23 
median 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
min 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 max 32 32 30 1 1 1 1 
 N 15,839 13,942 14,173 13,942 14,181 13,942 14,173 
Note: (1) is the total number of products produced in each year, (2) is total number of products added in current 
year, (3) is total number of products dropped in current year, (4) is a dummy with value one if one or more products 
were added in current year, (5) is a dummy with value one if one or more products were dropped in current year, (6) 
is share in current sales of product added in current year (t), (7) is share in (t-1) sales of produce dropped during  
current year (t). (N) is the number of observations in each period. 
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A dummy indicating whether there were any products dropped by each firm during a 
given year was created. This variable takes value 1 if one or more products were dropped 
and value 0 in the other case. It is reported in the fifth column of Table 3.1. This dummy 
has a mean value of 0.17. The number of products dropped over a one-year period 
cannot be observed for the year 2003 because we have no information on goods 
produced in 2004. 
In order to measure the relative importance of sales of innovated products, two 
variables were defined to measure the share of sales represented by products added and 
dropped. The sixth column of table 3.1 describes the share of sales that products added 
in any single year t represented in that same year. On average, 9% of yearly sales are due 
to products added in that specific year.  The last column of Table 3.1 describes the 
proportion of sales that products dropped represented in the last year they were 
produced. On average, approximately 7% of yearly sales were due to products that were 
being dropped in that particular year. 
Similarly to the recommendation of the OSLO manual that proposes measuring 
innovation over a three-year period, firms in the Chilean Innovation Survey report their 
innovation activities over a two-year period. Therefore, Table 3.2 extends the analysis of 
the innovation measures described in Table 3.1 by referring to product innovations 
carried out during a two-year period.  
For any given year, the number of products added by each firm, reported in the first 
column of Table 3.2, was computed as the number of products that were produced by a 
given firm in a given period (t) but that were not produced in the preceding year (t-1) 
plus the number of products that were introduced in (t-1) and that were not present in (t-
2). Therefore, the number of products added now shows innovations in both the present 
year and the previous year. This variable cannot be observed during the years 1996 and 
1997 because we lack information on products produced in 1995 and 1994. The basic 
description of number of products added is shown in Figure 3.1. This variable takes 
values from 0 to 32 and has a mean value that is below 1.  
 
ܲݎ݋݀ݑܿݐݏܣ݀݀݁݀௧ ൌ ܰ݁ݓܲݎ݋݀ݑܿݐݏ௧ ൅ ܰ݁ݓܲݎ݋݀ݑܿݐݏ௧ିଵ 
 
However, as mentioned, it could be that firms that drop products from their product 
mix are those that are either more innovative or less innovative, on average. The number 
of products dropped by each firm in every year reported in the second column of table 
3.2 corresponds to the number of goods produced in the previous year (t-1) but not 
produced in the present year (t) plus the number of goods produced in present year (t) 
but not produced during year (t+1). Because of the way in which this variable was built, it 
is not possible to observe it for the first and last periods of the database. The description 
of the number of products dropped is summarized in more detail in Figure 3.2. This 
variable goes from 0 to 30 and has a mean value of 0.6. 
 
ܲݎ݋݀ݑܿݐݏܦݎ݋݌݌݁݀௧ ൌ ܲݎ݋݀ݑܿݐݏܧ݈݅݉݅݊ܽݐ݁݀௧ିଵ ൅ ܲݎ݋݀ݑܿݐݏܧ݈݅݉݅݊ܽݐ݁݀௧ 
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Table 3.2 Number of Products Added and Dropped over a Two-year Period 
year stats 
(1) 
Number  
of Prod 
Added 
(2) 
Number of 
Prod 
Dropped 
(3) 
Added 
Prod. 
Dummy 
(4) 
Dropped 
Prod. 
Dummy 
(5) 
Share in 
Sales Prod. 
Added 
(6) 
Share in 
Sales Prod. 
Dropped 
1997 mean . 0.53 . 0.33 . 0.09 
N=2,045 Sd . 1.27 . 0.60 . 0.27 
 median . 0 . 0 . 0 
 min . 0 . 0 . 0 
 max . 12 . 2 . 2 
1998 mean 0.72 0.49 0.39 0.31 0.17 0.10 
N=2,117 Sd 1.45 1.24 0.62 0.57 0.37 0.29 
 median 2 0 0 0 0 0 
 min 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 max 13 23 2 2 2 2 
1999 mean 0.56 0.54 0.33 0.31 0.13 0.14 
N=2,077 Sd 1.30 1.26 0.57 0.56 0.32 0.33 
 median 2 0 0 0 0 0 
 min 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 max 14 11 2 2 2 2 
2000 mean 0.68 0.66 0.30 0.30 0.10 0.13 
N=2,059 Sd 1.76 1.88 0.55 0.55 0.27 0.32 
 median 2 0 0 0 0 0 
 min 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 max 32 30 2 2 2 2 
2001 mean 1.46 0.76 0.47 0.31 0.21 0.13 
N=2,071 Sd 3.37 2.22 0.66 0.52 0.40 0.31 
 median 2 0 0 0 0 0 
 min 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 max 32 30 2 2 2 2 
2002 mean 1.51 0.78 0.47 0.28 0.21 0.12 
N=1,915 Sd 3.68 2.39 0.63 0.52 0.37 0.31 
 median 2 0 0 0 0 0 
 min 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 max 30 28 2 2 2 1.93 
2003 mean 0.91 . 0.31 . 0.08 . 
N=1,658 Sd 2.83 . 0.55 . 0.22 . 
 min 0 . 0 . 0 . 
 median 2 . 0 . 0 . 
 max 28 . 2 . 1.83 . 
Total mean 0.97 0.63 0.38 0.31 0.15 0.12 
 Sd 2.57 1.77 0.60 0.55 0.34 0.30 
 median 2 0 0 0 0 0 
 min 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 max 32 30 2 2 2 2 
 N 11,534 11,778 11,534 11,778 11,534 11,778 
Note: (1) is total number of products added in current and previous year, (2) is total number of products dropped in 
current and previous year, (3) is a dummy with value one if one or more products were added in current and/or  
previous year, (4) is a dummy with value one if one or more products were dropped in current and/or  previous 
year, (5) is share in current sales of product added in current year (t) plus share in (t-1) sales of produce added in (t-
1), (6) is share in (t-1) sales of product dropped in  current year (t) plus share in (t) sales of product dropped in (t+1). 
(N) is the number of observations.  
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Figure 3.1 Histogram of Number of Products Added 
 
Note: Own calculations using data from Formulario 3 of Chilean Manufacturing Survey ENIA (1996-2003). 
Products Added is the number of products in current year (t) production that were absent in previous year (t-1) plus 
number of products in previous year (t-1) but absent in (t-2). 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Histogram of Number of Products Dropped 
  
Note: Own calculations using data from Formulario 3 of Chilean Manufacturing Survey ENIA (1996-2003). 
Products Dropped is the number of products in previous year (t-1) but absent in present year (t) plus the number of 
products in current year (t) but absent in next year (t+1).  
 
The added product dummy described in the third column of Table 3.2 takes value 1 
if the number of products added over a two-year period is greater than zero, while this 
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dummy takes value 0 in the opposite case. This variable is not observed during the first 
two periods of the sample.  
The dropped product dummy described on the fourth column of Table 3.2 takes 
value 1 if the number of products dropped in the present year t and in the previous year 
t-1 is greater than zero, while it takes value 0 in the opposite case. This variable cannot be 
computed for the first and last years of the database. 
One of the ways to measure innovation activities that is recommended by the Oslo 
Manual is to account for the proportion of innovative sales. The share of sales in each 
firm that corresponds to products added over a two year period was defined as the share 
of sales in the present year (t) of products produced in t but not produced in (t-1) plus 
the share of sales in (t-1) of goods produced in (t-1) but not in (t-2). This variable is 
reported on the fifth column of Table 3.2. On average, the share of sales that 
corresponded to products added over a two-year period was near 0.15. 
We find that an average of 15% of the sales corresponds to recently innovated 
(added) products. The sample contains firms that did not have any new products in their 
output and firms which only sold new products. More detail about this variable may be 
found in Figure 3.3. If all products produced last year (t-1) were new, and all the products 
produced in the present year (t) are also new, then the maximum value of this variable is 
2. 
 
ܣ݀݀݁݀݈ܵܽ݁ݏ௧ ൌ
ܰ݁ݓܲݎ݋݀ݑܿݐ݈ܵܽ݁ݏ௧
ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽ݈ܵܽ݁ݏ௧ ൅
ܰ݁ݓܲݎ݋݀ݑܿݐ݈ܵܽ݁ݏ௧ିଵ
ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽ݈ܵܽ݁ݏ௧ିଵ  
 
Figure 3.3 Histogram of Added Products Share of Sales 
 
Note: Own calculations using data from Formulario 3 of Chilean Manufacturing Survey ENIA (1996-2003). 
Products added sales share is the share of sales in (t-1) of products produced for the first time in that year plus the 
share of current sales of products produced for the first time in current year (t). Firms that produced only new 
products in (t-1) and again in (t) have the highest value, equal to 2.   
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To allow for a weighted impact of products dropped on productivity, we calculate 
the proportion of sales that dropped products represented before they were dropped. 
The last column of Table 3.2 describes the relative importance of sales of products 
dropped over a two-year period. The share of sales for each firm that corresponds to 
products dropped over a two-year period was defined as the share of sales in the present 
year (t) of products produced in (t) but not produced in (t+1) plus the share in (t-1) of 
products manufactured in (t-1) but not in (t). Figure 3.4 shows an additional perspective 
on this variable. If all firm products were dropped in (t-1), and all products in present 
year (t) are dropped again, then this variable can take a maximum value of 2. 
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Figure 3.4 Histogram of Dropped Products Share of Sales over 2 years. 
 
Note: Own calculations using data from Formulario 3 of Chilean Manufacturing Survey ENIA (1996-2003). 
Products dropped sales share is the share of sales in (t-1) of products produced for the last time in that year plus the 
share of current sales of products produced for the last time in current year (t). Firms that dropped all their products 
in (t-1) and again in (t) have the highest value equal to 2.   
3.4.2 Correlation between the Main Product Innovation Indicators 
We are interested in understanding the relations between the innovation variables 
that we have developed in this work. One hypothesis is that products added and products 
dropped may have a positive correlation to the extent that many innovations correspond 
to the substitution of products. We also expect that the number of products added and 
dropped are highly correlated to the sales of products added and dropped respectively. 
One of the first facts that we see from Table 3.3 is that the number of products at 
the firm level is positively correlated with all product innovation indicators, especially 
with those that refer to adding new products to the firms’ product mix. The change in the 
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number of products is positively and very highly correlated with all variables that reflect 
the addition of products and it is also correlated positively to the variables that show the 
number and importance of products dropped. This last finding may be due to the fact 
that more dynamic firms (those that are expanding their product variety) also need to 
release themselves from outdated or inefficient production. We also see that the variables 
that reflect adding products are very highly correlated to each other, while those that 
refer to products dropped are also highly correlated among themselves. Correlation 
between adding and dropping products is lower but always positive and strong. This may 
suggest that a large part of the product innovation activities are related to the replacement 
of old goods by new ones. 
 
Table 3.3 Correlation Matrix of Product Innovation Variables 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 Number of  Products 1        
2 Change in N of products 0.39 1       
3 Number  of products added 0.59 0.80 1      
4 Number of products dropped 0.45 0.25 0.38 1     
5 Added prod. dummy 0.43 0.41 0.61 0.26 1    
6 Dropped prod. dummy 0.36 0.12 0.26 0.64 0.33 1   
7 Share in sales products added 0.20 0.36 0.52 0.16 0.66 0.18 1  
8 Share in sales products dropped 0.12 0.05 0.13 0.50 0.1 0.62 0.23 1 
Note: Product innovation measures computed over a single period. See table 3.1 for variables detail. Data obtained 
from Chilean Manufacturing Survey years 1996 to 2003. Number of observations is 12,284. 
3.4.3 Correlation between New Price Growth and Innovation Indicators 
For each firm-level price growth and product innovation indicator that we have 
created and described in Table A4.2 and Table 3.1, we have computed a correlation 
coefficient with 4th Innovation Survey product and process innovation variables. There 
were 241 observations from the balanced sample that were also present in the 4th 
Innovation Survey, which covered the period 2003 and 2004. Because our panel covers 
1996 to 2003, these correlations were studied exclusively for the year 2003. Product and 
process innovation from the 4th Innovation Survey are variables that take values from 0 
(no innovation) to 4 (very high innovation).  
We want in the first place to test the hypothesis of our new innovation measures to 
be similar to the innovation measures from the Chilean Innovation Survey. Some of our 
innovation measures like the number of products dropped could be negatively related to 
innovation measures from the Chilean Innovation Survey which could mean that 
dropping products could be considered by itself as a non-innovative action. On the other 
hand, if some of our innovation measures relate positively with the Chilean Innovation 
Survey, we want to know the size of this correlation in order to have a preliminary 
understanding of how much these variables have in common. 
We also test the correlation between our new innovation variables and price growth 
at the firm-level. Because there has been no availability of firm-level prices before in 
combination with innovation information, we want to test the hypothesis of price growth 
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being directly correlated with innovation. It may be that firms that innovate with new 
products are also more likely to increase prices faster that other less innovative firms.  
The results of the correlation analysis are reported in Table 3.4. As expected, 
expanding the firm’s product variety is the factor most related to product and process 
innovation. When expressed as a dummy variable, the correlation with self-reported 
product innovation from the innovation survey is 0.16, and with process innovation is 
0.08. Number of products added has a correlation of 0.15 with product innovation and 
0.07 with process innovation. Number of products added, rescaled from 0 to 4, has a 
correlation of 0.16 with product innovation and 0.07 with process innovation from the 
4th Innovation Survey.  
The correlation between the number of products dropped and product innovation is 
-0.05, while the correlation between the products dropped dummy and product 
innovation is -0.01.  
We find that firm-level inflation is negatively correlated with product and process 
innovation. Among firms where prices increase faster, there is a lower probability of 
engaging in process and product innovations. The correlation between the third 
definition of firm-level price growth and process innovation is -0.09, while the correlation 
with product innovation it is -0.11.  
As the table shows that firm-level price growth has a negative correlation with 
product and process innovation, one may think of several alternative explanations for this 
finding. One possible implication is that innovative firms are subject to more market 
competition and therefore their price growth is relatively low compared with non-
innovating firms. 
 
Table 3.4 Correlations between Innovation Survey Product and Process Innovation, 
Product Innovation Indicators and Firm-level price growth 
 4th innovation 
survey process 
innovation 
4th innovation 
survey product 
innovation 
Total change in number of products in one year 0.02 0.14 
Dummy increased number of products in one year 0.08 0.16 
Number of products added in one year 0.07 0.15 
Number of products dropped in one year 0.04 -0.05 
Products added in one year dummy 0.08 0.16 
Products dropped in one year dummy 0.10 -0.01 
Number of products added + products dropped in one year 0.07 0.04 
Number of products added in one year (rescaled 1 to 4) 0.07 0.16 
Firm price growth 1 -0.06 -0.09 
Firm price growth 2 -0.05 -0.06 
Firm price growth 3 -0.09 -0.11 
Note: Data obtained from the Fourth Chilean Innovation Survey and the Chilean Manufacturing Survey for year 
2003. For this matrix, the number of observations present in the manufacturing sample and the 4th Innovation 
Survey was 241. 
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These results can also be seen in Figure 3.5, which shows positive product 
innovation correlations and negative correlations between products dropped and product 
innovation. We can see from this figure that Innovation Survey (IS) Product Innovation 
is more correlated than (IS) Process Innovation to all the variable defined in this work. In 
the case of the correlation between our new product innovation indicators and (IS) 
Product Innovation, these correlations are nearly double the ones with (IS) Process 
Innovation. 
3.4.4 Basic Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3.5 contains the basic descriptive statistics of the main variables in the model. In 
the first place, the table reports the statistics of non-deflated, industry-deflated and firm-
level deflated output per employee.  For the cases where deflated output was used as 
dependent variable, the values of intermediates and capital were also deflated with 
appropriate deflators computed from the Chilean Statistical Office wholesale price data. 
When non-deflated output was used, the inputs were also expressed in nominal terms. 
The non-deflated and deflated input levels of capital and intermediates are reported in the 
same table. Capacity utilization rate is on average 78% of the 365 days of the year. The 
firm that declared the lowest capacity utilization was active for the equivalent of one day 
of the year, while the observations with the highest capacity utilization operated 365 day 
in a year.  
The price growth at the level of firms has been calculated through a careful analysis 
of the product-firm level database.16 In first place, the average yearly price at the product-
firm level was calculated by dividing total product sales by the number of units sold. We 
then took logs of the product-firm level prices. Finally, the first difference of the log of 
price gave the approximate yearly product-firm level price growth rate. The firm-level 
price growth rate was calculated after deleting those outliers from the product-firm level 
data in which the first difference of log of price was higher than log(2) or lower than –
log(2). We computed a weighted average in order to incorporate information on the 
relative importance of each product to total firm sales. The overall coverage of product-
firm level information was also taken into account by weighting each firm’s inflation by 
the coverage of its product-firm level information and using the average 4-digit industry 
price growth to represent the share of production that is not detailed at the product-firm 
level. Table 3.5 shows that the mean value of firm-level yearly inflation rate is 
approximately 2.9% and has maximum and minimum values that are near 59% and -58% 
respectively. Four-digit sector average inflation has a mean value of 2.8% but has a much 
smaller dispersion than the firm-level inflation rate. Product-firm level data covers on 
average 72% of total firm-level sales before dropping products considered outliers in 
terms of their price change, and 55% of total firm-level sales after dropping around 10% 
of products considered outliers based on the criteria described above. 
  
                                              
16 More detail regarding the computation of firm-level price growth based on product-firm level data can be found 
in Appendix 4. 
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Table 3.6 shows a correlation matrix of the main variables that have been used in 
this study. The variables include output, productivity, and the newly defined variables that 
describe firm-level price behavior, products added, products dropped, and the proportion 
of innovated sales. These variables are expressed in first differences and the main 
descriptive statistics are also provided. The change in output per employee is positively 
correlated with changes in capital, intermediate consumption, labor, and capacity 
utilization. Changes in capacity utilization are positively correlated with total output but 
negatively correlated with changes in capital per employee. Deflated labor productivity 
has a negative relationship with prices and products dropped, while also a positive 
relationship with products added. The proportion of innovated sales is positively 
correlated with deflated productivity, which may imply a labor productivity advantage for 
innovative firms. The positive relationship between products added and dropped shows 
that a part of innovations corresponds to replacement of old products by new ones. 
 
3.5 Estimation Results 
The main results of this paper are presented in Tables 3.7 to 3.17.  Results show 
estimated input and scale elasticities that are feasible and in accordance with recent 
literature. Non-reported geographical, sector, and year dummies have been included in all 
the regressions.  
3.5.1 OLS Preliminary Estimates 
The left panel of Table 3.7 contains the most simple productivity function 
specification of this paper. These panel-data estimations using variables in levels were 
made by the Ordinary Least Squares method. Using variables in levels implies that the 
cross-sectional and time-series dimensions of the data are treated in the same way. All 
parameters are highly significant, which already gives a positive indication for this basic 
production function specification. The first column (1) uses non-deflated output per 
employee and non-deflated inputs. This is the simplest case, in which the production 
function has been simplified to a revenue function that is compared with different 
equations that use various deflating procedures. The specification of the second column 
(2) uses 4-digit industry-level deflated output per employee, while capital and 
intermediates are also deflated using appropriate price indexes for different kinds of 
capital and intermediates. Column (3) uses firm-level deflated output, while capital and 
intermediates are also deflated in the same way as in column (2). Columns (4) and (5) use 
non-deflated variables but consider as controls the industry-level prices and the firm-level 
prices, respectively. 
The capital per employee parameter is close to 0.12, while number of employees 
fluctuates around 0.09, showing that larger firms are on average more productive. The 
parameter of intermediate consumption lies around 0.63. Capacity utilization also has a 
positive and significant parameter, which shows that the omission of this variable would 
cause a bias on the estimated input elasticities.  The parameters remain fairly stable 
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throughout the 5 columns. This may indicate that price dispersion is not large enough to 
cause a significant bias in the non-deflated or industry deflated estimates. Adding industry 
and firm-level price growth as regressors in columns (4) and (5) results in positive and 
very significant parameters. This means that price growth does have a significant 
influence in the accounting of average per worker productivity, even though its omission 
does not cause a significant bias on the factor elasticity parameters. 
The right side panel of Table 3.7 contains the preliminary estimates in first 
differences using OLS. These estimations use the (log) “first differences” of the variables 
in the model. This way the estimations rely on the time-series dimension of the data. First 
differences control for individual heterogeneity simply by removing the firm effects from 
the equation. The number of observations is smaller in this case because one year of data 
is lost when taking first differences of the variables. The number of employees appears 
with a negative sign in these estimates that take the rates of growth of the variables. It is 
important to make a distinction between the interpretations of the results of the 
equations in levels from those of the equations in first differences. We find that labor 
input’s rate of growth is negatively correlated with labor productivity, which does not 
mean that the same variables in levels should necessarily present the same sign. In the 
case of the estimates on first differences, one possible interpretation of the negative labor 
input elasticity is the existence of decreasing returns to scale. Capital per employee, 
number of employees, and intermediate consumption remain fairly stable across columns. 
This shows that using non-deflated labor productivity, deflating it by an industry price 
index, or deflating it by an individual firm price index makes no big difference in the 
estimation of the production function parameters. The estimated coefficient of capacity 
utilization is even higher than that of capital in the equations on first differences. The role 
that this variable plays in the adjustment of capital stock is very important. The services 
provided by capital, which we represent by the book value of capital, are better 
understood if we adjust by changes in capacity utilization rate. 
Table 3.8 contains the results of the same experiment that is shown in Table 3.7, but 
assumes constant returns to scale by imposing the labor parameter to be equal to zero. 
When imposing constant returns to scale, the capital per employee parameter results in a 
significantly higher parameter. The increase in the capital elasticity parameter is 
particularly important for the case of the estimates in first differences, which may imply 
that assuming constant returns to scale is a very restrictive condition for this case. 
The evidence points out the existence of firms operating with decreasing returns to 
scale, which is in accordance with standard microeconomic theory. Results show that, 
across the regressions in levels, from the left panel, and also across the estimates in first 
differences, from the right panel, intermediates per employee and capacity utilization 
parameters in the model in Table 3.8 appear to remain very stable.  This result further 
confirms that using non-deflated or deflating with firm-level or industry-level price 
growth does not make a big difference to the simple revenue function estimation. The 
evidence we found in this regard supports what was found previously by Mairesse and 
Jaumandreu (2005), which used self-reported price growth in order to account for firm-
level inflation. 
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3.5.1 Instrumental Variable Estimates 
Because OLS estimation is not able to take into account the omission of managerial 
inputs and other factors that are likely related both to the decision of input level and 
output obtained, the parameters of the Production Function estimation are probably 
biased with the bias having the same positive sign that the effect of managerial inputs 
over output. We approach this endogeneity problem using Instrumental Variables.  
Tables 3.9 and 3.10 contain the estimates of the labor productivity model using 
Instrumental Variables. The variables that were instrumented are capital per employee, 
intermediates per employee, and number of employees. The instruments used throughout 
these sets of regressions were capital cost, number of hours worked in the firm during 
the year, and wages. Correlations between instruments and instrumented variables range 
from 0.14 to 0.69, while correlations of the instruments with the dependent variable are 
significantly lower.  
Table 3.9, which is the IV version of Table 3.7, shows some interesting results. Most 
of the parameters remain significant and with the expected signs, even though some of 
their magnitudes change. The value of the intermediates elasticity parameter is 
significantly lower on the IV estimates. Nevertheless, the parameter of capital per 
employee ratio is larger in the IV regressions but only significantly different on the first 
differences estimates. We can also notice an important reduction of the R-squared 
measure in the IV estimates with respect to OLS, especially for the case of the 
regressions in first differences.  The lower panel of Table 3.9 shows that the scale 
parameter that is represented by the estimated elasticity of number of employees to labor 
productivity is insignificant. This raises again the question of whether there are constant 
returns to scale. 
When constant returns to scale are assumed, we force that the number of employees 
does not affect the productivity per employee. We drop the variable that contains the 
number of employees and re-estimate the equations using Instrumental Variables. The 
left panel of Table 3.10 shows that the model is consistent, at least in the sense that 
parameters maintain their signs and significance levels, even though some of their 
magnitudes are affected. Capitals per employee and capacity utilization appear in these 
equations with significantly higher values than those found in the previous tables.  
The right panel of Table 3.10 shows the results of the IV estimates in first 
differences when imposing constant returns to scale. Comparing the input elasticities 
parameters to those in the lower panel of Table 3.9 shows that the constant returns to 
scale assumption makes no significant difference to the input parameters in the case of 
the estimates in first differences.  
Throughout these Instrumental Variables regressions results, the Kleibergen-Paap 
LM statistic rejected that the equation was under-identified. Nevertheless, the Sargan test 
rejects the validity of the instruments, and the weak identification using Cragg-Donald 
Wald F statistic does not reject that the instruments are weak. Therefore, and because we 
were not able to find better instruments, we prefer to focus on the OLS estimates in what 
follows. 
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Chapter 3 
3.5.2 Products Added or Dropped and the Proportion of Innovative Sales  
Table 3.11 shows the OLS results of including the total numbers of products added 
and dropped in the present and the previous year. In the left panel (estimates in levels) 
we find that the input parameters are robust to the inclusion of innovation indicators. In 
fact, the signs, magnitude, and significance of the parameters, as well as the R-squared 
measures, do not differ much from those in table 3.7. The number of products added 
appears with a significant and positive parameter, which confirms the expectations of the 
model. On the other side, the number of products dropped appears to have a negative 
coefficient, which is also in accordance with the results we expected to find. 
When manufacturers expand the varieties of products that they produce, it is likely 
that output per employee will increase, not only because the firm’s demand for innovated 
products may be larger, but also because new varieties of products offer new 
combinations of ways in which inputs can be organized and allocated for achieving 
higher productivity. 
The right panel of table 3.11 (estimates in first differences) shows results that also 
support the findings of the input elasticity parameter estimates from Table 3.7. The 
parameters of capital per employee, capacity utilization, intermediates per employee, and 
number of employees remain robust to the inclusion of product innovation indicators. 
Furthermore, there is evidence to support a positive impact on average per worker 
productivity of adding products and a negative effect on average per worker productivity 
of dropping products. 
Many of the products added and dropped correspond to a replacement of new 
products by old ones. Because products added and products dropped are positively 
correlated variables with opposite signs, it could be the case that estimating the model 
excluding one of the two variables will result in a much lower and even insignificant 
effect of the included innovation variable. This hypothesis is evaluated in Table 3.12, 
where the number of products dropped is excluded, and in Table 3.13, where the number 
of products added is excluded. The results in the left panel of Table 3.12 show that the 
number of products added in a two-year period seems to lose significance in the absence 
of the number of products dropped in the case of the equations in levels. 
Because we have found in previous estimations that constant returns to scale may 
result a too restrictive assumption for the parameters, tables 3.11 to 3.17 are focused on 
the production function model without imposing constant returns to scale. The 
estimation of the model imposing constant returns to scale can be found on Appendix 6. 
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Chapter 3 
 The other input parameters nevertheless remain robust with respect to the evidence 
found on the estimates in levels from Table 3.7. The right panel of Table 3.12 presents 
the estimates in first differences, where all the elasticity parameters do not change 
significantly with respect to the OLS first differences estimates that don’t consider 
product innovation indicators. The results show that, in this case, the effect of the 
number of products added remains present, even though the number of products 
dropped is omitted. 
Table 3.13 evaluates the effects of the number of products dropped only by 
excluding the number of products added from the equations. It may be seen that the 
parameters of the basic model presented in Table 3.7 remain robust to the inclusion of 
this single product innovation indicator. Results show that reducing the varieties of 
products by dropping products from the inventories has a negative effect on labor 
productivity, independently of whether products were added or not in the same period at 
the firm level. The magnitude of this negative effect is smaller than in the case of Table 
3.11. This result suggests that, even though products added and products dropped are 
positively correlated and influence the dependent variable in opposed directions, the 
effect of number of products dropped remains robust to the omission of the number of 
products added, at least it terms of the sign and the significance. 
Table 3.14 evaluates a different innovation measure that reflects the proportion of 
sales that correspond to innovated (added) products and the proportion of sales of 
dropped products. We are interested in comparing these results with those obtained in 
table 3.11. On the estimates in levels, as on the estimates in first differences, we find that 
this is also a good measure of innovation, and the effects are still present after controlling 
for added and dropped products’ relative importance in total sales. Even though the 
positive effect of products added and the negative effect of products dropped are still 
significant, we find that the magnitudes of the effects are smaller when controlling for 
their relative importance in total sales. Because products added and products dropped are 
positively correlated, it could be the case that excluding one of the two variables when 
estimating the model will result in a much lower and even insignificant effect of the 
included innovation variable. We evaluated this possibility in Table 3.15, where the 
number of products dropped is excluded, and in Table 3.16, where the number of 
products added is excluded. We found that the results are robust to the exclusion of each 
one of the innovation variables. 
  
100
Product Innovation, Price Growth, and Labor Productivity 
101 
  
Ta
bl
e 
3.
12
 O
LS
 re
gr
es
sio
ns
 w
ith
 N
um
be
r o
f P
ro
du
ct
s A
dd
ed
 
 
E
st
im
at
es
 in
 L
ev
el
s 
E
st
im
at
es
 in
 F
irs
t D
iff
er
en
ce
s 
 
(1
) 
(2
) 
(3
) 
(4
) 
(5
) 
(1
) 
(2
) 
(3
) 
(4
) 
(5
) 
 
Q
/L
 
no
t d
ef
lat
ed
 
Q
/L
 
3-
di
gi
t 
de
fla
te
d 
Q
/L
 
fir
m
-le
ve
l 
de
fla
te
d 
Q
/L
 
no
t d
ef
lat
ed
 
Q
/L
 
no
t d
ef
lat
ed
 
Q
/L
 
no
t d
ef
lat
ed
 
Q
/L
 
3-
di
gi
t 
de
fla
te
d 
Q
/L
 
fir
m
-le
ve
l 
de
fla
te
d 
Q
/L
 
no
t d
ef
lat
ed
 
Q
/L
 
no
t d
ef
lat
ed
 
Ca
pi
ta
l p
er
 e
m
pl
oy
ee
 
0.
11
4*
**
 
0.
10
6*
**
 
0.
12
2*
**
 
0.
10
9*
**
 
0.
11
1*
**
 
0.
01
9*
**
 
0.
02
6*
**
 
0.
01
2*
* 
0.
01
9*
**
 
0.
02
1*
**
 
(0
.0
04
) 
(0
.0
04
) 
(0
.0
04
) 
(0
.0
04
) 
(0
.0
04
) 
(0
.0
06
) 
(0
.0
06
) 
(0
.0
06
) 
(0
.0
06
) 
(0
.0
06
) 
N
um
be
r o
f e
m
pl
oy
ee
s 
0.
09
2*
**
 
0.
10
0*
**
 
0.
09
3*
**
 
0.
09
3*
**
 
0.
09
4*
**
 
-0
.3
66
**
* 
-0
.3
74
**
* 
-0
.3
88
**
* 
-0
.3
64
**
* 
-0
.3
61
**
* 
(0
.0
04
) 
(0
.0
04
) 
(0
.0
04
) 
(0
.0
04
) 
(0
.0
04
) 
(0
.0
14
) 
(0
.0
14
) 
(0
.0
15
) 
(0
.0
14
) 
(0
.0
14
) 
In
te
rm
ed
iat
es
 p
er
 
em
pl
oy
ee
 
0.
63
3*
**
 
0.
62
2*
**
 
0.
62
1*
**
 
0.
63
4*
**
 
0.
63
0*
**
 
0.
36
3*
**
 
0.
34
8*
**
 
0.
33
7*
**
 
0.
36
3*
**
 
0.
36
2*
**
 
(0
.0
05
) 
(0
.0
06
) 
(0
.0
06
) 
(0
.0
05
) 
(0
.0
05
) 
(0
.0
08
) 
(0
.0
08
) 
(0
.0
09
) 
(0
.0
08
) 
(0
.0
08
) 
Ca
pa
ci
ty
 u
til
iz
at
io
n 
0.
09
9*
**
 
0.
12
8*
**
 
0.
13
5*
**
 
0.
13
9*
**
 
0.
14
3*
**
 
0.
08
4*
**
 
0.
09
1*
**
 
0.
09
5*
**
 
0.
08
4*
**
 
0.
08
5*
**
 
(0
.0
20
) 
(0
.0
29
) 
(0
.0
27
) 
(0
.0
23
) 
(0
.0
24
) 
(0
.0
25
) 
(0
.0
27
) 
(0
.0
25
) 
(0
.0
25
) 
(0
.0
25
) 
N
um
be
r o
f p
ro
du
ct
s 
ad
de
d 
0.
00
9*
 
-0
.0
04
 
-0
.0
12
* 
-0
.0
00
 
-0
.0
01
 
0.
00
6*
 
0.
00
3 
0.
00
8*
* 
0.
00
5*
 
0.
00
5*
 
(0
.0
05
) 
(0
.0
06
) 
(0
.0
06
) 
(0
.0
05
) 
(0
.0
05
) 
(0
.0
03
) 
(0
.0
03
) 
(0
.0
03
) 
(0
.0
03
) 
(0
.0
03
) 
4-
di
gi
t i
nd
us
try
 p
ric
e 
in
de
x 
 
 
 
0.
19
8*
**
 
 
 
 
 
0.
04
9 
 
 
 
 
(0
.0
48
) 
 
 
 
 
(0
.0
54
) 
 
Fi
rm
-le
ve
l p
ric
e 
in
de
x 
 
 
 
 
0.
05
3*
**
 
 
 
 
 
0.
12
2*
**
 
 
 
 
 
(0
.0
13
) 
 
 
 
 
(0
.0
16
) 
Co
ns
ta
nt
 
2.
32
2*
**
 
2.
18
3*
**
 
2.
28
9*
**
 
2.
04
3*
**
 
2.
13
5*
**
 
0.
00
8*
* 
0.
01
7*
**
 
0.
00
7 
-0
.0
01
 
0.
00
1 
(0
.1
27
) 
(0
.1
79
) 
(0
.1
63
) 
(0
.1
42
) 
(0
.1
45
) 
(0
.0
04
) 
(0
.0
05
) 
(0
.0
05
) 
(0
.0
04
) 
(0
.0
03
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
 
11
89
7 
11
89
7 
11
89
7 
11
89
7 
11
89
7 
11
53
4 
11
53
4 
11
53
4 
11
53
4 
11
53
4 
R-
sq
ua
re
d 
0.
81
0 
0.
79
5 
0.
76
6 
0.
81
3 
0.
81
4 
0.
46
5 
0.
44
8 
0.
37
2 
0.
46
4 
0.
46
7 
N
ot
e: 
Pr
od
uc
tiv
ity
 e
st
im
at
io
ns
 u
sin
g 
Ch
ile
an
 M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
su
rv
ey
 d
at
a 
(IN
E
 1
99
6-
20
03
). 
D
ep
en
de
nt
 v
ar
iab
le
 is
 o
ut
pu
t p
er
 e
m
pl
oy
ee
 n
ot
 d
ef
lat
ed
 in
 c
ol
um
ns
 (1
), 
(4
) a
nd
 (5
); 
de
fla
te
d 
w
ith
 a
n 
av
er
ag
e 
3-
di
gi
t I
SI
C 
in
du
st
ry
 d
ef
lat
or
 in
 c
ol
um
n 
(2
); 
an
d 
de
fla
te
d 
at
 th
e 
fir
m
 le
ve
l i
n 
co
lu
m
n 
(3
). 
N
o 
re
st
ric
tio
n 
ha
s b
ee
n 
im
po
se
d 
on
 re
tu
rn
s t
o 
sc
ale
. O
rd
in
ar
y 
Le
as
t S
qu
ar
e 
es
tim
at
es
. S
ta
nd
ar
d 
er
ro
rs
 in
 p
ar
en
th
es
es
. S
ig
ni
fic
an
ce
 n
ot
ed
 b
y 
**
* 
if 
p<
0.
01
, *
* 
if 
p<
0.
05
, *
 if
 p
<
0.
 S
ec
to
r a
nd
 re
gi
on
 d
um
m
ie
s i
nc
lu
de
d.
 
 
 
Chapter 3 
  
102
Ta
bl
e 
3.
13
 O
LS
 re
gr
es
sio
ns
 w
ith
 N
um
be
r o
f P
ro
du
ct
s D
ro
pp
ed
 
 
E
st
im
at
es
 in
 L
ev
el
s 
E
st
im
at
es
 in
 F
irs
t D
iff
er
en
ce
s 
 
(1
) 
(2
) 
(3
) 
(4
) 
(5
) 
(1
) 
(2
) 
(3
) 
(4
) 
(5
) 
 
Q
/L
 
no
t d
ef
lat
ed
 
Q
/L
 
3-
di
gi
t 
de
fla
te
d 
Q
/L
 
fir
m
-le
ve
l 
de
fla
te
d 
Q
/L
 
no
t d
ef
lat
ed
 
Q
/L
 
no
t d
ef
lat
ed
 
Q
/L
 
no
t d
ef
lat
ed
 
Q
/L
 
3-
di
gi
t 
de
fla
te
d 
Q
/L
 
fir
m
-le
ve
l 
de
fla
te
d 
Q
/L
 
no
t d
ef
lat
ed
 
Q
/L
 
no
t d
ef
lat
ed
 
Ca
pi
ta
l p
er
 e
m
pl
oy
ee
 
0.
11
3*
**
 
0.
11
3*
**
 
0.
12
4*
**
 
0.
11
5*
**
 
0.
11
3*
**
 
0.
03
3*
**
 
0.
03
4*
**
 
0.
03
2*
**
 
0.
03
3*
**
 
0.
03
2*
**
 
(0
.0
04
) 
(0
.0
04
) 
(0
.0
04
) 
(0
.0
04
) 
(0
.0
04
) 
(0
.0
06
) 
(0
.0
06
) 
(0
.0
06
) 
(0
.0
06
) 
(0
.0
06
) 
N
um
be
r o
f e
m
pl
oy
ee
s 
0.
09
2*
**
 
0.
09
7*
**
 
0.
08
8*
**
 
0.
09
0*
**
 
0.
09
2*
**
 
-0
.3
73
**
* 
-0
.3
79
**
* 
-0
.3
89
**
* 
-0
.3
74
**
* 
-0
.3
76
**
* 
(0
.0
04
) 
(0
.0
04
) 
(0
.0
04
) 
(0
.0
04
) 
(0
.0
04
) 
(0
.0
14
) 
(0
.0
14
) 
(0
.0
15
) 
(0
.0
14
) 
(0
.0
14
) 
In
te
rm
ed
iat
es
 p
er
 
em
pl
oy
ee
 
0.
62
7*
**
 
0.
61
7*
**
 
0.
62
2*
**
 
0.
63
3*
**
 
0.
62
7*
**
 
0.
35
4*
**
 
0.
34
5*
**
 
0.
33
5*
**
 
0.
35
3*
**
 
0.
35
2*
**
 
(0
.0
05
) 
(0
.0
05
) 
(0
.0
06
) 
(0
.0
05
) 
(0
.0
05
) 
(0
.0
08
) 
(0
.0
08
) 
(0
.0
08
) 
(0
.0
08
) 
(0
.0
08
) 
Ca
pa
ci
ty
 u
til
iz
at
io
n 
0.
14
9*
**
 
0.
11
8*
**
 
0.
15
0*
**
 
0.
13
4*
**
 
0.
14
8*
**
 
0.
07
4*
**
 
0.
07
5*
**
 
0.
08
9*
**
 
0.
07
5*
**
 
0.
07
6*
**
 
(0
.0
23
) 
(0
.0
22
) 
(0
.0
26
) 
(0
.0
21
) 
(0
.0
23
) 
(0
.0
23
) 
(0
.0
24
) 
(0
.0
24
) 
(0
.0
23
) 
(0
.0
23
) 
N
um
be
r o
f p
ro
du
ct
s 
dr
op
pe
d 
-0
.0
27
**
* 
-0
.0
31
**
* 
-0
.0
31
**
* 
-0
.0
29
**
* 
-0
.0
27
**
* 
-0
.0
09
**
 
-0
.0
08
**
 
-0
.0
10
**
 
-0
.0
09
**
 
-0
.0
09
**
 
(0
.0
06
) 
(0
.0
06
) 
(0
.0
07
) 
(0
.0
06
) 
(0
.0
06
) 
(0
.0
04
) 
(0
.0
04
) 
(0
.0
04
) 
(0
.0
04
) 
(0
.0
04
) 
4-
di
gi
t i
nd
us
try
 p
ric
e 
in
de
x 
 
 
 
0.
27
4*
**
 
 
 
 
 
0.
12
5*
* 
 
 
 
 
(0
.0
43
) 
 
 
 
 
(0
.0
54
) 
 
Fi
rm
-le
ve
l p
ric
e 
in
de
x 
 
 
 
 
0.
05
5*
**
 
 
 
 
 
0.
10
4*
**
 
 
 
 
 
(0
.0
15
) 
 
 
 
 
(0
.0
16
) 
Co
ns
ta
nt
 
2.
00
9*
**
 
2.
18
5*
**
 
1.
89
7*
**
 
2.
04
8*
**
 
2.
00
7*
**
 
0.
03
4*
**
 
-0
.0
13
**
* 
-0
.0
13
**
* 
0.
03
1*
**
 
0.
03
1*
**
 
(0
.1
39
) 
(0
.1
37
) 
(0
.1
55
) 
(0
.1
30
) 
(0
.1
39
) 
(0
.0
05
) 
(0
.0
05
) 
(0
.0
05
) 
(0
.0
05
) 
(0
.0
05
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
 
12
28
4 
12
28
4 
12
28
4 
12
28
4 
12
28
4 
11
77
8 
11
77
8 
11
77
8 
11
77
8 
11
77
8 
R-
sq
ua
re
d 
0.
81
2 
0.
79
9 
0.
77
3 
0.
80
9 
0.
81
2 
0.
47
5 
0.
45
6 
0.
39
8 
0.
47
6 
0.
47
8 
N
ot
e: 
Pr
od
uc
tiv
ity
 e
sti
m
at
io
ns
 u
sin
g 
Ch
ile
an
 M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
su
rv
ey
 d
at
a 
(IN
E
 1
99
6-
20
03
). 
D
ep
en
de
nt
 v
ar
iab
le
 is
 o
ut
pu
t p
er
 e
m
pl
oy
ee
 n
ot
 d
ef
lat
ed
 in
 c
ol
um
ns
 (1
), 
(4
) a
nd
 (5
); 
de
fla
te
d 
w
ith
 a
n 
av
er
ag
e 
3-
di
gi
t I
SI
C 
in
du
st
ry
 d
ef
lat
or
 in
 c
ol
um
n 
(2
); 
an
d 
de
fla
te
d 
at
 th
e 
fir
m
 le
ve
l i
n 
co
lu
m
n 
(3
). 
N
o 
re
st
ric
tio
n 
ha
s b
ee
n 
im
po
se
d 
on
 re
tu
rn
s t
o 
sc
ale
. O
rd
in
ar
y 
Le
as
t S
qu
ar
e 
es
tim
at
es
 w
ith
 st
an
da
rd
 e
rr
or
s i
n 
pa
re
nt
he
se
s, 
sig
ni
fic
an
ce
 n
ot
ed
 b
y 
**
* 
if 
p<
0.
01
, *
* 
if 
p<
0.
05
, *
 if
 p
<
0.
 S
ec
to
r a
nd
 re
gi
on
 d
um
m
ie
s i
nc
lu
de
d.
 
 
 
Product Innovation, Price Growth, and Labor Productivity 
103 
  
Ta
bl
e 
3.
14
 O
LS
 re
gr
es
sio
ns
 w
ith
 P
ro
du
ct
s A
dd
ed
 a
nd
 D
ro
pp
ed
 S
ale
s P
ro
po
rti
on
s 
 
E
st
im
at
es
 in
 L
ev
el
s 
E
st
im
at
es
 in
 F
irs
t D
iff
er
en
ce
s 
 
(1
) 
(2
) 
(3
) 
(4
) 
(5
) 
(1
) 
(2
) 
(3
) 
(4
) 
(5
) 
 
Q
/L
 
no
t d
ef
lat
ed
 
Q
/L
 
3-
di
gi
t 
de
fla
te
d 
Q
/L
 
fir
m
-le
ve
l 
de
fla
te
d 
Q
/L
 
no
t d
ef
lat
ed
 
Q
/L
 
no
t d
ef
lat
ed
 
Q
/L
 
no
t d
ef
lat
ed
 
Q
/L
 
3-
di
gi
t 
de
fla
te
d 
Q
/L
 
fir
m
-le
ve
l 
de
fla
te
d 
Q
/L
 
no
t d
ef
lat
ed
 
Q
/L
 
no
t d
ef
lat
ed
 
Ca
pi
ta
l p
er
 e
m
pl
oy
ee
 
0.
11
1*
**
 
0.
11
1*
**
 
0.
12
2*
**
 
0.
11
1*
**
 
0.
11
2*
**
 
0.
02
9*
**
 
0.
03
0*
**
 
0.
02
8*
**
 
0.
02
9*
**
 
0.
02
9*
**
 
(0
.0
04
) 
(0
.0
04
) 
(0
.0
04
) 
(0
.0
04
) 
(0
.0
04
) 
(0
.0
06
) 
(0
.0
06
) 
(0
.0
07
) 
(0
.0
06
) 
(0
.0
06
) 
N
um
be
r o
f e
m
pl
oy
ee
s 
0.
09
4*
**
 
0.
09
9*
**
 
0.
09
0*
**
 
0.
09
4*
**
 
0.
09
4*
**
 
-0
.3
67
**
* 
-0
.3
75
**
* 
-0
.3
84
**
* 
-0
.3
68
**
* 
-0
.3
70
**
* 
(0
.0
04
) 
(0
.0
04
) 
(0
.0
05
) 
(0
.0
04
) 
(0
.0
04
) 
(0
.0
15
) 
(0
.0
15
) 
(0
.0
17
) 
(0
.0
15
) 
(0
.0
15
) 
In
te
rm
ed
iat
es
 p
er
 
em
pl
oy
ee
 
0.
63
0*
**
 
0.
62
0*
**
 
0.
62
4*
**
 
0.
63
0*
**
 
0.
63
0*
**
 
0.
35
7*
**
 
0.
34
7*
**
 
0.
33
5*
**
 
0.
35
6*
**
 
0.
35
5*
**
 
(0
.0
06
) 
(0
.0
06
) 
(0
.0
06
) 
(0
.0
06
) 
(0
.0
06
) 
(0
.0
09
) 
(0
.0
09
) 
(0
.0
09
) 
(0
.0
09
) 
(0
.0
09
) 
Ca
pa
ci
ty
 u
til
iz
at
io
n 
0.
15
1*
**
 
0.
11
2*
**
 
0.
14
5*
**
 
0.
15
1*
**
 
0.
15
0*
**
 
0.
07
4*
**
 
0.
07
6*
**
 
0.
09
1*
**
 
0.
07
5*
**
 
0.
07
6*
**
 
(0
.0
25
) 
(0
.0
24
) 
(0
.0
29
) 
(0
.0
25
) 
(0
.0
25
) 
(0
.0
24
) 
(0
.0
25
) 
(0
.0
26
) 
(0
.0
24
) 
(0
.0
24
) 
Pr
od
uc
ts
 a
dd
ed
 sa
le
s 
pr
op
or
tio
n 
0.
00
6*
**
 
0.
00
3 
0.
00
1 
0.
00
6*
**
 
0.
00
6*
**
 
0.
00
3*
* 
0.
00
4*
**
 
0.
00
3*
* 
0.
00
3*
* 
0.
00
3*
* 
(0
.0
02
) 
(0
.0
02
) 
(0
.0
02
) 
(0
.0
02
) 
(0
.0
02
) 
(0
.0
01
) 
(0
.0
01
) 
(0
.0
01
) 
(0
.0
01
) 
(0
.0
01
) 
Pr
od
uc
ts
 d
ro
pp
ed
 sa
le
s 
pr
op
or
tio
n 
-0
.0
12
**
* 
-0
.0
12
**
* 
-0
.0
11
**
* 
-0
.0
12
**
* 
-0
.0
12
**
* 
-0
.0
05
**
* 
-0
.0
05
**
* 
-0
.0
05
**
* 
-0
.0
05
**
* 
-0
.0
05
**
* 
(0
.0
03
) 
(0
.0
03
) 
(0
.0
03
) 
(0
.0
03
) 
(0
.0
03
) 
(0
.0
02
) 
(0
.0
02
) 
(0
.0
02
) 
(0
.0
02
) 
(0
.0
02
) 
4-
di
gi
t i
nd
us
try
 p
ric
e 
in
de
x 
 
 
 
0.
00
2 
 
 
 
 
0.
10
2*
 
 
 
 
 
(0
.0
61
) 
 
 
 
 
(0
.0
60
) 
 
Fi
rm
-le
ve
l p
ric
e 
in
de
x 
 
 
 
 
0.
05
1*
**
 
 
 
 
 
0.
11
5*
**
 
 
 
 
 
(0
.0
15
) 
 
 
 
 
(0
.0
18
) 
Co
ns
ta
nt
 
2.
04
4*
**
 
2.
31
0*
**
 
2.
08
5*
**
 
2.
04
4*
**
 
2.
03
5*
**
 
0.
01
2 
0.
01
9*
 
0.
02
6*
* 
0.
00
9 
0.
01
0 
(0
.1
54
) 
(0
.1
47
) 
(0
.1
74
) 
(0
.1
54
) 
(0
.1
54
) 
(0
.0
10
) 
(0
.0
11
) 
(0
.0
12
) 
(0
.0
10
) 
(0
.0
10
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
 
10
23
9 
10
23
9 
10
23
9 
10
23
9 
10
23
9 
98
76
 
98
76
 
98
76
 
98
76
 
98
76
 
R-
sq
ua
re
d 
0.
81
3 
0.
80
0 
0.
76
9 
0.
81
3 
0.
81
3 
0.
47
1 
0.
44
9 
0.
38
3 
0.
47
1 
0.
47
4 
N
ot
e: 
Pr
od
uc
tiv
ity
 e
sti
m
at
io
ns
 u
sin
g 
Ch
ile
an
 M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
su
rv
ey
 d
at
a 
(IN
E
 1
99
6-
20
03
). 
D
ep
en
de
nt
 v
ar
iab
le
 is
 o
ut
pu
t p
er
 e
m
pl
oy
ee
 n
ot
 d
ef
lat
ed
 in
 c
ol
um
ns
 (1
), 
(4
) a
nd
 (5
); 
de
fla
te
d 
w
ith
 a
n 
av
er
ag
e 
3-
di
gi
t I
SI
C 
in
du
st
ry
 d
ef
lat
or
 in
 c
ol
um
n 
(2
); 
an
d 
de
fla
te
d 
at
 th
e 
fir
m
 le
ve
l i
n 
co
lu
m
n 
(3
). 
N
on
-c
on
st
an
t r
et
ur
ns
 to
 sc
ale
, O
rd
in
ar
y 
Le
as
t S
qu
ar
e 
es
tim
at
es
. 
St
an
da
rd
 e
rr
or
s i
n 
pa
re
nt
he
se
s, 
sig
ni
fic
an
ce
 n
ot
ed
 b
y 
**
* 
if 
p<
0.
01
, *
* 
if 
p<
0.
05
, *
 if
 p
<
0.
 S
ec
to
r a
nd
 re
gi
on
 d
um
m
ie
s i
nc
lu
de
d.
 
 
 
Chapter 3 
  
104
Ta
bl
e 
3.
15
 O
LS
 re
gr
es
sio
ns
, w
ith
 P
ro
du
ct
s A
dd
ed
 S
ale
s P
ro
po
rti
on
 
 
E
st
im
at
es
 in
 L
ev
el
s 
E
st
im
at
es
 in
 F
irs
t D
iff
er
en
ce
s 
 
(1
) 
(2
) 
(3
) 
(4
) 
(5
) 
(1
) 
(2
) 
(3
) 
(4
) 
(5
) 
 
Q
/L
 
no
t d
ef
lat
ed
 
Q
/L
 
3-
di
gi
t 
de
fla
te
d 
Q
/L
 
fir
m
-le
ve
l 
de
fla
te
d 
Q
/L
 
no
t d
ef
lat
ed
 
Q
/L
 
no
t d
ef
lat
ed
 
Q
/L
 
no
t d
ef
lat
ed
 
Q
/L
 
3-
di
gi
t 
de
fla
te
d 
Q
/L
 
fir
m
-le
ve
l 
de
fla
te
d 
Q
/L
 
no
t d
ef
lat
ed
 
Q
/L
 
no
t d
ef
lat
ed
 
Ca
pi
ta
l p
er
 e
m
pl
oy
ee
 
0.
11
0*
**
 
0.
11
1*
**
 
0.
12
2*
**
 
0.
11
6*
**
 
0.
11
7*
**
 
0.
02
4*
**
 
0.
02
6*
**
 
0.
02
5*
**
 
0.
02
4*
**
 
0.
02
4*
**
 
(0
.0
04
) 
(0
.0
04
) 
(0
.0
04
) 
(0
.0
04
) 
(0
.0
04
) 
(0
.0
06
) 
(0
.0
06
) 
(0
.0
06
) 
(0
.0
06
) 
(0
.0
06
) 
N
um
be
r o
f e
m
pl
oy
ee
s 
0.
09
5*
**
 
0.
10
0*
**
 
0.
09
2*
**
 
0.
09
1*
**
 
0.
09
3*
**
 
-0
.3
69
**
* 
-0
.3
74
**
* 
-0
.3
84
**
* 
-0
.3
70
**
* 
-0
.3
72
**
* 
(0
.0
04
) 
(0
.0
04
) 
(0
.0
04
) 
(0
.0
04
) 
(0
.0
04
) 
(0
.0
14
) 
(0
.0
14
) 
(0
.0
15
) 
(0
.0
14
) 
-0
.0
1 
In
te
rm
ed
iat
es
 p
er
 
em
pl
oy
ee
 
0.
63
0*
**
 
0.
61
8*
**
 
0.
62
1*
**
 
0.
63
1*
**
 
0.
62
5*
**
 
0.
35
9*
**
 
0.
34
8*
**
 
0.
33
5*
**
 
0.
35
8*
**
 
0.
35
6*
**
 
(0
.0
05
) 
(0
.0
06
) 
(0
.0
06
) 
(0
.0
05
) 
(0
.0
05
) 
(0
.0
08
) 
(0
.0
08
) 
(0
.0
09
) 
(0
.0
08
) 
(0
.0
08
) 
Ca
pa
ci
ty
 u
til
iz
at
io
n 
0.
14
6*
**
 
0.
10
3*
**
 
0.
13
8*
**
 
0.
11
3*
**
 
0.
12
3*
**
 
0.
08
7*
**
 
0.
09
1*
**
 
0.
10
1*
**
 
0.
08
8*
**
 
0.
08
9*
**
 
(0
.0
24
) 
(0
.0
23
) 
(0
.0
27
) 
(0
.0
21
) 
(0
.0
22
) 
(0
.0
26
) 
(0
.0
27
) 
(0
.0
27
) 
(0
.0
26
) 
(0
.0
26
) 
Pr
od
uc
ts
 a
dd
ed
 sa
le
s 
pr
op
or
tio
n 
0.
00
4*
* 
0.
00
1 
-0
.0
00
 
0.
00
7*
**
 
0.
00
7*
**
 
0.
00
3*
* 
0.
00
3*
**
 
0.
00
3*
* 
0.
00
3*
* 
0.
00
3*
**
 
(0
.0
02
) 
(0
.0
02
) 
(0
.0
02
) 
(0
.0
02
) 
(0
.0
02
) 
(0
.0
01
) 
(0
.0
01
) 
(0
.0
01
) 
(0
.0
01
) 
(0
.0
01
) 
4-
di
gi
t i
nd
us
try
 p
ric
e 
in
de
x 
 
 
 
0.
22
6*
**
 
 
 
 
 
0.
08
0 
 
 
 
 
(0
.0
46
) 
 
 
 
 
(0
.0
55
) 
 
Fi
rm
-le
ve
l p
ric
e 
in
de
x 
 
 
 
 
0.
05
0*
**
 
 
 
 
 
0.
12
2*
**
 
 
 
 
 
(0
.0
13
) 
 
 
 
 
(0
.0
16
) 
Co
ns
ta
nt
 
2.
15
1*
**
 
2.
47
7*
**
 
2.
26
6*
**
 
2.
23
3*
**
 
2.
30
5*
**
 
0.
04
3*
**
 
0.
03
0*
**
 
0.
05
4*
**
 
0.
04
0*
**
 
0.
03
9*
**
 
(0
.1
45
) 
(0
.1
39
) 
(0
.1
63
) 
(0
.1
29
) 
(0
.1
34
) 
(0
.0
08
) 
(0
.0
09
) 
(0
.0
09
) 
(0
.0
09
) 
(0
.0
08
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
 
11
89
7 
11
89
7 
11
89
7 
11
89
7 
11
89
7 
11
53
4 
11
53
4 
11
53
4 
11
53
4 
11
53
4 
R-
sq
ua
re
d 
0.
81
4 
0.
79
9 
0.
76
6 
0.
81
0 
0.
81
2 
0.
47
0 
0.
44
8 
0.
38
2 
0.
47
0 
0.
47
3 
N
ot
e: 
Pr
od
uc
tiv
ity
 e
st
im
at
io
ns
 u
sin
g 
Ch
ile
an
 M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
su
rv
ey
 d
at
a 
(IN
E
 1
99
6-
20
03
). 
D
ep
en
de
nt
 v
ar
iab
le
 is
 o
ut
pu
t p
er
 e
m
pl
oy
ee
 n
ot
 d
ef
lat
ed
 in
 c
ol
um
ns
 (1
), 
(4
) a
nd
 (5
); 
de
fla
te
d 
w
ith
 a
n 
av
er
ag
e 
3-
di
gi
t I
SI
C 
in
du
st
ry
 d
ef
lat
or
 in
 c
ol
um
n 
(2
); 
an
d 
de
fla
te
d 
at
 th
e 
fir
m
 le
ve
l i
n 
co
lu
m
n 
(3
). 
N
on
-c
on
st
an
t r
et
ur
ns
 to
 sc
ale
, O
rd
in
ar
y 
Le
as
t S
qu
ar
e 
es
tim
at
es
 
w
ith
 st
an
da
rd
 e
rr
or
s i
n 
pa
re
nt
he
se
s, 
sig
ni
fic
an
ce
 n
ot
ed
 b
y 
**
* 
if 
p<
0.
01
, *
* 
if 
p<
0.
05
, *
 if
 p
<
0.
 S
ec
to
r a
nd
 re
gi
on
 d
um
m
ie
s i
nc
lu
de
d.
 
 
 
Product Innovation, Price Growth, and Labor Productivity 
105 
  
Ta
bl
e 
3.
16
 O
LS
 re
gr
es
sio
ns
 w
ith
 P
ro
du
ct
s D
ro
pp
ed
 S
ale
s P
ro
po
rti
on
 
 
E
st
im
at
es
 in
 L
ev
el
s 
E
st
im
at
es
 in
 F
irs
t D
iff
er
en
ce
s 
 
(1
) 
(2
) 
(3
) 
(4
) 
(5
) 
(1
) 
(2
) 
(3
) 
(4
) 
(5
) 
 
Q
/L
 
no
t d
ef
lat
ed
 
Q
/L
 
3-
di
gi
t 
de
fla
te
d 
Q
/L
 
fir
m
-le
ve
l 
de
fla
te
d 
Q
/L
 
no
t d
ef
lat
ed
 
Q
/L
 
no
t d
ef
lat
ed
 
Q
/L
 
no
t d
ef
lat
ed
 
Q
/L
 
3-
di
gi
t 
de
fla
te
d 
Q
/L
 
fir
m
-le
ve
l 
de
fla
te
d 
Q
/L
 
no
t d
ef
lat
ed
 
Q
/L
 
no
t d
ef
lat
ed
 
Ca
pi
ta
l p
er
 e
m
pl
oy
ee
 
0.
11
3*
**
 
0.
11
4*
**
 
0.
12
3*
**
 
0.
11
3*
**
 
0.
11
4*
**
 
0.
03
3*
**
 
0.
03
4*
**
 
0.
03
2*
**
 
0.
03
3*
**
 
0.
03
2*
**
 
(0
.0
04
) 
(0
.0
04
) 
(0
.0
04
) 
(0
.0
04
) 
(0
.0
04
) 
(0
.0
06
) 
(0
.0
06
) 
(0
.0
06
) 
(0
.0
06
) 
(0
.0
06
) 
N
um
be
r o
f e
m
pl
oy
ee
s 
0.
09
1*
**
 
0.
09
6*
**
 
0.
08
8*
**
 
0.
09
1*
**
 
0.
09
1*
**
 
-0
.3
75
**
* 
-0
.3
80
**
* 
-0
.3
90
**
* 
-0
.3
76
**
* 
-0
.3
77
**
* 
(0
.0
04
) 
(0
.0
04
) 
(0
.0
04
) 
(0
.0
04
) 
(0
.0
04
) 
(0
.0
14
) 
(0
.0
14
) 
(0
.0
15
) 
(0
.0
14
) 
(0
.0
14
) 
In
te
rm
ed
iat
es
 p
er
 
em
pl
oy
ee
 
0.
62
7*
**
 
0.
61
8*
**
 
0.
62
1*
**
 
0.
62
7*
**
 
0.
62
7*
**
 
0.
35
3*
**
 
0.
34
5*
**
 
0.
33
4*
**
 
0.
35
2*
**
 
0.
35
1*
**
 
(0
.0
05
) 
(0
.0
05
) 
(0
.0
06
) 
(0
.0
05
) 
(0
.0
05
) 
(0
.0
08
) 
(0
.0
08
) 
(0
.0
08
) 
(0
.0
08
) 
(0
.0
08
) 
Ca
pa
ci
ty
 u
til
iz
at
io
n 
0.
15
2*
**
 
0.
12
3*
**
 
0.
14
9*
**
 
0.
15
2*
**
 
0.
15
1*
**
 
0.
07
3*
**
 
0.
07
5*
**
 
0.
08
8*
**
 
0.
07
4*
**
 
0.
07
5*
**
 
(0
.0
23
) 
(0
.0
22
) 
(0
.0
26
) 
(0
.0
23
) 
(0
.0
23
) 
(0
.0
22
) 
(0
.0
24
) 
(0
.0
24
) 
(0
.0
22
) 
(0
.0
23
) 
Pr
od
uc
ts
 d
ro
pp
ed
 sa
le
s 
pr
op
or
tio
n 
-0
.0
11
**
* 
-0
.0
11
**
* 
-0
.0
11
**
* 
-0
.0
11
**
* 
-0
.0
11
**
* 
-0
.0
05
**
* 
-0
.0
05
**
* 
-0
.0
05
**
* 
-0
.0
05
**
* 
-0
.0
05
**
* 
(0
.0
02
) 
(0
.0
02
) 
(0
.0
03
) 
(0
.0
02
) 
(0
.0
02
) 
(0
.0
01
) 
(0
.0
01
) 
(0
.0
02
) 
(0
.0
01
) 
(0
.0
01
) 
4-
di
gi
t i
nd
us
try
 p
ric
e 
in
de
x 
 
 
 
0.
00
1 
 
 
 
 
0.
12
7*
* 
 
 
 
 
(0
.0
61
) 
 
 
 
 
(0
.0
54
) 
 
Fi
rm
-le
ve
l p
ric
e 
in
de
x 
 
 
 
 
0.
05
5*
**
 
 
 
 
 
0.
10
4*
**
 
 
 
 
 
(0
.0
15
) 
 
 
 
 
(0
.0
16
) 
Co
ns
ta
nt
 
1.
92
9*
**
 
2.
09
8*
**
 
1.
85
2*
**
 
1.
92
9*
**
 
1.
92
8*
**
 
0.
00
7 
-0
.0
39
**
* 
-0
.0
40
**
* 
0.
00
5 
0.
00
5 
(0
.1
39
) 
(0
.1
37
) 
(0
.1
57
) 
(0
.1
39
) 
(0
.1
39
) 
(0
.0
09
) 
(0
.0
09
) 
(0
.0
09
) 
(0
.0
09
) 
(0
.0
09
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
 
12
28
4 
12
28
4 
12
28
4 
12
28
4 
12
28
4 
11
77
8 
11
77
8 
11
77
8 
11
77
8 
11
77
8 
R-
sq
ua
re
d 
0.
81
2 
0.
79
9 
0.
77
4 
0.
81
2 
0.
81
2 
0.
47
6 
0.
45
6 
0.
39
8 
0.
47
6 
0.
47
8 
N
ot
e: 
Pr
od
uc
tiv
ity
 e
st
im
at
io
ns
 u
sin
g 
Ch
ile
an
 M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
su
rv
ey
 d
at
a 
(IN
E
 1
99
6-
20
03
). 
D
ep
en
de
nt
 v
ar
iab
le
 is
 o
ut
pu
t p
er
 e
m
pl
oy
ee
: n
ot
 d
ef
lat
ed
 in
 c
ol
um
ns
 (1
), 
(4
) a
nd
 (5
); 
de
fla
te
d 
w
ith
 a
n 
av
er
ag
e 
3-
di
gi
t I
SI
C 
in
du
st
ry
 d
ef
lat
or
 in
 c
ol
um
n 
(2
); 
an
d 
de
fla
te
d 
at
 th
e 
fir
m
 le
ve
l i
n 
co
lu
m
n 
(3
). 
N
on
-c
on
st
an
t r
et
ur
ns
 to
 sc
ale
, O
rd
in
ar
y 
Le
as
t S
qu
ar
e 
es
tim
at
es
 
w
ith
 st
an
da
rd
 e
rr
or
s i
n 
pa
re
nt
he
se
s, 
sig
ni
fic
an
ce
 n
ot
ed
 b
y 
**
* 
if 
p<
0.
01
, *
* 
if 
p<
0.
05
, *
 if
 p
<
0.
 S
ec
to
r a
nd
 re
gi
on
 d
um
m
ie
s i
nc
lu
de
d.
 
 
 
Chapter 3 
Based on the results shown so far, some questions may arise with respect to the 
relationships among different product innovation behaviors. We are interested in 
knowing the impact of products added on labor productivity, both in the presence and in 
the absence of products dropped. We specified four dummies that describe the four 
different possible combinations of innovative behaviors. In the first place, the “only 
added products” dummy takes value 1 when the number of products added in the past 2 
periods is greater than 0 only if there were no products dropped in the same period, and 
it takes value 0 in any other case. The “only dropped products” dummy takes value 1 of 
there were one or more products dropped over the previous 2 years but there were no 
products added in the same period and takes value 0 in any other case. The “added and 
dropped products” dummy takes value 1 if products were added and products were 
dropped and takes value 0 in any other case. The “no added or dropped products” 
dummy takes value 1 only if no products were added and no products were dropped over 
a two-year period. 
Table 3.17 shows the result in our main model of including these dummies except 
“added and dropped products”, because it is linearly dependent on the other dummies 
and the constant. The parameter significance levels are very high in most of the cases. In 
the left panel we find the results of the model expressed in levels. In all regressions, the 
coefficients “only added products” and “only dropped products” are positive which 
means that their productivity value is higher than in the case of “added and dropped 
products”. The value of the “no products added or dropped” dummy coefficient is in 
most cases also higher than the constant coefficient that stands for “added and dropped 
products”. The parameter “only dropped products” has a higher value than “only added 
products,” which means that, among the firms that dropped products, the ones that also 
added products are driving the negative parameter of “products dropped” in Table 3.7. 
This explanation is supported by the fact that in the level equations from Table 3.13 the 
value of “added and dropped products dummy” is the lowest of the four intercepts in the 
equation. From this equation we also conclude that the value of doing nothing (the value 
of the “no added or dropped products dummy”) is higher than the value of replacing 
products (the value of the constant that stands for “added and dropped products”). 
The right panel of Table 3.17 gives additional information on the effects of products 
replacement on productivity. The estimates in first differences show that, even though 
the replacement of goods has a negative impact on the present level of productivity, it 
has a positive impact on the rate of growth of productivity. The value of “added and 
dropped products” has a relatively high value that is about two times as large as the value 
of the “no added or dropped products” parameter. We find that the highest value is 
associated with the “only added products” behavior.  The option of “no products added 
or dropped” has a lower value but in some cases is higher than the “only dropped 
products” value. 
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Chapter 3 
3.6 Concluding Remarks 
This work studied the relationships among inputs, prices, product innovation, and 
productivity at the firm level using Chilean data for the period 1996-2003. The main 
contribution of this work is that, besides using firm-level industrial data, it takes 
advantage of an additional survey form that collects product-firm level information. We 
compared the estimation of the revenue function (using a nominal output measure) and 
the production function (using a real output measure). The outcomes were also 
compared to the usual case in which output is deflated by an industry level deflator. 
Results show that estimating the production or revenue function does not yield 
significantly different results when a variety of deflators are used to express output in 
constant prices. This may indicate that intra-industry price dispersion is enough 
correlated with output as to cause a significant bias on the non-deflated or industry 
deflated estimates. Therefore, using non-deflated or deflating with firm-level or industry-
level price growth does not make a big difference to the input elasticities in the function 
estimation. The evidence we found in this regard supports what was found previously by 
Mairesse and Jaumandreu (2005), which used self-reported price growth in order to 
account for firm-level inflation.  
In this paper, we found firm-level evidence to support the idea that product 
diversification has a positive effect on manufacturing productivity. It seems that 
variations in the range of products manufactured by firms have an impact on the level 
and the rate of growth of average output per employee. In particular, the incorporation 
of new products is clearly associated with a higher and increasing level of productivity 
among Chilean manufacturing firms. 
The results of this study show that the behavior of only adding products is positively 
and strongly related to increases in productivity in the case of the estimates in levels and 
also in the rates of growth. The findings also show that dropping products has an 
immediate negative effect on labor productivity. This suggests that the reduction in 
output associated with products dropped is not contemporaneously accompanied by a 
reduction in labor, probably due to labor input rigidities. 
The positive effect of adding products is not independent of whether some products 
are taken out of production at the same time. On average, firms that replace products 
face a contemporaneous reduction in labor productivity but a clear increase in the rate of 
growth of labor productivity. Additionally, we find that the behavior of only dropping 
products also has a positive effect on labor productivity in levels and almost no effect in 
first differences. The combinations of innovative activities such as adding and dropping 
products may result in positive productivity gains in terms of rate of growth, while doing 
no product-mix changes results in lower productivity gains. 
This chapter adds to the literature at least in two ways. First, it incorporates some 
new measures of product innovation into the traditional productivity estimates. We have 
found that the addition of new products by a firm is significantly associated with a 
positive increase in average worker productivity and that there is a complex relationship 
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between the behaviors of adding and dropping products. Second, the main 
methodological contribution of this work is proposing a measure for firm-level price 
change. Using this measure, nominal output can be expressed in real terms in order to 
estimate the production function. 
Results of this chapter imply that promoting product innovation has an additional 
positive effect that was previously not properly accounted for. Expanding product variety 
at the firm level may spur productivity by mechanisms that are not fully explained in 
previous literature and must be further studied. It is possible that firm-level product 
diversification generates access to new knowledge that, once used inside a firm, may be 
shared among all employees, thus expanding productivity. Products dropped allow 
resources to be freed for more efficient uses. However, if the dropped products are not 
replaced, the effect on the rate of growth of productivity is negative. Further studies 
should also refer to models in which firm-level output price information is incorporated 
into a system that considers demand for output and inputs as determinants of the 
production process, in the style of the work that was done in Mairesse and Jaumandreu 
(2006). 
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Abstract 
This work jointly estimates Price-Cost Markups and Union Bargaining Power using 
input elasticities and shares of input cost over sales. A novelty of this chapter is that it 
uses real output and productivity growth which are calculated using firm-level price 
corrected output growth, using new product-firm level data from the Chilean 
manufacturing industry between 1996 and 2003. The industry is divided and compared 
across seven manufacturing sectors. The Paper, Printing, and Publishing industry was 
found to have the lowest markups, measured by the estimations in levels, followed by the 
Textile industry. The Food and Beverages industry appears to have the highest average 
markup of price over marginal cost and also the highest extent of rent sharing. The 
Textile industry was found to be the sector where workers get the smallest share of rents. 
One finding of the present paper that is new and differs from all previous evidence is that 
in some industries workers do not receive a share of turnover that surpasses their own 
contribution to output, in some cases workers receive a share that is lower than their 
average marginal productivity.  In the sample we analyzed, production activity was 
subject to a strong contraction in 1998 and 1999, when output growth was -2% and -
8%.  Nevertheless, firm rents are distributed between capital owners and employees, 
resulting in different labor market outcomes across sectors of the manufacturing 
industry.  We found that deflating output at the firm level or at the industry level does 
not change the estimated parameters significantly, even though some differences may be 
found in the estimated standard deviations.  
  
Chapter 4 
4.1 Introduction 
One of the key concerns of empirical economists is the effects of market power on 
social welfare and the variations in resource allocation that result from deviations from 
perfect competition. In the manufacturing industry, imperfect competition implies that 
firms can raise prices above marginal costs and reduce the level of output below the 
socially optimal level.  Many approaches in the economic literature empirically analyze 
and describe monopoly and monopsony power.  Typically, this kind of analysis requires 
estimating demand and supply elasticities as a starting point for assessing the 
competitiveness of a market. 
This paper follows the model developed by Crepon, Desplatz, and Mairesse (1999, 
2002, 2007), which is an extension of the approach by Hall (1988). Earlier work by Solow 
(1957) developed a model that estimated total factor productivity growth as a measure of 
technical change. The model by Crepon et al. (1999) has the advantage of explicitly 
considering imperfect competition in the labor market. As shown in that paper, ignoring 
the existence of labor market imperfection causes a biased estimation of markups due to 
the omission of the share of rents that are captured by the workers in a manufacturing 
firm.  When the condition that labor is priced competitively is relaxed, the Solow residual 
can be decomposed into three parts: a markup of price over marginal cost, a parameter 
that represents the bargaining power of workers, and the rate of technical change. 
This work used a rich dataset from the Chilean manufacturing industry. This dataset 
allows us to clearly distinguish the changes in prices from the changes in quantities at the 
firm level. The absence of information on prices in previous work did not allow 
observation of changes of output in real terms. Instead, real sales value was estimated by 
deflating nominal sales with industry-level average price growth, forcing an assumption of 
no price or markup variations among firms within the same sector. This paper relaxes 
that assumption by introducing firm-level information on prices. 
One of the main objectives of this study is to evaluate whether estimating the model 
using real output instead of industry level deflated output will make significant 
differences in the estimated parameters. Additionally, it separates the Chilean 
manufacturing industry into seven sectors that we characterize individually using the 
model. We then draw some preliminary conclusions on market power distribution across 
the manufacturing industry in Chile. 
The analysis was at first focused on the whole manufacturing industry level. The 
model was then re-estimated using a disaggregation of the Chilean manufacturing 
industry into seven economic sectors: Foods-Beverages, Textiles-Leather, Wood-
Furniture, Paper-Publishing, Chemicals-Petroleum-Plastic, Non-Metallic Minerals, 
Metallurgic-Machinery. We divided firms into sectors that use similar technologies and 
inputs to obtain parameters that reflect the average overall level of competition in a 
specific industry. Nevertheless, it is not possible from our results to measure the market 
power of a specific firm or product market. Therefore, this study is intended as a general 
analysis of Chilean manufacturing rather than an empirical measure of market 
competition from an antitrust point of view. 
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The results show that deflating output at the firm level does not lead to a change in 
the estimated parameters, in contrast to what we find by deflating output at the two, 
three, or four-digit level. In fact, the differences in the parameters estimated with 
different deflations are never significant.  Nevertheless, the standard deviations of the 
estimated parameters are higher in the firm-level deflated model in comparison with the 
industry-level deflated equations. This result is consistent with a downward bias of the 
estimated standard deviations when deflating output using the same industry-level 
deflator for a large group of firms. 
In regard to the markup of price over cost, this paper found a parameter that is 
always high and significant, which implies that imperfect competition predominates in 
the Chilean manufacturing industry. Some of the lowest markups of price over cost were 
found in the Paper, Printing, and Publishing sector, followed by the Textile industry. The 
highest estimated markups were seen in the Food and Beverages sector and the Wood, 
Wood Products, and Furniture industries. 
The results also suggest that workers in general receive a small share of firm rents. In 
fact, the only sector that shows some degree of rent sharing that remains stable across 
regressions is the Food, Beverages, and Tobacco industry. The sectors where employees 
are relatively disadvantaged with respect to rent sharing are Textiles and Metallurgic 
industries. 
The rest of this document is structured as follows. Section 2 contains a literature 
review that mentions previous work on which this study was based; these studies are 
related to mark-up, rent sharing, and production function estimation. Section 3 discusses 
some theoretical considerations of the model and refers to the main contributions that 
were made to the econometric model prior to this empirical application. Section 4 
describes the data and discusses its sources and values. The estimation strategy is 
discussed in section 5. Section 6 presents the main estimation results and comments on 
some of their implications. Section 7 concludes and summarizes the main findings. 
4.2 Previous Literature 
4.2.1 The Empirical Study of Market Power 
The role of market power when estimating production functions in the 
manufacturing industry requires the analysis of various consequences of monopoly and 
monopsony in market outcomes.  
The paper by Bresnahan (1989) studied industries with market power and reviewed 
previous work on the same topic. He analyzed previously published econometric studies 
of market power. He focused on work that referred to single markets and also groups of 
related markets. He also mentioned that the increase in the number of such studies and 
substantial advances in the methods for carrying them out constituted a dramatic shift in 
the focus of empirical work in the industrial organization field.  
Baker and Bresnahan (2006) present a more recent survey of econometric studies on 
market power and their relevance for antitrust legal cases. The paper by Just and Chern 
Chapter 4 
(1980) is an example of an empirical work that ended up as legal evidence in an antitrust 
case in the United States. 
One approach that empirical economists have developed to detect imperfect 
competition is measuring some of the key variables that are affected by market power. 
Because price and quantity are simultaneously determined for each specific market, the 
presence of an external shock that affects either of them may be used to evaluate what 
happens to the other as a response.  Evaluating the changes of price and quantities when 
an external shock affecting demand or supply is introduced can prove the existence of 
market power in some cases17.  However, this kind of model has the limitation of 
ignoring the possibility that inputs were not priced competitively.  
4.2.2 Market Power and Rent Distribution 
Jovanovic (1979) presented a long-run equilibrium theory of turnover and explained 
some of the market outcomes that had been observed by empirical investigators. A 
worker's productivity in a particular job becomes known as the worker's experience in a 
particular job increases. Turnover is generated by the existence of differences in a 
worker's productivity across different jobs. This positive profit is caused by the variation 
in the quality of the worker-employer match.  
McDonald and Solow (1981) searched for a convincing theoretical explanation of the 
behavior of wage rates during fluctuations in output and employment. They found that 
previous literature confirms the prevailing view that real-wage movements are more or 
less independent of the business cycle. They proposed and studied two main questions. 
The first asked why nominal wages should be sticky. The second focused on real wages 
and asked why fluctuations in the demand for labor should so often lead to large changes 
in employment and small changes in the real wage. 
Evidence that the share of rents captured by workers is related to the power of firms 
in the labor market was also found by the model of Christofides and Oswald (1992). 
They proposed that microeconomic forces that influence real wages were not fully 
understood. Their paper studied pay determination using data on approximately 600 
labor contracts. They found that real wages were higher when past profitability in the 
employer's industry had been also high. They also found that wages are negatively related 
to the level of unemployment in the employer's region.  
Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1994) studied a longitudinal sample of over one 
million French workers and over 500,000 employing firms. Wages were decomposed into 
components related to observable characteristics, including worker and firm 
heterogeneity. They found that firms that pay higher wages, controlling for person-
effects, are more productive and more profitable.   
Another work that studied market power and wages is Nickell, Vainiomaki, and 
Wadhwani (1994). They analyzed time-series on nearly 800 British manufacturing firms to 
address various questions concerning the role of market power in wage determination. 
                                              
17 See, for example, the work by Just and Chern (1980) 
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Among their results, they found that product market power has a positive impact on 
wages; this impact is enhanced in large firms but is not influenced by union status.  
Blanchflower, Oswald, and Sanfey (1996) suggested a new test for rent-sharing in the 
U.S. labor market. Using an unbalanced panel from the manufacturing sector, they 
showed that a rise in a sector's profitability leads, after some years, to an increase in the 
long-run level of wages in that sector. The paper controlled for workers' characteristics, 
industry fixed effects, and unionism.  
Buguin (1996) developed a production function model with efficient bargaining 
between oligopolistic firms and unions to distinguish between product market power and 
union power in capturing economic rents. The model was formalized using the 
generalized Nash bargaining solution, and was empirically tested on four Belgian 
manufacturing sectors. Buguin showed that product market power is significantly eroded 
by wage rents, but firms retain most of their power during negotiations.  
Hildreth and Oswald (1997) discussed whether the competitive model provides an 
adequate representation of the labor market. Using longitudinal firm data, their article 
suggested that the labor market is not competitive. As predicted by rent-sharing models 
of the labor market, changes in profitability are related to long-run changes in wages. 
They concluded that these are not temporary wage effects and are not driven by the 
unionized workplaces in the data.  
4.2.3 Mark-up and Rent sharing in the Manufacturing Industry 
This paper focuses on the measurement of market power and the distribution of 
rents in the entire manufacturing industry and does not focus on a specific monopolistic 
firm. It follows a research line that originated after the work by Solow (1957), who 
proposed estimating total factor productivity growth as a measure of technical change.  
Based on this model, Hall (1988) developed an empirical measure of how much market 
outcomes deviate from perfect competition. His model documented the disparity 
between price and marginal cost, where marginal cost was estimated from annual 
variations in cost. He found that some U.S. industries have marginal cost well below 
price. He also argued that cyclical variations in labor input were small compared with 
variations in output. In booms, firms produce substantially more output and sell it for a 
price that exceeds the costs of the added inputs.  
Following the bargaining model of Robert Hall, the work by Crepon, Desplatz, and 
Mairesse (1999, 2002, 2007) developed the model on which this paper is based. They 
presented a model for estimating price cost margins, scale economies, and workers' 
bargaining power from a panel of firm-level data. They extended Hall’s framework, based 
on the estimation of the Solow residual. They allowed for the possibility that wages were 
bargained off the labor demand curve, according to an efficient bargaining model. One 
interesting aspect of their methodology is that it does not require measuring the 
opportunity cost of labor for the estimation of the union bargaining power because they 
use the value of labor marginal productivity as a benchmark for salary.  They found 
substantial imperfections in both the product and labor markets in French manufacturing 
and they showed that the lack of explicit consideration of labor market imperfection 
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results in a significant underestimation of markups, due to the omission of the part of 
product rents captured by workers.  
After the model by Crepon et al. (1999, 2002, 2007), many papers have followed 
with a variety of empirical applications. The work by Dobbelaere (2004) analyzed 
imperfections in both the product market and the labor market for firms in the Belgian 
manufacturing industry over the period 1988–1995. She further investigated the 
heterogeneity in price-cost mark-up and workers’ bargaining power parameters among 18 
sectors within the manufacturing industry. Using a sample of more than 7000 firms, she 
also confirmed that ignoring the imperfection in the labor market leads to an 
underestimation of the price-cost margin.  
Benavente and Contreras (2006) followed the same model by Crepon et al. (2002). 
Using that model, they jointly estimated markup and rent sharing in the Chilean 
manufacturing industry for the period from 1993 to 1999. Using GMM, they found that 
workers take around 21% of the rent. The remaining rent stays in hands of the capital 
owners. They also showed that not considering imperfections on the input market causes 
biased estimations of the markup. They used industry-level deflated sales in their work.  
Dobbelaere and Mairesse (2009) provided evidence of rent sharing from different 
dimensions in the same data. They use real current production deflated by the two-digit 
producer price index of the French industrial classification. Taking advantage of a rich 
matched employer-employee dataset for France over the period 1984-2001, they 
compared industry differences in rent-sharing parameters derived from three different 
approaches: the accounting approach, the standard labor economics approach, and the 
productivity approach. They classified industries into six categories according to their 
level of competition in the product market (perfect competition and imperfect 
competition) and the rent sharing between firms and workers (right to manage 
bargaining, efficient bargaining, and monopsony). A paper by Benavente, Dobbelaere, 
and Mairesse (2009) compared three applications of the model by Crepon et al. (2002), 
using Chilean, Belgian, and French manufacturing industry data. 
All these papers that followed and added to the model developed by Crepon et al 
(1999) have failed to consider that the share of turnover captured by workers in not 
necessarily higher than average marginal productivity of labor. In fact the evidence 
presented in the present chapter will show that in some cases the payment to the labor 
force at the firm level can be on average lower that the level of the marginal productivity 
of labor. 
Arai (2003) studied the relationship between wages and firms’ ability to pay. He used 
Swedish data on workers and firms’ balance-sheet reports for his empirical analysis. His 
results indicate that experienced and highly educated workers are sorted into profitable 
firms. Wages are positively correlated with profits and the capital-labor ratio. He 
controlled for worker quality, degree of effort, supervision, job characteristics, local 
unemployment, firms’ employment history, and employer size.   
Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) developed and estimated an equilibrium search model 
to evaluate the distribution of wages and the relation between market imperfections and 
wages. They found that the share of the cross-sectional wage variance that is explained by 
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person effects varies across skill groups. According to their estimations, the contribution 
of market imperfections to wage dispersion is typically around 50%. 
Estevao and Tevlin (2003) estimated the effects of rents per worker on wages and 
found parameters that were significantly positive. Using the U.S. input–output tables to 
isolate demand shocks, they identified the effects of the industry financial situation on 
wages. Their instrumental variables estimates revealed substantial rent sharing, much 
larger than it would be consistent with a purely competitive labor market. 
There is a varied literature that relates the final product market outcomes with the 
input markets to evaluate the presence of market power. The paper by Neven, Roller, and 
Zhang (2006) allowed for endogenous costs in the estimation of price-cost margins. They 
estimated price-cost margins when firms bargain over wages. They proposed that price-
cost margins are determined by wages and vice versa. They used data from eight 
European airlines from 1976–1994, and showed that the treatment of endogenous costs 
has important implications for the measurement of price-cost margins and the 
assessment of market power. They found that observed prices in Europe were virtually 
identical to monopoly prices, even though observed margins are consistent with Nash 
behavior.  
4.2.4 Managerial Efforts, Innovation, and Market Power 
There is also abundant literature that relates market power with firm performance. 
Schamalensee (1989) provided a vast literature review that was concerned with inter-
industry studies of the relationships among various measures of market structure, 
conduct, and performance. Schmidt (1997) showed in his paper that increasing the level 
of market competition has two opposing effects on managerial incentives. On one side, it 
increases risk, which has a positive effect on managerial effort. On the other side, it 
reduces profits, which may make it less attractive to exert high managerial effort.  He 
finds that the total effect of market competition on managerial effort is ambiguous. 
Nickell (1996) proposed some arguments to claim that competition improves firm 
performance, not only in terms of innovation but especially in terms of productivity 
growth.  Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) showed that monopoly power does not necessarily turn 
resources away from a sector because it may also allow paying fixed costs, enabling entry 
to the market. They investigated whether market equilibrium yields the social optimum 
level of welfare in terms of quantities and varieties of commodities.  
Van Reenen (1996) examined the impact of technological innovation on wages using 
a panel of British firms. A head-count measure of major innovations between 1945 and 
1983 was combined with share price and accounting information. Innovating firms were 
found to have higher average wages, but rival innovation tends to depress own wages. He 
claimed this result to be consistent with a model where wages are partly determined by a 
sharing in the rents generated by innovation.  
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4.3 Markup and Rent Sharing Econometric  Model 
The model has its origin in the derivations of Solow (1957) in which total factor 
productivity could be measured based on the difference between output growth and 
input growth rates. This work was followed by Hall (1988), who measured market power 
of firms by documenting the differences between price and marginal cost. The paper by 
Klette (1994) allowed for imperfect competition in the product market; although it 
assumed that firms were price takers in the input market, it was able to obtain an estimate 
of the scale elasticity parameter and the markup of price over cost. The later model by 
Crepon, Desplatz, and Mairesse (1999) proposed an estimation of the production 
function equation assuming that markups, scale economies, and the workers' bargaining 
power were constant over time and therefore could be estimated jointly with the input 
and scale elasticities. This last addition to the model defines the labor share as a function 
of a parameter that measures the workers' bargaining power.  
However, in the work by Klette and Griliches (1996), evidence has been found that 
using non-deflated sales as a measure of real output creates a downwards bias in the scale 
estimate. Crepon, Duguet, and Mairesse (1999) also proposed a methodology that 
considers output prices that are unobserved and endogenous. They designed a 
modification to the equation that takes this bias into account by adding a variable 
reflecting the output growth at the industry level. In this paper, we avoid the problems 
that arise from not observing the output price changes using a firm-level price growth 
estimate obtained from product-firm level information. 
This paper follows the model by Crepon, Desplatz, and Mairesse (1999) and does 
not use the extensions to account for the unobserved output prices problem. We further 
relax the idea of a reservation wage represented by the marginal productivity of labor as a 
fixed benchmark to calculate workers share of profits. Instead, we use the value of labor 
marginal productivity as a reference point for estimating workers bargaining power 
without assuming that the reservation wage is not lower than the benchmark. 
4.3.1 Markup of Prices over Marginal Costs 
We start from a traditional production function of firm i in period t, expressing the 
idea that output quantity is produced from capital, labor, and materials satisfying the 
equation: 
 
ܳ௜௧ ൌ ܣ௜௧ܨሺܭ௜௧ǡ ܮ௜௧ǡܯ௜௧ሻ 
 
where ܣ௜௧ is an index of technical change defined as “Total Factor Productivity.” 
The logarithmic differentiation of the production function is defined as: 
 
οݍ௜௧ ൌ οܽ௜௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧௄ο݇௜௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧௅ ο݈௜௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧ெο݉௜௧ 
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where we know that the variables expressed as log-derivatives can be replaced by the 
rates of growth and the resulting elasticities will be the averages over adjacent years.  
We can first assume that there is imperfect competition in the product market and 
that firms are price takers in the input markets. We consider labor and materials as 
variable costs and capital as a quasi-fixed factor. Because firms maximize short-run 
benefits, labor and materials move to their short-run equilibrium in every period. Under 
these conditions we can define that marginal cost  ܥ௜௧ொ  is equal to marginal revenue ܴ௜௧ொ . 
Another way to express this relationship is to define the firm markup ߤ௜௧as the ratio of 
output price  ௜ܲ௧ to marginal cost:  
 
ߤ௜௧ ൌ ௜ܲ௧ܴ௜௧ொ
ൌ ௜ܲ௧ܥ௜௧ொ
 
 
Short run profit maximization implies the two following first order conditions: 
 
ߝ௜௧௅ ൌ ߤ௜௧ ௜ܵ௧௅  
ߝ௜௧ெ ൌ ߤ௜௧ ௜ܵ௧ெ 
 
Where  ߝ௜௧௅  and ߝ௜௧ெ are the elasticities of output with respect to the variable inputs 
labor and materials, we know that  ߤ௜௧ is defined as the markup of price over cost and ௜ܵ௧௅  
and ௜ܵ௧ெ are the shares of labor and material costs in total firm revenue. These 
relationships mean that the elasticity of output with respect to a variable input is equal to 
the ratio of that specific input cost to output. 
Without necessarily imposing constant returns to scale, we can propose that the 
elasticity of scale is ߣ௜௧ ൌ ߝ௜௧௅ ൅ ߝ௜௧ெ ൅ ߝ௜௧௄. We can also express the capital elasticity in 
terms of the scale parameter, the markup of price over cost, and the shares of each 
variable input over sales. 
 
ߝ௜௧௄ ൌ ߣ௜௧ െ ߤ௜௧ ௜ܵ௧௅ െ ߤ௜௧ ௜ܵ௧ெ 
 
This equation provides a convenient way to estimate capital elasticity with respect to 
output without having to calculate the user cost of capital or the share of capital costs in 
revenues. Instead, for the estimation of capital elasticity, we can calculate an average scale 
elasticity λ that in some cases may be assumed to yield constant returns (λ=1). 
When we find profits that are not equal to zero, we may be interested in determining 
if the source of profit is related to the existence of increasing returns to scale (the case of 
a natural monopoly) or the presence of imperfect competition. We can obtain the profit 
ratio if we divide the markup by the elasticity of scale such that:  ௜ܲ௧ ሺܥ௜௧ ܳΤΤ ௜௧ሻ ൌ
ߤ௜௧ ߣ௜௧Τ .  
Inserting materials, labor, and capital elasticities into the logarithmic differentiation 
of the production function and rearranging the terms gives: 
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Δݍ௜௧ ൌ ߤ௜௧ሼ ௜ܵ௧௅ ሺΔ݈௜௧ െ Δ݇௜௧ሻ ൅ ௜ܵ௧ெሺΔ݉௜௧ െ Δ݇௜௧ሻሽ ൅ ߣ௜௧Δ݇௜௧ ൅ Δܽ௜௧ 
 
We can rewrite the equation as the Solow residual18 decomposed into a markup of 
price over cost, a scale factor, and a measure of productivity growth. 
 
ܴܵ௜௧ ൌ ሺߤ௜௧ െ ͳሻሼ ௜ܵ௧௅ ሺΔ݈௜௧ െ Δ݇௜௧ሻ ൅ ௜ܵ௧ெሺΔ݉௜௧ െ Δ݇௜௧ሻሽ ൅ ሺߣ௜௧ െ ͳሻΔ݇௜௧ ൅ Δܽ௜௧ 
 
If we assume that the scale parameter and the markup coefficient are constant and 
represent average parameters, and if we introduce the notation Δݔ௜௧ఓ ൌ ௜ܵ௧௅ ሺΔ݈௜௧ െ
Δ݇௜௧ሻ ൅ ௜ܵ௧ெሺΔ݉௜௧ െ Δ݇௜௧ሻ, we can estimate the following model: 
 
ܴܵ௜௧ ൌ ሺߤ௜௧ െ ͳሻοݔ௜௧ఓ ൅ ሺߣ௜௧ െ ͳሻΔ݇௜௧ ൅ Δݑ௜௧ 
 
where Δݑ௜௧ is a disturbance term that includes Total Factor Productivity growth and 
all other errors and shocks. 
4.3.2 Labor Force Market Power 
The model so far has assumed that perfect competition applies to the labor market. 
When labor is in equilibrium, wage equals marginal revenue of labor and therefore firms 
act as price takers in the labor market. We will now relax the assumption that labor is 
priced competitively and follow the efficient bargaining model of McDonald and Solow 
(1981). This model proposed that wage is bargained between firms and their employees. 
In order to obtain the desired parameter, a given level of wage is assumed as a 
benchmark for the market power factor estimation. The level of salary that equals the 
marginal revenue of labor was chosen as this benchmark. In the context of the efficient 
bargaining model, workers maximizeܮ௜௧ሺݓ௜௧ െ ݓഥ௜௧ሻ, where ݓഥ௜௧ is the marginal 
productivity wage. Firms maximize their short-run profit given by ܴ௜௧ െ ݓ௜௧ܮ௜௧ െ ݆௜௧ܯ௜௧. 
The Nash solution to the bargaining model results in the weighted maximization of 
workers’ collective objective and the firm short-run profit such that: 
 
௪೔೟ǡ௅೔೟ǡெ೔೟ሾܮ௜௧ሺݓ௜௧ െ ݓഥ௜௧ሻሿ
ఏ೔೟ ሾܴ௜௧െݓ௜௧ܮ௜௧ െ ݆௜௧ܯ௜௧ሿଵିఏ೔೟ 
 
The first order condition of this maximization gives the following expression for 
wage: 
 
ݓ௜௧ ൌ ܴ௜௧௅ ൅ ߠ௜௧
ܴ௜௧ െ ܴ௜௧௅ ܮ௜௧ െ ݆௜௧ܯ௜௧
ܮ ൌ ߠ௜௧
ܴ௜௧ െ ݆௜௧ܯ௜௧
ܮ ൅ ሺͳ െ ߠ௜௧ሻܴ௜௧
௅  
 
                                              
18 The conventional Solow residual or Total Factor Productivity is defined by: 
 ܴܵ݅ݐ ൌ ȟݍ݅ݐ െ ܵ݅ݐܮ ȟ݈݅ݐ െ ܵ݅ݐܯȟ݉݅ݐ െ ሺͳ െ ܵ݅ݐܮ െ ܵ݅ݐܯሻȟ݇݅ݐ 
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where ݓ௜௧ is workers’ wage,ܴ௜௧ is total firm revenue, ܴ௜௧௅  is marginal revenue of 
labor, ݆௜௧ is the cost of materials, and L and M represent the amounts of labor and 
materials used by firms. This equation shows that workers are paid the value of their 
marginal productivity plus a share of firm’s profits after inputs have been paid. In the 
original model, the marginal productivity wage is a reservation wage, but we can relax that 
assumption if desired and allow a parameter range of  -1<ߠ௜௧ ൏ ͳ.  
If ߠ௜௧ ൌ Ͳ, workers are being paid on average the value of their marginal 
productivities. If ߠ௜௧ ൐ Ͳ, workers receive a share of firm rents on top of the payment of 
their marginal productivities.  If ߠ௜௧ is negative, it means that the reservation wage is 
lower than the value of marginal revenue of labor. In this last case, the parameter gives a 
minimum measure of the distance between marginal productivity wage and the 
reservation wage, expressed in terms of the value of total markup of price over marginal 
cost. The actual unobserved reservation wage could be even lower than that, but we are 
not able to measure it within this model. We can rewrite the previous equation in terms 
of the markup of price over cost ߤ௜௧,  labor and materials shares ௜ܵ௧௅  and ௜ܵ௧ெ and labor 
elasticity ߝ௜௧௅ : 
 
௜ܵ௧௅ ൌ ߠ௜௧ሺͳ െ ௜ܵ௧ெሻ ൅ ሺͳ െ ߠ௜௧ሻ ଵఓ೔೟ߝ௜௧
௅  
 
The estimated markup in this setting now includes the part of the rent that is 
captured by the workforce. Inserting the previous equation into the Solow residual with 
the notation Δݔ௜௧ఏ ൌ ሺ ௜ܵ௧௅ ൅ ௜ܵ௧ெ െ ͳሻሺΔ݈௜௧ െ Δ݇௜௧ሻ  we can write: 
 
ܴܵ௜௧ ൌ ሺߤ௜௧ െ ͳሻοݔ௜௧ఓ ൅ ሺߣ௜௧ െ ͳሻΔ݇௜௧ ൅ ߤ௜௧
ߠ
ͳ െ ߠ ο୧୲
θ ൅ Δݑ௜௧ 
 
It can be now defined that the Solow residual is decomposed into a markup of price 
over costሺߤ௜௧ െ ͳሻ, a scale factor ሺߣ௜௧ െ ͳሻ, a rent sharing factor ఏଵିఏ ൌ ߣ that represents 
the proportion of the rent that is being captured by workers, and a measure of 
productivity growth that contains all other shocks, Δݑ௜௧.  
Finally, the paper of Dobbelaere and Mairesse (2010) showed that a joint market 
imperfection parameter (ψ) could be defined by taking into account both labor market 
and materials market imperfections, given that we have access to data on at least two 
variable input factors. 
 
߰ ൌ ሺఌಾ
ೂ ሻ೔೟
ሺఈಾሻ೔೟ െ
ሺఌಽೂሻ೔೟
ሺఈಽሻ೔೟ ൌ ߤ௜௧
ఏ೔೟
ଵିఏ೔೟ ሾ
ଵିሺఈಽሻ೔೟ିሺఈಾሻ೔೟
ሺఈಽሻ೔೟  ] 
 
This expression shows that the joint market imperfection parameter (ψ) is a measure 
of the firm’s market power in the materials market relative to its market power in the 
labor market. If ψ<0, then firms exercise more power in the labor market than in the 
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materials market. If ψ=0, both input markets are equally competitive. If ψ>0, then 
workers bargain efficiently and get a share of rents higher than the share material 
providers get relative to their own marginal productivities.  
4.4 Chilean Manufacturing Industry Data  
The data used for this research has been collected by Instituto Nacional de 
Estadisticas (INE). This paper uses data from the main Encuesta Nacional Industrial 
Annual (ENIA) survey (Form 1) and the product-firm level annex from ENIA (Form 3). 
Firms are first described in terms of the level of output, which can be deflated by each 
individual firm’s price growth.   When the product-firm level ENIA annex is merged with 
firm-level ENIA information, the result is a very rich industrial dataset that provides high 
quality information on price growth within firms’ products. 
The database used for this paper has been cleaned to make sure no significant 
outliers are found within the most important variables of the model. In terms of the 
input shares in output, no individual input share (capital, materials, and labor) was 
allowed to be equal to or greater than 1. The share of capital in output was restricted to a 
minimum of 0.05 and a maximum of 0.6. The growth of capital per employee expressed 
as the first difference of the log values was restricted to a maximum value of 0.69=ln(2). 
The same limit was applied to the rate of growth of materials/output, output per 
employee, and number of employees. 
 
Table 4.1 Number of Observations by Industrial Sector 
Industry 
Number 
Number 
of firms 
Number of 
observations 
ISIC REV2 
Code 
Industry Sector Definition 
1 
 
702 
 
4496 
 
31 
 
Manufacture of food, beverages 
and tobacco 
 
2 
 
362 
 
2277 
 
32 
 
Textile, wearing apparel and leather 
 
3 
 
214 
 
1303 
 
33 
 
Manufacture of wood and wood 
products, including furniture 
4 
 
142 
 
674 
 
34 
 
Manufacture of paper and paper products, 
printing and publishing 
5 
 
243 
 
1565 
 
35 
 
Manufacture of chemicals and chemical, 
petroleum, coal, rubber and plastic products 
6 
 
113 
 
661 
 
36 and 39 
 
Manufacture of non-metallic mineral 
products and other manufacturing industries 
7 
 
406 
 
2384 
 
37 and 38 
 
Basic metal and manufacture of fabricated metal 
products, machinery and equipment 
 
Table 4.1 contains the basic information on the number of firms and the number of 
observations that represent those firms on different industrial sectors. The sample 
consists of 2,182 firms over an 8-year period from 1996 to 2003. The unbalanced panel 
of 13,360 observations contains only firms for which data is available on 3 or more 
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consecutive years. Productive units for which data was available with gaps in time have 
been dropped from the sample.  
The largest industry in terms of number of firms is the manufacture of Food, 
Beverages, and Tobacco, followed by the Metallic industries and Textiles. Table 4.2 
contains the description of the panel. Almost 80% of the sample is made of firms for 
which information was provided in 6 or more consecutive periods.  
 
 
Table 4.2 Unbalanced Panel Summary 
Number of 
surveys 
Number 
of firms 
Number of 
observations 
3 267 801 
4 286 1144 
5 216 1080 
6 272 1632 
7 425 2975 
8 716 5728 
Total 2182 13360 
 
Table 4.3 All Manufacturing Industries Descriptive Statistics 
Variables  Mean Std. Dev. p25 p50 p75 N 
Annual output firm-level deflated q(f) 2,280,097 9,332,376 182,207 386,628 1,232,649 13,360 
Annual output industry 2digit deflated q(i2) 2,215,851 8,907,208 180,970 380,733 1,183,781 13,360 
Annual output industry 3digit deflated q(i3) 2,216,640 8,851,341 181,882 381,192 1,192,537 13,360 
Annual output industry 4digit deflated q(i4) 2,233,351 9,110,452 181,436 381,321 1,201,454 13,360 
Number of employees 64 120 17 27 57 13,360 
Annual intermediates expenditures deflated 1,165,534 4,397,433 83,578 188,406 610,611 13,360 
Capital deflated 1,187,575 5,350,734 42,135 128,815 450,389 13,360 
Labor share in nominal output α_{N} 0.175 0.091 0.109 0.163 0.223 13,360 
Materials share in nominal output α_{M} 0.494 0.167 0.372 0.485 0.609 13,360 
Capital share in nominal output 1-α_{N}-α_{M} 0.331 0.152 0.229 0.334 0.436 13,360 
Output growth rate firm-level deflated Δq(f) -0.004 0.223 -0.125 -0.002 0.124 11,178 
Output growth rate industry 2digit deflated Δq(i2) -0.007 0.207 -0.116 -0.005 0.107 11,178 
Output growth rate industry 3digit deflated Δq(i3) -0.007 0.207 -0.116 -0.004 0.108 11,178 
Output growth rate industry 4digit deflated Δq(i4) -0.007 0.208 -0.118 -0.004 0.110 11,178 
Labor growth rate Δn -0.018 0.163 -0.095 0.000 0.061 11,178 
Materials growth rate Δm -0.020 0.289 -0.188 -0.016 0.150 11,178 
Capital growth rate Δk 0.045 0.106 0.000 0.005 0.054 11,178 
ܴܵ ൌ οݍ െ ߙ௡ο݊ െ ߙ௠ο݉ െ ሺͳ െ ߙ௡ െ ߙ௠ሻο݇ -0.006 0.179 -0.113 -0.006 0.099 11,178 
SR  without 1998 and 1999 0.009 0.174 -0.094    0.010 0.117 7,769 
Note: Descriptive statistics from Chilean manufacturing industry data (ENIA). Includes ISIC Rev.2 sectors 31 to 39. 
Unbalanced panel with 2,182 firms from 1996 to 2003.  
 
Table 4.3 contains the descriptive statistics of the entire sample. Annual output is 
provided with four different deflation options for comparison. In the first place, output is 
deflated at the firm level with the price growth that was calculated as the weighted 
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average price growth of each product within firms. Then the ISIC REV2 code is used to 
take the average price growth of a specific industry at three different aggregation levels. 
The average manufacturing firm in Chile has 64 employees, while the value of 
intermediates and capital are highly dispersed. The share of labor and intermediates in 
nominal output are 0.17 and 0.49 respectively, on average. The resulting capital share on 
nominal output is 0.33.  
On average, operational profits before taxes represented a 64% of the value of 
capital. An interesting feature of this data is that deflated output growth had on average a 
very low negative value independently of the deflation used. This effect is due to a 
financial crisis that hit the Chilean manufacturing sector in 1998 and 1999, resulting in 
average manufacturing output changes of -2% and -8% respectively.  Labor and materials 
also present negative growth, while the average annual growth of capital is less than 5%. 
The resulting Solow residuals estimated from this dataset are negative. The estimated 
Solow residual takes a value of 1% when we exclude crisis years 1998 and 1999 from the 
sample.  
Tables 4.4 to 4.10 summarize the descriptive statistics of the sample that has been 
divided into 7 economic sectors. Table 4.4 summarizes the Food, Beverages, and 
Tobacco industries than contain one-third of the observations. In terms of sales size, this 
industry has firms that are slightly above the manufacturing average. In terms of number 
of employees, however, these firms are smaller than the manufacturing average. When 
deflated at the firm level, this industry has a positive though very low output rate of 
growth. After counting the change on inputs, the resulting Solow residual is a negative 
and very small number. 
 
Table 4.4 Manufacture of Food, Beverages and Tobacco Industries 
Variables  Mean Std. Dev. p25 p50 p75 N 
Annual output firm-level deflated q(f) 2,596,299 11,600,000 160,011 291,622 1,040,039 4,496 
Annual output industry 2digit deflated q(i2) 2,516,999 10,900,000 158,978 282,267 1,011,915 4,496 
Annual output industry 3digit deflated q(i3) 2,507,173 10,800,000 159,082 282,095 1,013,110 4,496 
Annual output industry 4digit deflated q(i4) 2,539,740 11,200,000 158,964 282,093 1,045,619 4,496 
Number of employees 61 125 16 24 44 4,496 
Annual intermediates expenditures deflated 1,441,546 5,810,951 77,478 140,743 595,860 4,496 
Capital deflated 1,063,503 4,601,241 26,055 66,938 305,725 4,496 
Labor share in nominal output α_{N} 0.148 0.069 0.097 0.146 0.191 4,496 
Materials share in nominal output α_{M} 0.518 0.157 0.403 0.504 0.620 4,496 
Capital share in nominal output 1-α_{N}-α_{M} 0.335 0.147 0.233 0.333 0.437 4,496 
Output growth rate firm-level deflated Δq(f) 0.002 0.199 -0.101 -0.001 0.107 3,794 
Output growth rate industry 2digit deflated Δq(i2) -0.003 0.182 -0.091 -0.008 0.085 3,794 
Output growth rate industry 3digit deflated Δq(i3) -0.003 0.182 -0.090 -0.008 0.085 3,794 
Output growth rate industry 4digit deflated Δq(i4) -0.003 0.183 -0.091 -0.006 0.088 3,794 
Labor growth rate Δn -0.008 0.162 -0.080 0.000 0.062 3,794 
Materials growth rate Δm -0.015 0.248 -0.155 -0.013 0.121 3,794 
Capital growth rate Δk 0.050 0.112 0.000 0.005 0.062 3,794 
ܴܵ ൌ οݍ െ ߙ௡ο݊ െ ߙ௠ο݉ െ ሺͳ െ ߙ௡ െ ߙ௠ሻο݇ -0.007 0.169 -0.107 -0.007 0.088 3,794 
Note: Descriptive statistics from Chilean manufacturing industry data (ENIA). Includes ISIC Rev.2 sector 31. 
Unbalanced panel with 702 firms from 1996 to 2003.  
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Table 4.5 refers to the Textile, Wearing Apparel and Leather industries and contains 
17% of the observations in the sample. These firms are 50% smaller than the industry 
average, though their average number of employees is almost on the same level. They use 
much less intermediates and capital, which is consistent with a labor intensive industry. 
Output and input growth are also small and negative, which is also consistent with an 
almost zero negative Solow residual. 
 
Table 4.5 Textile, Wearing Apparel and Leather Industries Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. p25 p50 p75 N 
Annual output firm-level deflated q(f) 1,027,991 1,854,562 167,579 365,436 1,014,490 2,277 
Annual output industry 2digit deflated q(i2) 1,006,427 1,820,954 159,757 365,129 979,435 2,277 
Annual output industry 3digit deflated q(i3) 1,011,281 1,834,778 159,845 363,900 980,904 2,277 
Annual output industry 4digit deflated q(i4) 1,014,490 1,841,536 161,321 364,686 973,145 2,277 
Number of employees 58 96 16 28 59 2,277 
Annual intermediates expenditures deflated 523,593 998,002 80,142 189,832 477,577 2,277 
Capital deflated 540,055 1,559,972 41,833 121,661 377,538 2,277 
Labor share in nominal output α_{N} 0.183 0.097 0.111 0.170 0.232 2,277 
Materials share in nominal output α_{M} 0.502 0.179 0.365 0.491 0.630 2,277 
Capital share in nominal output 1-α_{N}-α_{M} 0.315 0.165 0.207 0.322 0.426 2,277 
Output growth rate firm-level deflated Δq(f) -0.038 0.215 -0.160 -0.035 0.090 1,915 
Output growth rate industry 2digit deflated Δq(i2) -0.040 0.198 -0.155 -0.039 0.082 1,915 
Output growth rate industry 3digit deflated Δq(i3) -0.040 0.199 -0.154 -0.039 0.085 1,915 
Output growth rate industry 4digit deflated Δq(i4) -0.040 0.200 -0.156 -0.037 0.085 1,915 
Labor growth rate Δn -0.037 0.160 -0.113 -0.009 0.043 1,915 
Materials growth rate Δm -0.057 0.295 -0.235 -0.056 0.133 1,915 
Capital growth rate Δk 0.032 0.092 0.000 0.001 0.031 1,915 
ܴܵ ൌ οݍ െ ߙ௡ο݊ െ ߙ௠ο݉ െ ሺͳ െ ߙ௡ െ ߙ௠ሻο݇ -0.012 0.185 -0.126 -0.011 0.105 1,915 
Note: Descriptive statistics from Chilean manufacturing industry data (ENIA). Includes ISIC Rev.2 sector 32. 
Unbalanced panel with 362 firms from 1996 to 2003.  
 
Table 4.6 refers to the industry of Wood, Wood Products, and Furniture, containing 
nearly 10% of the firms in the sample. In terms of output and inputs, this industry looks 
very close to the manufacturing average. It has a higher number of employees but the 
labor share on output is as low as the whole manufacturing average, which tells us that 
the salaries might be on average lower on this industry. Output growth is very small but 
positive. Labor and materials growth are negative and small, while capital growth is near 
5%, resulting in an average Solow residual that is close to zero. 
Table 4.7 refers to the Paper, Printing, and Publishing industries, with nearly 5% of 
the observations contained in the full manufacturing sample. These firms have more than 
double the average sales level of the whole Chilean manufacturing sector. They have 
average capital around 400% higher than the full sample. With 99 employees on average, 
that receive 19% of the turnover, the share that stockholders get before taxes and other 
non-operational costs is 37% of the sales, equivalent to 39% of the capital stock. 
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Table 4.6 Manufacture of Wood and Wood Products and Furniture Industries 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. p25 p50 p75 N 
Annual output firm-level deflated q(f) 2,235,349 5,876,237 185,008 464,049 1,207,481 1,303 
Annual output industry 2digit deflated q(i2) 2,150,444 5,545,596 181,459 437,035 1,182,625 1,303 
Annual output industry 3digit deflated q(i3) 2,155,472 5,557,415 182,852 436,379 1,194,247 1,303 
Annual output industry 4digit deflated q(i4) 2,157,212 5,578,309 182,965 439,555 1,199,375 1,303 
Number of employees 78 148 19 31 72 1,303 
Annual intermediates expenditures deflated 1,198,979 2,953,129 97,365 246,148 641,214 1,303 
Capital deflated 1,178,922 3,822,631 57,310 146,969 568,151 1,303 
Labor share in nominal output α_{N} 0.173 0.103 0.100 0.150 0.222 1,303 
Materials share in nominal output α_{M} 0.533 0.159 0.424 0.530 0.634 1,303 
Capital share in nominal output 1-α_{N}-α_{M} 0.293 0.149 0.196 0.301 0.396 1,303 
Output growth rate firm-level deflated Δq(f) 0.009 0.263 -0.154 0.005 0.175 1,089 
Output growth rate industry 2digit deflated Δq(i2) 0.007 0.252 -0.142 0.016 0.164 1,089 
Output growth rate industry 3digit deflated Δq(i3) 0.007 0.251 -0.141 0.013 0.162 1,089 
Output growth rate industry 4digit deflated Δq(i4) 0.007 0.251 -0.143 0.014 0.162 1,089 
Labor growth rate Δn -0.011 0.177 -0.095 0.000 0.071 1,089 
Materials growth rate Δm -0.010 0.322 -0.212 -0.015 0.194 1,089 
Capital growth rate Δk 0.052 0.122 0.000 0.008 0.063 1,089 
ܴܵ ൌ οݍ െ ߙ௡ο݊ െ ߙ௠ο݉ െ ሺͳ െ ߙ௡ െ ߙ௠ሻο݇ 0.001 0.193 -0.114 0.004 0.124 1,089 
Note: Descriptive statistics from Chilean manufacturing industry data (ENIA). Includes ISIC Rev.2 sector 33. 
Unbalanced panel with 214 firms from 1996 to 2003.  
 
Table 4.7 Manufacture of Paper and Paper Products, Printing and Publishing Industries  
Variables Mean Std. Dev. p25 p50 p75 N 
Annual output firm-level deflated q(f) 4,915,490 13,500,000 205,159 505,433 1,863,086 674 
Annual output industry 2digit deflated q(i2) 4,897,805 13,500,000 213,600 523,481 1,648,339 674 
Annual output industry 3digit deflated q(i3) 4,906,301 13,500,000 207,038 511,711 1,648,339 674 
Annual output industry 4digit deflated q(i4) 4,805,165 13,200,000 207,038 522,799 1,703,197 674 
Number of employees 99 222 18 28 75 674 
Annual intermediates expenditures deflated 2,051,693 5,136,688 87,601 246,432 672,970 674 
Capital deflated 4,656,178 16,200,000 74,994 198,375 918,347 674 
Labor share in nominal output α_{N} 0.189 0.088 0.122 0.189 0.247 674 
Materials share in nominal output α_{M} 0.443 0.171 0.317 0.419 0.573 674 
Capital share in nominal output 1-α_{N}-α_{M} 0.368 0.142 0.270 0.375 0.473 674 
Output growth rate firm-level deflated Δq(f) 0.007 0.188 -0.097 0.008 0.109 532 
Output growth rate industry 2digit deflated Δq(i2) 0.009 0.172 -0.081 0.018 0.099 532 
Output growth rate industry 3digit deflated Δq(i3) 0.009 0.173 -0.084 0.018 0.101 532 
Output growth rate industry 4digit deflated Δq(i4) 0.010 0.175 -0.092 0.014 0.104 532 
Labor growth rate Δn -0.010 0.143 -0.082 0.000 0.061 532 
Materials growth rate Δm -0.006 0.257 -0.140 -0.016 0.139 532 
Capital growth rate Δk 0.040 0.105 0.000 0.005 0.042 532 
ܴܵ ൌ οݍ െ ߙ௡ο݊ െ ߙ௠ο݉ െ ሺͳ െ ߙ௡ െ ߙ௠ሻο݇ -0.003 0.158 -0.100 -0.001 0.086 532 
Note: Descriptive statistics from Chilean manufacturing industry data (ENIA). Includes ISIC Rev.2 sector 34. 
Unbalanced panel with 142 firms from 1996 to 2003.  
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Table 4.8 summarizes the industry of Chemicals, Chemical Petroleum, Coal, Rubber, 
and Plastic Products that represent nearly an 11% of the whole Chilean manufacturing 
industry sample. This industry is characterized by sales almost 50% higher than the 
manufacturing average. Capital about 20% higher than the manufacturing average. 
Capital share on output is 0.35, which means that every year a typical firm of this sector 
makes a profit of 80% of the value of its capital before taking taxes and non-operational 
costs into account. 
 
Table 4.8 Chemicals and Chemical Petroleum, Coal, Rubber and Plastic Products 
Industries 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. p25 p50 p75 N 
Annual output firm-level deflated q(f) 3,350,088 13,900,000 326,348 790,836 2,400,388 1,565 
Annual output industry 2digit deflated q(i2) 3,247,834 13,200,000 313,119 755,368 2,311,471 1,565 
Annual output industry 3digit deflated q(i3) 3,261,238 13,200,000 317,209 762,393 2,340,436 1,565 
Annual output industry 4digit deflated q(i4) 3,299,322 13,600,000 317,209 768,735 2,364,748 1,565 
Number of employees 73 118 20 37 78 1,565 
Annual intermediates expenditures deflated 1,592,936 5,650,202 156,511 369,209 1,211,746 1,565 
Capital deflated 1,454,183 4,259,939 106,410 309,068 1,035,342 1,565 
Labor share in nominal output α_{N} 0.163 0.079 0.105 0.152 0.207 1,565 
Materials share in nominal output α_{M} 0.492 0.160 0.371 0.486 0.610 1,565 
Capital share in nominal output 1-α_{N}-α_{M} 0.346 0.141 0.249 0.344 0.445 1,565 
Output growth rate firm-level deflated Δq(f) 0.034 0.204 -0.082 0.043 0.159 1,322 
Output growth rate industry 2digit deflated Δq(i2) 0.026 0.184 -0.081 0.037 0.132 1,322 
Output growth rate industry 3digit deflated Δq(i3) 0.029 0.184 -0.077 0.041 0.136 1,322 
Output growth rate industry 4digit deflated Δq(i4) 0.029 0.186 -0.074 0.033 0.135 1,322 
Labor growth rate Δn 0.002 0.153 -0.069 0.000 0.073 1,322 
Materials growth rate Δm 0.019 0.283 -0.140 0.022 0.181 1,322 
Capital growth rate Δk 0.056 0.107 0.000 0.019 0.073 1,322 
ܴܵ ൌ οݍ െ ߙ௡ο݊ െ ߙ௠ο݉ െ ሺͳ െ ߙ௡ െ ߙ௠ሻο݇ 0.003 0.171 -0.095 0.001 0.106 1,322 
Note: Descriptive statistics from Chilean manufacturing industry data (ENIA). Includes ISIC Rev.2 sector 35. 
Unbalanced panel with 243 firms from 1996 to 2003.  
 
Table 4.9 describes Non-Metallic Mineral Products, and other Manufacturing 
Industries, with around 5% of the whole industrial sector. Sales on this miscellaneous 
group of firms are nearly 30% higher than the value of capital. These firms are on 
average among the smallest in the industry in terms of number of employees and sales. 
The small but negative growth of output is driven, as in the rest of the sample, by the fact 
that there were negative output growth rates in the manufacturing industry of 2% and 8% 
respectively in the years 1998 and 1999, counteracting the nearly 2% average output 
growth that was observed during the other 5 years in the period 1997-2003. 
The last sector grouped in Table 4.10 describes the behavior of Basic Metal, Fabricated 
Metal Products, Machinery, and Equipment Industries. This industry contains 18% of the 
Chilean manufacturing observations. Sales are lower than the average manufacturing, 
though capital is also about a half of the value of sales. The capital share on sales may be 
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explained by saying that operational rents are 61% of the capital value before taxes and 
non-operational costs. 
Table 4.9 Non-metallic Mineral Products and Other Manufacturing Industries 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. p25 p50 p75 N 
Annual output firm-level deflated q(f) 1,187,795 3,302,603 159,521 343,381 891,492 661 
Annual output industry 2digit deflated q(i2) 1,132,887 2,953,491 165,264 333,961 949,726 661 
Annual output industry 3digit deflated q(i3) 1,130,732 2,954,814 163,732 334,587 950,854 661 
Annual output industry 4digit deflated q(i4) 1,116,587 2,891,075 167,346 335,706 904,354 661 
Number of employees 48 70 18 26 48 661 
Annual intermediates expenditures deflated 498,943 1,249,135 67,863 132,371 355,556 661 
Capital deflated 914,080 5,511,002 67,134 168,167 308,555 661 
Labor share in nominal output α_{N} 0.213 0.105 0.138 0.198 0.285 661 
Materials share in nominal output α_{M} 0.427 0.154 0.323 0.413 0.521 661 
Capital share in nominal output 1-α_{N}-α_{M} 0.360 0.153 0.265 0.362 0.465 661 
Output growth rate firm-level deflated Δq(f) -0.024 0.246 -0.159 -0.018 0.113 548 
Output growth rate industry 2digit deflated Δq(i2) -0.019 0.227 -0.147 -0.020 0.123 548 
Output growth rate industry 3digit deflated Δq(i3) -0.020 0.228 -0.147 -0.019 0.116 548 
Output growth rate industry 4digit deflated Δq(i4) -0.023 0.227 -0.148 -0.019 0.115 548 
Labor growth rate Δn -0.042 0.169 -0.134 -0.043 0.045 548 
Materials growth rate Δm -0.026 0.319 -0.235 -0.009 0.182 548 
Capital growth rate Δk 0.038 0.102 0.000 0.001 0.051 548 
ܴܵ ൌ οݍ െ ߙ௡ο݊ െ ߙ௠ο݉ െ ሺͳ െ ߙ௡ െ ߙ௠ሻο݇ -0.017 0.189 -0.134 -0.016 0.096 548 
Note: Descriptive statistics from Chilean manufacturing industry data (ENIA). Includes ISIC Rev.2 sectors 36 and 
39. Unbalanced panel with 113 firms from 1996 to 2003.  
 
Table 4.10 Basic Metal, Fabricated Metal Products, Machinery and Equipment Industries  
Variables Mean Std. Dev. p25 p50 p75 N 
Annual output firm-level deflated q(f) 1,759,513 5,073,395 204,706 414,624 1,180,126 2,384 
Annual output industry 2digit deflated q(i2) 1,703,383 5,073,676 200,907 405,226 1,166,440 2,384 
Annual output industry 3digit deflated q(i3) 1,708,349 5,110,803 203,972 409,011 1,167,482 2,384 
Annual output industry 4digit deflated q(i4) 1,744,071 5,331,043 204,204 412,520 1,158,252 2,384 
Number of employees 56 74 17 30 58 2,384 
Annual intermediates expenditures deflated 893,568 3,013,356 80,800 185,732 557,963 2,384 
Capital deflated 964,925 3,379,585 54,927 155,841 462,810 2,384 
Labor share in nominal output α_{N} 0.211 0.101 0.136 0.199 0.271 2,384 
Materials share in nominal output α_{M} 0.456 0.171 0.330 0.439 0.571 2,384 
Capital share in nominal output 1-α_{N}-α_{M} 0.332 0.152 0.230 0.339 0.438 2,384 
Output growth rate firm-level deflated Δq(f) -0.013 0.256 -0.157 -0.005 0.144 1,978 
Output growth rate industry 2digit deflated Δq(i2) -0.014 0.241 -0.152 -0.008 0.132 1,978 
Output growth rate industry 3digit deflated Δq(i3) -0.013 0.241 -0.152 -0.007 0.134 1,978 
Output growth rate industry 4digit deflated Δq(i4) -0.014 0.245 -0.158 -0.007 0.133 1,978 
Labor growth rate Δn -0.031 0.168 -0.115 -0.019 0.058 1,978 
Materials growth rate Δm -0.028 0.335 -0.233 -0.024 0.183 1,978 
Capital growth rate Δk 0.040 0.095 0.000 0.006 0.048 1,978 
ܴܵ ൌ οݍ െ ߙ௡ο݊ െ ߙ௠ο݉ െ ሺͳ െ ߙ௡ െ ߙ௠ሻο݇ -0.007 0.191 -0.124 -0.004 0.107 1,978 
Note: Descriptive statistics from Chilean manufacturing industry data (ENIA). Includes ISIC Rev.2 sectors 37 and 
38. Unbalanced panel with 406 firms from 1996 to 2003. 
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In summary, there were a variety of market outcomes across manufacturing sectors 
in Chile from 1996 to 2003. In general, profits before non-operational costs were high 
and represented something between 20 and 40% of total turnover. This result is found 
even though a foreign financial crisis decreased aggregated demand, causing an 8% 
decrease of industrial activity in 1998. Yearly capital revenues in the manufacturing 
industry over an 8-year period have ranged from 39% to 82% yearly before taxes and 
non-operational costs across the seven sectors considered for this study. Total factor 
productivity growth as measured by the Solow (1957) residual was 1% as a yearly average 
when not considering crisis years 1998 and 1999. 
4.5 Estimation Strategy 
This section proposes a strategy to measure the rents captured by capitalists and 
workers in the Chilean manufacturing industry. Our results may be compared to the 
output obtained by Crepon, Desplatz, and Mairesse (1999, 2002, 2005) and the empirical 
papers that followed. One of the main objectives of this application is to test the 
presence of heterogeneity among the estimated values of the parameters when output has 
been deflated at the firm level or at the industry level using either two, three, or four 
digits of ISIC code disaggregation, in order to estimate the sector averages of output 
price growth. This study has therefore used a firm-level price growth that was computed 
using product-firm level data for every firm in our sample. Secondly, we have taken the 
average price growth at the three different disaggregation levels and have calculated real 
output and real output growth four times using each particular firm-level or industry-level 
deflator.  
The output of the empirical application is presented in a way that allows identifying 
not only the main parameters of the model but also the factor elasticities of the standard 
production function. We present the results obtained from Chilean data over the period 
1996-2003 with and without imposing constant returns to scale. The model was initially 
estimated at the manufacturing level and was re-estimated seven times, separating firms 
into the main manufacturing economic sectors present in the sample. In the first place, 
the model was estimated using OLS with the log values of the variables in levels. 
Secondly, the estimates in First Differences were obtained by OLS. In these regressions, 
we take into account endogeneity problems that arise when measuring rents or profits. 
We therefore estimated the model using a First-Differenced GMM estimator first 
developed by Arellano and Bond (1991). The second and third lags of the variables in 
levels were used as instruments of the variables in first differences. In this differenced 
GMM model, some variables have time series persistence. When using the First-
Differenced GMM estimator on a finite sample, the parameters may be affected by large 
biases. We have therefore used a system GMM estimator as our last estimation method.  
The augmented version of the GMM model was first proposed by Arellano and Bover 
(1995) and fully developed by Blundell and Bond (1998, 2000). The system GMM 
specification includes the level moments as additional instruments and uses a two-step 
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standard-error correction. We estimate the model using the xtabond2 command in Stata 
version 10 and follow the procedures outlined in Roodman (2006). 
In this work, we compared levels and first differences estimates.   An equation in 
levels uses the log actual values of the variables in the model. In first differences, the 
annual growth rate of each variable is used instead of the logarithms. Estimating 
equations in levels and first differences should not differ much if there is 
contemporaneous adjustment of all variables in the model to any given exogenous impact 
related to the equation. If we do not assume a smooth and fast adjustment of output to 
its optimal level for any given change in inputs, we would expect that the estimates in 
levels would yield approximately the short term relationship of the variables, while the 
first differences estimates would offer a two-year average of the elasticity values.  
In the data used for this study, we find an important exogenous shock that negatively 
affected the value of output and inputs in the years 1998 and 1999. This shock is 
connected to a foreign market financial crisis that affected interest rates and raw materials 
prices and consequently affected production in the manufacturing industry.  One 
consequence of estimating on first differences is that the elasticities become more 
sensitive to the values of input and output over the years in which aggregated demand 
decreased. When GMM methods are employed, the second and third lags are used as 
instruments and therefore the effect is mostly compensated by focusing on an even more 
restricted sample (1999-2003).  
Using the Delta Method, we report the output elasticities with respect to labor ሺߝேொሻ, 
materials ሺߝெொሻǡand capital ሺߝ௄ொሻ. The scale parameter (λ) is the summation of these three 
elasticities. We then report the estimated markup of the reduced model without workers’ 
bargaining power (μonly) and we adjust the markup parameter by the scale elasticity 
parameter (μonly/λ). The four main parameters of the model are displayed next in each 
table,. The joint market imperfection parameter (ψ) reflects the average market power 
exercised by firms in the labor market relative to the market power they exercise in the 
materials market. This parameter is equal to zero when both input markets are equally 
competitive, positive when workers can bargain more than material suppliers can, and 
negative when firms exercise more monopsony power over workers that they do over 
materials. The markup of price over cost (μ) indicates imperfect competition in the final 
product market when it has a value larger than one. The workers bargaining power (θ) 
results from comparing the share of rents captured by workers with their marginal 
contribution to output. The extent of rent sharing (γ) is a statistical measure of the share 
of the firm rents that are actually being shared with the workers. 
4.6 Estimation Results 
4.6.1 Manufacturing Level Results  
Table 4.11 presents the first results of the estimation using the entire manufacturing 
sample. Constant returns to scale were imposed in this table.  The first result that clearly 
appears from these preliminary estimates is that the different deflations of output made 
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almost no significant difference in the estimated parameter values. The estimated 
parameter standard deviations were marginally larger when output was deflated at the 
firm level.   
In the first panel, the model was estimated by OLS in levels without explicitly 
considering simultaneity. The results show immediately that there is a large markup. This 
finding is independent of whether labor market imperfections are taken into account. 
When the bargaining power of workers is not included in the estimation, the markup 
parameter is biased downwards, which is the result found by Crepon, Desplatz, and 
Mairesse (1999). There appears to be some rent sharing between capital owners and 
workers; the joint market imperfection parameter is positive on the OLS levels 
regressions, implying that some workers get a larger share of rents than do material 
providers. We will later see that the positive rent sharing parameter is caused by the 
imposition of constant returns, which creates a downward bias on the labor elasticity 
parameter.  
Secondly, the model was estimated in first differences in order to eliminate 
unobserved firm-specific effects. We gave up the first year of our panel in order to 
estimate with this method and the results seem to be sensitive to that change. The first 
year of our 8-year panel was 1996, a period in which the Chilean economy was expanding 
vigorously. Estimating in first differences gives more importance to the periods in the 
middle of the panel, including 1998 and 1999, when output growth was negative due to a 
financial crisis that hit from foreign markets.  
The results show that, in first differences, and when returns to scale were forced to 
be constant, the markups were less than one. It could be the case that the endogeneity of 
quasi-fixed inputs is causing a bias on the estimated parameters in the absence of 
instrumental variables estimation. 
The estimation method used in the third panel of Table 4.11 accounts for 
endogeneity problems. The instruments used correspond to the regression variables in 
levels with 2 and 3 lags. We find severely biased parameters showing firms that operate 
with theoretically unfeasible marginal productivities. This large bias, which we found on 
the estimations using GMM in differences, has also been documented in the work by 
Blundell and Bond (2000) and has to do with autocorrelation of the instruments. We 
found that the Sargan test rejected the null hypothesis that proposes joint validity of the 
instruments used. There also seems to be autocorrelation of second order from the AR(2) 
test. These findings lead us to our last estimation method, which uses lagged first 
differences of the series as additional instruments for the level equations. 
The fourth panel displays a dynamic GMM specification which allows for an 
autoregressive component in the productivity shock. The instruments used correspond to 
the variables in levels and first differences with 2 and 3 lags.  This definition of 
instruments leaves out of the second stage estimation the observations from the first four 
years of the sample and therefore has the advantage of focusing the estimation on the 
period right after the financial crisis that hit the manufacturing industry in 1998-1999 
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When using GMM methods the use of lagged variables as instruments implies that 
the sample in the main estimations is reduced to the period 1999-2003. We have found 
that estimating over this restricted sample with OLS does not alter the results 
significantly.  
The results are very much in accordance with economic theory and consistent with 
the results from Blundell and Bond (2000) and the papers that followed. We find a larger 
material elasticity in comparison to the OLS results. The imposition of constant returns 
to scale forces the labor elasticities to take a very small value and hence to show workers 
as having relatively higher levels of market power. Markup of price over cost is higher 
when allowing workers’ bargaining power into the model.  In this case, the Sargan test 
also rejects the joint validity of the set of instruments, but there seems to be no problem 
of AR(1) or AR(2) autocorrelation. We will further find that Sargan rejection is most 
likely due to the heterogeneity of the full manufacturing sample, because this problem 
disappears when estimating the model on more homogeneous industry level samples.  
Table 4.12 shows the results for the whole manufacturing industry allowing the scale 
economies to be different than 1. If we are interested in a model that produces an output 
consistent with our basic assumptions, we expect returns to scale to be equal or close to 
1. Very few differences are found on the estimated parameters across columns and within 
panels, which means that deflating at the firm or industry level does not make a 
significant difference in the results, even when constant returns are not imposed.  
In the first estimation panel by OLS in levels, allowing non-constant returns had 
almost no effect on capital and material elasticities but had a positive impact on labor 
elasticity that was allowed to be larger in comparison to the case when constant returns 
were imposed. Adding the three elasticities leads to a highly significant scale economy 
equal to 1.07. The share that workers obtain from rents in these estimates is not 
significantly different from zero. The joint market imperfection parameter value suggests 
that, taking the intermediates market as a neutral reference, firms are exercising 
monopsony power over the labor market, on average. 
The second panel of table 4.12 displays the OLS estimates of the variables in first 
differences. The marginal productivity parameters are lower now than when scale 
economies were assumed in the previous table. The OLS first differences estimates 
suggest an overall average markup of price over cost equal to 1.04. We also find from the 
negative bargaining power parameter that workers are on average being paid less than 
their marginal productivity. According to joint market imperfection parameters found on 
these regressions, firms are paying less to workers than to material supplies relative to 
their respective marginal productivities.  
The third panel from Table 4.12 shows the GMM in differences results. We find that 
this set of regressions expresses the model in an exaggerated way, proposing a scale 
economy higher than 2 with very large market power indicators. This result may be 
explained by the autocorrelation problems mentioned by Blundell and Bond (2000). 
Because very heterogeneous firms were grouped for estimation in this table, the joint 
validity of the instruments was again rejected by the Sargan test. There appears to be 
some AR(2) autocorrelation but no evidence of AR(1). 
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The last panel is therefore a preferred estimation method because it uses GMM as a 
system that considers the first differences and level moments as instruments in a dynamic 
specification. We find a large markup and negative bargaining power of workers. If the 
main assumptions of our model are true for the average firm in our sample, then these 
parameters indicate that workers are being paid less than their marginal productivities. 
The joint market imperfection parameter is not significantly different from zero, which 
means that firms are not exercising more power in the labor market than in the materials 
market. The joint validity of instruments and autocorrelations AR(1) and AR(2) was 
rejected by the tests in the lower part of the table.  
It has been argued in the previous work by Bergoeing et al (2011) that some variable 
may have skewed distributions and this may alter the results. Bergoeing et al (2011) 
decided to run regressions on medians rather than means because of this. For the case of 
this chapter we have preferred to run regressions on means because we are interested in 
comparing these results to other experiences that used this model. 
In summary, from Tables 4.11 and 4.12, we find that markups of price over marginal 
cost are high, which is consistent with the existence of imperfect competition. Workers 
may have positive bargaining power only when constant returns to scale are imposed. 
Imposing constant returns to scale results in a downward biased elasticity of labor with 
respect to output. Therefore, when constant returns are imposed, we find an 
overestimation of workers’ ability to capture a share of the firm’s rent. As it can be seen 
from the tables, OLS in levels and OLS in first differences may result in scale economy 
parameters that are biased because of endogeneity. GMM in differences is not a good 
solution because it presents autocorrelation problems in the instruments. Therefore, for 
the industry level regressions, the OLS levels estimates are reported as the simplest 
preliminary estimation method accompanied by the results of system GMM that is the 
preferred estimation method. 
4.6.2 Industry Level Analysis 
Tables 4.13 to 4.19 summarize the results of estimating the model after separating 
the manufacturing industry into seven economic sectors according to the ISIC Rev.2 
classification. Results are reported with and without imposing constant returns to scale. 
Small differences are found in the parameters when output has been deflated at the firm 
or industry level. These differences are almost never significant in any industry.  
Table 4.13 refers to the Manufacture of Food, Beverages, and Tobacco industries. 
Results show a markup parameter that varies among estimations but is significantly 
higher than 1, with values between 1.26 and 1.42. This shows that imperfect competition 
occurs in this industry. Not taking workers bargaining into account made very little 
difference in the estimated markup parameter. Workers’ bargaining power is positive and 
significant in most of the cases, which suggests there may be a share of the rents being 
captured by workers.  
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The joint market imperfection parameter is positive when constant returns are 
imposed and equal to zero when non-constant returns are allowed. This result shows that 
workers do not necessarily have greater bargaining power than material suppliers, but, 
when constant returns are imposed, the resulting downward biased labor elasticities 
produce relatively higher workers’ bargaining power. 
Some different results were found with data from the Textile, Wearing Apparel, and 
Leather industry estimates. Table 4.14 displays the results of estimating the model for this 
industry and again finds markup values that are consistent with imperfect competition. 
The markup measures are significantly smaller once workers’ bargaining power has been 
taken into account. We find a negative value for workers bargaining power. The numbers 
suggest that workers may be getting wages lower than their marginal productivity, which 
means they do not receive a share of the rent but instead give a share of their own 
marginal productivity value to firm owners. In the context of the Textile, Wearing 
Apparel, and Leather industry, many hypotheses could explain this deviation from the 
market equilibrium defined by the theoretical model. If we accept the fact that textiles are 
highly tradable goods, then in the equilibrium marginal productivity of labor across 
countries that are open to trade should be equal. It could be the case that the presence of 
cheap textile imports coming from other countries forces a lower payment to the labor 
force on this industry in comparison with other manufacturing industries. This 
explanation is plausible in the context of international trade theory. According to most 
mainstream models, the marginal productivities of inputs will be pushed to the values of 
the marginal productivities seen in the international markets, given that the economy is 
open to trade and trading costs are low. 
Table 4.15 refers to the Wood, Wood Products, and Furniture industry results. The 
markup parameter is much greater than 1, which indicates the presence of imperfect 
competition in this manufacturing sector.  In this industry, workers capture some part of 
the rent, even though this result is not always significant and the model that was 
estimated without allowing for workers’ bargaining power did not yield a significantly 
different markup parameter. The joint market imperfection parameter indicates a higher 
degree of monopsony power of the average firm with respect to intermediates in 
comparison with its market power in the case of labor market. This last effect, which 
could suggest some extent of rent sharing toward workers, disappears after relaxing the 
assumption of constant returns to scale. 
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Chapter 4 
The results of estimating the model on the industry of Paper, Paper Products, 
Printing, and Publishing are summarized in Table 4.16. Markups show significant 
evidence of imperfect final product markets. Returns to scale are higher than 1 when the 
constant returns assumption is relaxed. Workers appear to receive some share of the rent 
when imposing constant returns to scale but this result again disappears when relaxing 
this assumption. In fact, when non-constant returns are allowed, the parameter for the 
bargaining power of workers is lower than zero, which means that workers are not 
bargaining at all and that their actual reservation wage is lower than the value of their 
own average marginal productivity. It is not clear whether firms enjoy a higher degree of 
monopsony power in the labor market than they do in the intermediates market because 
the joint market imperfection parameter is not very significant across columns in Table 
4.16.  
Table 4.17 shows the results of estimating the model with data from Manufacture of 
Chemicals, Chemical Petroleum, Coal, Rubber, and Plastic Products sector. It is clear that 
workers get on average a rent share equal to 0 or a value very little above 0. This 
translates into a rent sharing measure that is similarly small. The markup parameter is 
always significantly large, which implies prices above marginal cost. The joint market 
imperfection parameter does not hold a value significantly different from zero across 
estimations, which implies that firms on average do not exercise more power in the labor 
market than they do on the intermediate market.  
The results of the model estimated for the Non-Metallic Mineral Products and Other 
Manufacturing Industry are displayed in Table 4.18. We find this industry fits the model 
very well on average because the scale economy parameter is not significantly larger or 
smaller than one. Markups are high and always significantly above 1, which implies that 
average firms set prices above marginal cost. The particularity of this market is that 
workers’ bargaining power is also positive, ending up with a significantly positive rent 
sharing parameter almost every time. The joint market imperfection parameter was found 
to be significantly positive in some regressions when constant returns were imposed. 
However, in the third and fourth panel, when constant returns to scale were not 
imposed, results showed that this parameter is not significantly different from zero.  
The last industry evaluated with this model was Basic Metal, Metal Products, 
Machinery, and Equipment. These results are displayed in Table 4.19. We find a markup 
parameter that is significantly above 1, which implies that imperfect competition exists on 
average in the final product market in this industry. 
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Table 4.19 also shows that not accounting for workers’ market power always results 
in biased estimates of the price-cost markup. Returns to scale are significantly higher than 
1 when constant returns are not forced. When constant returns were imposed, workers 
were found to have some degree of market power.  However, when this assumption is 
relaxed, the parameter becomes negative and significant as a result of higher estimated 
labor productivity. The joint market imperfection parameter does not hold a significant 
sign across estimations. In the case of constant returns, it appears that the average firms 
exercise more market power on intermediate markets than they do on the labor market. 
This result reverses under non-constant returns, but with relatively high standard errors.  
When instrumental variables were used in the second and fourth panel of each table 
(Tables 4.13 to 4.19), the p-value of the Sargan test, AR(1) test and AR(2) test were 
reported. We found that, at the industry level, the validity of instruments is only partially 
rejected in the food and beverages sector. In other industries, the joint instrument validity 
test is passed for almost every column. Autocorrelations AR(1) and AR(2) were not 
always rejected by the tests done at the industry-level samples, even though at the 
manufacturing level these tests are found to be very significant. For this reason, using 
system GMM is the most adequate method to estimate this model for the present Chilean 
dataset, taking endogeneity into account. 
Table 4.20 summarizes the findings from the OLS Estimates in Levels. It was found 
that imperfect competition prevails in the final product markets for all seven 
manufacturing sectors evaluated on this study. The extent of rent sharing varies among 
sectors. In most Chilean manufacturing industries, workers appear to have little or no 
bargaining power. According to the non-constant returns results, among the industries in 
which workers may have a higher degree of bargaining power are the Food and 
Beverages sector, the Wood, Wood Products, and Furniture sector, and the Chemicals 
and Plastic sector. Among the manufacturing sectors with the lowest share of rents 
captured by workers, we found the Textile, Wearing Apparel, and Leather industry and 
the Metallurgic sector.  
Table 4.21 summarizes the results from the GMM system estimates. Imperfect 
competition always applies, regardless of sector and returns to scale assumptions. The 
two sectors where workers have some degree of market power according to the non-
constant returns estimates were Textiles and Metallurgic industries. The sectors where 
workers do share some part of the rents are the Manufacture of Food and Beverages 
sector and the Non-Metallic Mineral Products, and Other Manufacturing Industries.  
According to these results, imperfect competition applies in each and every market 
in the Chilean manufacturing industry. In most cases, workers do not capture a 
significant share of profits. In extreme cases, employees are getting paid on average less 
than their marginal productivity. Finally, these results describe the extent to which 
different output deflation methods can produce heterogeneity in the estimated 
parameters. It was found that deflation at the firm or industry level does not produce 
significantly different elasticities but does make some small difference in the estimated 
standard deviations.  
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Chapter 4 
4.7 Concluding Remarks 
This work has estimated an empirical model to measure price cost markups and 
workers’ bargaining power in terms of input elasticities and input shares on sales.  It 
relied on the theoretical model presented by Crepon, Desplatz, and Mairesse (1999) and 
work that followed, with which our results can be compared. The model is based on the 
idea of a production function that can be expressed in terms of the rates of growth of 
inputs and output. The estimation of the Solow residual allows obtaining parameters that 
measure markup and workers’ bargaining power. 
This work was focused on the Chilean Manufacturing Industry between 1996 and 
2003. The industry was divided into seven sectors to allow comparing the results across 
industries. The data used for this study came from the Chilean National Statistical Office 
(INE) that includes information on quantities and prices of products within firms. One 
advantage of this dataset is that it allows obtaining real firm output growth deflated at the 
firm level. 
At the manufacturing level, this work found evidence that, on average, imperfect 
competition predominates in the final good markets. Workers have little bargaining 
power over rents when constant returns to scale are imposed. When returns to scale are 
allowed to be different than 1, the small bargaining power of workers disappears 
completely in most cases. It was found that this discrepancy is due to an underestimation 
of labor elasticity when constant returns were imposed. 
At the industry level, results showed that imperfect competition applies across all the 
Chilean manufacturing sectors that were evaluated in this study. From the estimations in 
levels, the industry of Paper, Printing, and Publishing appears to have the lowest markup 
of price over cost, followed by the Textiles industry. Food and Beverages has been found 
to have the largest markup, even though returns to scale are nearly constant. Relatively 
high markups are also found in the Manufactures of Wood, Wood Products, and 
Furniture industries and in the production of Non-Metallic Minerals and Other 
Manufacturing.  
In general, results show that workers have little bargaining power over rents 
generated in Chilean industry. The sector in which employees appeared to have a 
relatively higher degree of market power was Manufacture of Food, Beverages, and 
Tobacco. Other sectors where workers enjoy some degree of rent sharing are 
Manufactures of Wood, Wood Products, and Furniture and Non-Metallic Minerals and 
Other Manufacturing. These sectors were also found to be those that are able to yield 
higher profits on average. On the other hand, those sectors where markup profits were 
found to be lower are also the ones where the share obtained by workers is smaller. 
The model and estimation methods used in this paper allow us to draw conclusions 
about the average firm’s behavior. We are also capable of distinguishing some differences 
among the average firms across different manufacturing sectors. Nevertheless, these 
results cannot be generalized to specific firms in our sample and therefore this study is 
not relevant from an antitrust perspective. 
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Further research should investigate whether or not the differences in product and 
labour market imperfections among sectors could be due to export orientation and/or 
labour unions effects. Additionally, because some of the variables in the model have 
skewed distribution further research should evaluate the effect of running regressions 
over medians instead of means. 
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F I N A L  C O N C L U S I O N  
 
 
This thesis analyzed the Chilean manufacturing industry, focusing on the role of 
innovation, labor productivity, and information flows in spurring economic growth in the 
industry. It went from a macroeconomic analysis of economic growth and development, 
describing exports and industry composition, to a meso-economic evaluation of the 
industry sectors and a micro-econometric analysis of manufacturing data at the firm level. 
In aggregate terms, Chile has achieved economic success during the past decades. 
This success included high economic growth rates and improving development 
standards. Chile enjoys a relatively stable democracy, with an open economy, good 
macroeconomic policies, reasonable institutional quality, and a financial sector that 
facilitates transactions. Chile has among its advantages a natural resource industry that 
has fostered growth in other sectors. Even though copper extraction has provided 
growing income in recent years, it is important for the economy to diversify production 
to include other exports that can be produced through the accumulation of knowledge, 
instead of reliance on a natural resource that is exhaustible and subject to price 
fluctuations. One of the challenges for the future is to develop an economy that grows 
sustainably. Innovations, public education, export market diversity, inequality of income, 
and mining exports revenue allocation are some of the most important concerns to which 
economists and politicians should pay attention in the near future. 
Exogenous fluctuations in the price of copper have a huge impact on Chilean 
exchange rates, creating distortions in other markets and threatening the stability of other 
exporting industries. Stimulating industrial investment, facilitating the import of capital 
goods, improving the educational system, and promoting R&D are some of the state’s 
most important roles for promoting diversified economic growth in the next decades. 
The National Innovation System established in Chile in 2006 implies greater growth 
opportunities but it is not alone going to generate the growth potential that Chile needs 
for the future. Becoming internationally competitive in diversified manufactured goods 
and services requires innovation and the development of other capacities that were not 
needed for the export of primary commodities like copper.  
A section of this work has empirically measured R&D cooperation determinants 
among Chilean innovating firms during the years 2003-2004. The data used for this study 
came from the Fourth Chilean Innovation Survey (2005) and had the feature of 
distinguishing among different kinds of R&D partners with which firms can cooperate. 
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The empirical model related the probability of R&D cooperation to information flows 
and innovation restrictions among firms that have innovated. 
The findings showed that incoming spillovers determine a significantly greater 
probability of R&D cooperation among innovative firms. This is seen in all regressions, 
independently of which kind of partner is being considered. Incoming spillovers or 
information flows affect cooperation with universities and with consulting agents to a 
larger extent than cooperation with competitors, suppliers, and customers. These results 
imply that one way to promote innovation is to improve access to information flows that 
are public but do not always find their way to the minds of those that can use them to 
achieve an innovation. Promoting information spillovers could happen through the 
collection and sharing of data that is relevant to markets, such as prices and product 
characteristics. Information flows are also stronger if the know-how of many of the 
industries in the market are easily accessible to everyone who wants to learn. If education 
promotes information flows, and information flows spur R&D cooperation and 
innovation, than a better and deeper educational system is the path toward economic 
success.  
This empirical analysis also found that the use of legal protection to protect firms’ 
knowledge has a positive effect on cooperation. This shows that, in order to promote 
R&D cooperation agreements, the state should protect the legal rights of those products 
and designs that are patented or protected by legitimate secrecy agreements. The 
authority should also offer a serious commitment to consign patent rights to 
organizations or individuals that create innovations that are new to the market. 
This work has also studied the relation between inputs, prices, product innovation, 
and productivity at the firm level using Chilean data for the period 1996-2003. Besides 
using firm-level industrial data, this study had the advantage of an additional survey form 
that collected information at the level of products inside firms. We compared the 
estimation of the revenue function (using a nominal output measure) and the production 
function (using a real output measure). The outcomes were also compared to the usual 
case in which output is deflated by an industry level deflator. 
Results showed that estimating the production or revenue function does not yield 
significantly different results when a variety of deflators are used to express output in 
constant prices. This may indicate that price dispersion is not large enough to cause a 
significant bias on the non-deflated or industry deflated estimates.  
This study found evidence that product diversification has a positive effect on 
manufacturing productivity. It seems that variations in the range of products 
manufactured by firms have an impact on the level and the rate of growth of average 
output per employee. In particular, the incorporation of new products is clearly 
associated with a higher and increasing level of productivity among Chilean 
manufacturing firms. The findings also show that dropping products has an immediate 
negative effect on labor productivity. This suggests that the reduction in output 
associated with products dropped is not contemporaneously accompanied by a reduction 
in labor, probably due to labor input rigidities. 
Final Conclusion 
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This work adds to the literature by incorporating some new measures of product 
innovation into the traditional productivity estimates. Additionally, this study proposed a 
measure for firm-level yearly price change. Using this measure, nominal output can be 
expressed in real terms to separate the growth of physical output from the growth of 
product prices. 
The last part of this research has estimated an empirical model to measure price cost 
markups and workers’ bargaining power, expressed in terms of input elasticities and input 
shares on sales. The empirical model used is based on the idea of a production function 
that can be expressed in terms of the rates of growth of inputs and output. The 
estimation of the Solow residual allows obtaining parameters that measure markup and 
workers’ bargaining power. 
The industry was divided into seven sectors to allow comparing the results across 
industries. At the manufacturing level, this work found evidence that, on average, 
imperfect competition observed through high price-cost markups predominates in the 
final good markets. At the industry level, results also showed that imperfect competition 
applies across all the Chilean manufacturing sectors that were evaluated in this study. 
From the estimations in levels, the industry of Paper, Printing, and Publishing appears to 
have the lowest markup of price over cost, followed by the Textiles industry. Food and 
Beverages has been found to have the largest markup, even though returns to scale are 
nearly constant. Results also showed that workers have little bargaining power over rents 
generated in Chilean industry. The sector in which employees appeared to have a 
relatively higher degree of market power was Manufacture of Food, Beverages, and 
Tobacco. Other sectors where workers enjoy some degree of rent sharing are 
Manufactures of Wood, Wood Products, and Furniture and Non-Metallic Minerals and 
Other Manufacturing. These sectors were also found to be those that, on average, are 
able to yield higher markups. On the other hand, those sectors where markups were 
found to be lower are also the ones where the share obtained by workers is smaller. 
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Appendix 1 Statistics of Growth and Development in Chile  
 
  
  
Ta
bl
e 
A
1.
1 
Y
ea
rly
 to
ta
l G
D
P 
an
d 
G
D
P 
gr
ow
th
 in
 C
hi
le
, 1
96
0-
20
09
 
Y
ea
r 
19
60
 
19
61
 
19
62
 
19
63
 
19
64
 
19
65
 
19
66
 
19
67
 
19
68
 
19
69
 
G
D
P 
(c
on
st
an
t 2
00
0 
m
ill
io
ns
 o
f U
S$
) 
14
,0
87
 
14
,6
58
 
15
,4
19
 
16
,3
62
 
16
,7
98
 
16
,8
69
 
18
,5
56
 
19
,2
31
 
19
,9
53
 
20
,6
45
 
G
D
P 
gr
ow
th
 (a
nn
ua
l %
) 
4.
05
%
 
5.
19
%
 
6.
12
%
 
2.
67
%
 
0.
42
%
 
10
.0
0%
 
3.
64
%
 
3.
75
%
 
3.
47
%
 
19
70
 
19
71
 
19
72
 
19
73
 
19
74
 
19
75
 
19
76
 
19
77
 
19
78
 
19
79
 
21
,0
84
 
22
,9
85
 
22
,7
97
 
21
,6
70
 
22
,2
11
 
19
,6
87
 
20
,3
58
 
22
,1
28
 
23
,7
79
 
25
,8
44
 
2.
12
%
 
9.
02
%
 
-0
.8
2%
 
-4
.9
4%
 
2.
49
%
 
-1
1.
36
%
 
3.
41
%
 
8.
70
%
 
7.
46
%
 
8.
68
%
 
19
80
 
19
81
 
19
82
 
19
83
 
19
84
 
19
85
 
19
86
 
19
87
 
19
88
 
19
89
 
27
,9
50
 
29
,2
74
 
26
,2
52
 
25
,2
58
 
27
,2
72
 
29
,2
13
 
30
,8
48
 
32
,8
83
 
35
,2
87
 
39
,0
13
 
8.
15
%
 
4.
74
%
 
-1
0.
32
%
 
-3
.7
9%
 
7.
97
%
 
7.
12
%
 
5.
60
%
 
6.
59
%
 
7.
31
%
 
10
.5
6%
 
19
90
 
19
91
 
19
92
 
19
93
 
19
94
 
19
95
 
19
96
 
19
97
 
19
98
 
19
99
 
40
,4
56
 
43
,6
80
 
49
,0
43
 
52
,4
69
 
55
,4
64
 
61
,3
59
 
65
,9
08
 
70
,2
61
 
72
,5
31
 
71
,9
79
 
3.
70
%
 
7.
97
%
 
12
.2
8%
 
6.
99
%
 
5.
71
%
 
10
.6
3%
 
7.
41
%
 
6.
61
%
 
3.
23
%
 
-0
.7
6%
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
75
,2
11
 
77
,7
50
 
79
,4
49
 
82
,5
60
 
87
,5
48
 
92
,4
15
 
96
,6
57
 
10
1,
10
4 
10
4,
83
0 
10
3,
23
0 
4.
49
%
 
3.
38
%
 
2.
18
%
 
3.
92
%
 
6.
04
%
 
5.
56
%
 
4.
59
%
 
4.
60
%
 
3.
69
%
 
-1
.5
3%
 
So
ur
ce
: W
or
ld
 B
an
k 
20
10
. 
Appendix 1 
 
 
Table A1.2 Average Per capita Income and GINI Index in Chile, 1980-2009 
Year GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 US$) GINI index 
1980 5,366 
1981 5,536 
1982 4,887 
1983 4,627 
1984 4,914 
1985 5,178 
1986 5,377 
1987 5,636 56.43 
1988 5,947 
1989 6,462 
1990 6,583 55.52 
1991 6,980 
1992 7,695 
1993 8,084 
1994 8,398 55.19 
1995 9,140 
1996 9,669 55.06 
1997 10,162 
1998 10,352 55.74 
1999 10,144 
2000 10,470 55.36 
2001 10,697 
2002 10,807 
2003 11,107 54.92 
2004 11,653 
2005 12,172 
2006 12,599 52 
2007 13,045 
2008 13,390 
2009 13,057 
Source: World Bank (2010) and Central Bank of Chile 
(2010). 
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Table A1.3 Interest Rate, Inflation Rate and Unemployment rate in Chile, 1980-2009 
Year Deposit interest Rate (%) 
Inflation 
(annual %) 
Unemployment, total 
(% of labor force) 
1980 37.72 35.14 10.41 
1981 40.90 19.69 11.31 
1982 48.68 9.94 19.60 
1983 28.01 27.27 14.65 
1984 27.63 19.86 13.89 
1985 32.10 29.46 12.17 
1986 19.04 20.61 8.73 
1987 25.28 19.89 7.90 
1988 15.16 14.68 6.26 
1989 27.79 17.03 5.32 
1990 40.35 26.03 5.66 
1991 22.35 21.78 5.27 
1992 18.29 15.43 4.41 
1993 18.24 12.73 4.49 
1994 15.12 11.44 5.87 
1995 13.73 8.24 4.71 
1996 13.48 7.36 6.33 
1997 12.02 6.14 6.12 
1998 14.92 5.11 6.34 
1999 8.56 3.34 9.81 
2000 9.20 3.84 9.16 
2001 6.19 3.57 9.13 
2002 3.80 2.49 8.94 
2003 2.73 2.81 8.50 
2004 1.94 1.05 8.81 
2005 3.93 3.05 8.00 
2006 5.11 3.39 7.69 
2007 5.61 4.41 7.14 
2008 7.49 8.70 7.80 
2009 2.05 1.50 9.69 
Source: World Bank (2010) and Central Bank of Chile (2010). 
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Table A1.4 Chilean Consolidated Public Debt, 1990-2008 
Year Current US$ Millions % of GDP 
1990 9,611 30.46 
1991 8,698 23.88 
1992 8,251 18.56 
1993 7,824 16.4 
1994 7,390 13.4 
1995 5,755 8.07 
1996 4,729 6.24 
1997 4,380 5.29 
1998 3,796 4.78 
1999 3,935 5.39 
2000 4,832 6.38 
2001 4,209 6.14 
2002 3,568 5.3 
2003 6,140 8.3 
2004 5,814 6.08 
2005 3,250 2.75 
2006 -8,899 -6.08 
2007 -23,284 -14.21 
2008 -40,630 -23.77 
Source: Author’s calculations using data from Central Bank of 
Chile (2010). 
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Table A1.5 Labor Market Development Indicators in Chile, 1980-2009 
Year 
Urban 
population (% of 
total) 
Labor force, 
female (% of total 
labor force) 
School enrollment, 
secondary (% 
gross) 
Ratio of female 
to male tertiary 
enrollment (%) 
1980 81.20 29.29 62.52 77.04 
1981 81.48 28.85 63.37 
1982 81.76 29.79 63.88 
1983 82.04 30.68 68.84 74.56 
1984 82.32 30.76 71.93 75.88 
1985 82.60 29.38 75.57 77.83 
1986 82.74 29.44 77.73 79.73 
1987 82.88 29.81 81.43 
1988 83.02 30.16 82.51 
1989 83.16 30.25 81.10 
1990 83.30 30.49 78.19 
1991 83.52 30.35 97.27 
1992 83.74 31.54 97.42 
1993 83.96 32.34 77.38 85.21 
1994 84.18 32.33 86.25 
1995 84.40 31.89 86.02 
1996 84.70 32.31 85.30 
1997 85.00 32.92 87.40 
1998 85.30 33.38 78.06 87.62 
1999 85.60 33.55 79.50 91.43 
2000 85.90 33.40 82.70 91.70 
2001 86.24 33.27 
2002 86.58 33.60 85.57 93.14 
2003 86.92 34.34 87.80 94.42 
2004 87.26 35.57 89.15 95.05 
2005 87.60 35.42 90.79 95.69 
2006 87.88 35.76 91.18 99.67 
2007 88.16 36.84 90.60 100.76 
2008 88.44 37.52 90.39 102.83 
2009 88.72 37.18 
Source: World Bank 2010. 
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Table A1.6 Development Indicators in Chile, 1980-2009 
Year 
Life expectancy 
at birth, total 
(years) 
Fertility rate, 
total (births 
per woman) 
Mobile 
phones (per 
100 people) 
Internet users 
(per 100 
people) 
1980 69.06 2.68   
1981 69.73 2.66   
1982 70.35 2.65   
1983 70.90 2.65   
1984 71.39 2.66   
1985 71.83 2.66   
1986 72.21 2.66   
1987 72.56 2.65 0.00   
1988 72.90 2.65 0.00   
1989 73.23 2.64 0.04   
1990 73.55 2.62 0.11 0.00 
1991 73.87 2.60 0.27  0.00  
1992 74.16 2.56 0.47 0.04 
1993 74.45 2.51 0.61 0.07 
1994 74.72 2.45 0.82 0.14 
1995 75.00 2.39 1.37 0.35 
1996 75.31 2.32 2.18 0.68 
1997 75.64 2.25 2.76 1.06 
1998 76.01 2.19 6.41 1.66 
1999 76.40 2.13 14.84 4.10 
2000 76.80 2.08 22.06 16.60 
2001 77.19 2.05 32.69 18.74 
2002 77.54 2.02 39.57 19.06 
2003 77.83 1.99 45.56 25.47 
2004 78.07 1.97 57.43 28.18 
2005 78.25 1.96 64.85 31.18 
2006 78.39 1.95 75.61 34.50 
2007 78.50 1.94 83.88 31.03 
2008 78.61 1.93 88.05 32.47 
2009 78.73 1.93 96.94 33.98 
Source: World Bank 2010. 
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Table A1.7 Education Expenditure in Chile, 1990-2008 (% of current GDP) 
Year 
Public 
Education 
Expenditure (% 
of GDP) 
Private 
Education 
Expenditure (% 
of GDP) 
Total Education 
Expenditure (% 
of GDP) 
1990 1.5 2.4 3.9 
1991 1.6 2.4 4 
1992 1.7 2.5 4.2 
1993 1.9 2.7 4.6 
1994 2 2.8 4.8 
1995 2 2.7 4.7 
1996 2.2 3 5.2 
1997 2.2 3.2 5.4 
1998 2.6 3.5 6.1 
1999 2.9 3.8 6.7 
2000 2.9 3.9 6.8 
2001 2.9 4.1 7 
2002 3 4.1 7.1 
2003 3.1 4.1 7.2 
2004 3 3.9 6.9 
2005 2.9 3.7 6.6 
2006 2.7 3.3 6 
2007 2.5 3.6 6.1 
2008 2.7 4.2 6.9 
Source: MINEDUC (2010) 
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Table A1.8 Manufacture Exports, Copper Exports and GDP in Chile, 1980-2009 
Year Manufacture exports (current millions US$) 
Copper Exports 
(current millions US$) 
GDP (current 
millions US$) 
1980 4,278 21,525 275,723 
1981 2,958 17,126 326,449 
1982 2,697 16,698 243,394 
1983 2,578 18,504 197,704 
1984 2,684 15,703 192,327 
1985 2,612 17,600 164,860 
1986 3,623 17,501 177,225 
1987 4,670 22,267 209,021 
1988 6,444 34,774 246,409 
1989 8,371 39,447 283,850 
1990 9,420 38,496 315,589 
1991 11,954 36,031 364,242 
1992 13,615 39,103 444,679 
1993 15,215 32,657 476,940 
1994 19,565 44,854 551,542 
1995 21,606 63,921 713,492 
1996 24,389 58,385 757,690 
1997 27,862 68,510 828,090 
1998 28,182 53,237 793,736 
1999 28,858 61,638 729,953 
2000 31,197 72,863 752,105 
2001 32,902 65,259 685,683 
2002 30,980 62,793 672,654 
2003 33,342 75,530 739,896 
2004 41,761 145,300 956,527 
2005 53,196 177,626 1,182,496 
2006 63,338 333,506 1,467,726 
2007 69,114 379,132 1,643,152 
2008 84,469 365,502 1,708,503 
2009 60,282 262,711 1,636,691 
Source: World Bank (2010) and COCHILCO (2009) 
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Appendix 2 R&D Cooperation Determinants Model Variable 
Definitions 
Cooperation: Variable that takes the value 0 if the firm does not declare that it has 
cooperated on innovative activities with any other agent (suppliers, clients, competitors, 
consultants, universities, research institutes) and takes the value 1 if the firm has declared 
that it cooperates with at least one of them. 
 
Cooperation with competitors: Variable that takes the value 1 when the firm has 
declared that it cooperates with its competitors in innovating and takes the value 0 
otherwise. 
 
Cooperation with Consultants: Variable that takes the value 1 when the firm has 
declared that it cooperates with private consultants or R&D laboratories in innovating, 
and takes the value 0 otherwise. 
 
Cooperation with Suppliers or Customers: Variable that takes the value 1 when the 
firm has declared that it cooperates with its suppliers or customers in innovating, and 
takes the value 0 otherwise. 
 
Cooperation with Universities: Variable that takes the value 1 when the firm has 
declared that it cooperates with universities or public research institutes in innovating, 
and takes the value 0 otherwise. 
 
Incoming Spillovers: Variable that takes the value 0 if innovation ideas are not 
originated by professional conferences, exhibitions, meetings, and journals, and takes 
values between 1 (low) and 4 (high) when these sources are declared to be sources for 
innovating ideas. Rescaled between 1 (high) and 0 (not relevant). 
 
Basic nature of R&D: Variable that takes the value 0 if innovation ideas are not 
originated by institutional sources and takes values between 1 (low) and 4 (high) when 
institutional sources are declared to be sources for innovating ideas. Rescaled between 1 
(high) and 0 (not relevant). 
 
Lack of Information: Variable that takes the value 0 if lack of information is not an 
obstacle for the innovative process, as declared by the firm, and takes values between 1 
(low importance) and 4 (high importance) when the lack of information is an obstacle for 
innovating. Rescaled between 0 (not relevant) and 1 (high). 
 
Appendix 2 
Legal Protection: Variable that takes the value 0 if the firm has no patents or know-how 
agreements and takes the value 1 otherwise. 
 
Cost-Risk: Sum of the scores of importance of the following declared obstacles to 
innovating (values between 0 (not relevant) and 4 (very important obstacle)): Difficulty in 
finding sources of finance; High cost of innovating; High risk perceived; Payback period 
too long. Rescaled between 0 (not relevant) and 1 (high). 
 
Industry Level Imitation: Mean of Imitation for each industry. The industry has been 
defined with a 2-digit classification. 
 
Industry Level of Incoming Spillovers: Mean of Incoming Spillovers for each 
industry. The industry has been defined with a 2-digit classification. 
 
Industry Level of Legal Protection: Mean of Legal Protection for each industry. The 
industry has been defined with a 2-digit classification. 
 
Industry Level of Cooperation: Mean of Cooperation for each industry. The industry 
has been defined with a 2-digit classification. 
 
Industry Level of Cooperation with Competitors: Mean of Cooperation with 
Competitors for each industry. The industry has been defined with a 2-digit classification. 
 
Industry Level of Cooperation with Consultants: Mean of Cooperation with 
Consultants for each industry. The industry has been defined with a 2-digit classification. 
 
Industry Level of Cooperation with Suppliers or Customers: Mean of Cooperation 
with Suppliers or Customers for each industry. The industry has been defined with a 2-
digit classification. 
 
Industry Level of Cooperation with Universities: Mean of Cooperation with 
Universities for each industry. The industry has been defined with a 2-digit classification. 
 
R&D Intensity: Ratio between intramural R&D expenditures and turnover. 
 
Size: Log of number of employees of the firm. 
 
Size squared: square of log of number of employees. 
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Appendix 3 Chilean Survey Data on Manufacturing and 
Innovation 
A3.1 Introduction to the Data 
This appendix describes a database and the variables that will be used as the basis of 
production function regressions. The databases that have been reproduced, combined, 
and edited for the purposes of this research have their origin in the Chilean 
Manufacturing Industry and are focused on an 8-year period from 1996 to 2003.  The 
firm-level Chilean Industrial survey “Encuesta Nacional Industrial Anual (ENIA)” 
collects detailed yearly data on firms’ basic characteristics, employment, wages, inputs, 
energy consumption and energy production, external services, depreciation, interest, 
taxes, capital goods, investment, sales, other income, inventories, and monetary 
correction based on the consumer price index. An additional survey questionnaire form 
(Formulario 3) has been applied to a subsample of the ENIA firms. This survey provides 
yearly information on product quantities and prices for each production line within firms, 
offering a very detailed description of products and also providing information on 
inventories and exports. When necessary, and in order to answer particular questions 
about firms’ knowledge creation, this research will also make use of  the Chilean 
Innovation Survey databases, which have been collected during the same period by the 
Chilean Statistical Office (INE) every three years on behalf of the Chilean Ministry of 
Economics. 
All survey data used and described in this section was collected by the Chilean 
National Statistical Office. A Chilean public statistical institution was firstly established by 
law in 1843. At the present time, “Instituto Nacional de Estadisticas” (INE) is a technical 
agency that produces, analyzes, and publishes the official and public Chilean statistics. 
INE provides economic, social, demographic, environmental, and census data and 
cooperates with the OECD statistical unit in order to maintain internationally 
comparable databases These databases allow public, private, and research agents to make 
informed and responsible decisions, allowing the development of an open and 
democratic society. The institution employs more than 1500 people and has gained the 
credibility among its users based on the laws and norms that govern its behavior. 
In what follows, we first describe the original files used to create a main database, 
and we discuss how the information was merged. Secondly, we describe the creation of 
the main database, the most important variables that were defined, and the basic cleaning 
of the data. Finally, we present a set of preliminary non-deflated panel data production 
function estimates. 
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A3.2 Panel Data from Different Surveys 
Firm-level Industrial Survey data was obtained from Chilean firms for each year of 
the period 1996-2003. A difficulty arises in combining all the available survey data across 
years since the statistical office has used three identification variables at different stages 
of the data collection. This created different databases that were not merged easily, 
despite the fact that they contain information on the same group of firms. The ID 
variables “Padron” and “Nui” identify establishments as productive units; that is to say 
they disregard the fact that some manufacturing firms may be sold or simply change 
owners over time. The third ID variable “Rol” considers the manufacturing firm as a 
tributary unit. Whenever a firm changed its tributary identification R.U.T. because of an 
acquisition or a tributary condition change, a new “Rol” identification value was assigned 
to that establishment.  
In the Chilean industrial survey ENIA, there was a change on the definition of the 
identification variable that took place in 2001. The establishment identifier used 
previously, “Padron,” was replaced by “Nui” (Unique identification number). This way, 
instead of providing a match with both ID variables, two different files containing ENIA 
survey data were made available for the year 2001. The main divergence among these files 
is the identification variable that they use. One of the files uses as an ID the variable 
“Padron,” which was used for the last time in 2001. The second file identifies the 
observations with a new ID variable named “Nui,” which has been used from 2001 
onward. Another difference between these files is the number of observations that they 
contain. The divergence in the number of observations is due to the existence in both 
files of different numbers of firms that did not answer or incompletely answered the 
survey in 2001. Incomplete observations will be deleted in further stages of the data 
analysis, but may be useful at this stage as we match the two ID variables together. 
In order to create a panel that could merge the observations before and after 2001, it 
was necessary to merge the two 2001 ENIA databases according to other variables in a 
way that they would not produce duplicates. The combination of four variables produced 
no repeated observations in either 2001 version of the database. Therefore, the matching 
of the observations from these two databases has allowed connecting each observation 
identified with Padron to the same observation identified with Nui. The variables that 
were used to connect the two identification variables are: 
- Legal Organization (with 9 different categories) 
- Total Male Workers 
- Total Income 
- Value Added 
Because there are no duplicate firms in any of the 2001 versions of the ENIA in 
terms of these four variables, we can merge the firms from the two databases one by one. 
As a result, we were able to obtain the correspondence of Padron and Nui for 3,895 
firms that were present in both 2001 databases 
Product-firm level data was collected for a large subsample of the Chilean Industrial 
Survey (ENIA) during the period 1996-2003. We have used two files containing product 
level data from 1996 to 1999 and from 1999 to 2003, respectively. The data is raw in the 
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sense that it contains a number of missing values and incomplete entries. Consequently, 
some observations will have to be deleted with a careful cleaning before performing any 
estimation procedures.  
The two product-firm level databases have codified observations with different firm-
level identification variables. In the first database (1996-1999), the firm ID was defined as 
“Rol,” while in the second (1999-2003) it was defined as “Nui.” Therefore we took the 
observations of the year 1999 from both databases and merged them together using a 
similar algorithm as the one described above, which was used for merging the two ENIA 
ID variables. For this procedure, observations were merged according to the other eight 
variables on each file. The variables included in two of these (1999) databases are: 
- Product Code 
- Product Name 
- Initial Stock 
- Units Sold 
- Value Sold 
- Sales Tax 
- Final Stock 
- Exported Share  
In this exercise using both databases, 14 observations turned out to be duplicated 
according to the eight listed variables. These were deleted from the sample because it was 
impossible to merge those observations for the two sample periods. There were 22 firms 
that were identified with a single “Rol” in 1999 but were separated into 2 different “Nui,” 
most likely for having their production divided into two physical establishments. These 
firms were dropped from the sample to avoid further discrepancies and duplicated ID 
values. As a result, we were able to obtain the merge for 3,349 firms that were present in 
both databases. 
Table A3.1 provides information on the number of observations that were made 
available by the statistical office for each survey in each year. The last column represents 
the number of establishments that were surveyed in each year and for which we could 
identify the three IDs (Nui, Padron and Rol). 
Additionally, two files containing useful merging information were obtained from 
the Chilean Statistical Office. In the first place, a file contained 5,480 observations with 
“Padron” and “Rol”. A second file provided the match between “Rol” and “Nui” for 
1,020 observations for which we also have the 2003-2004 innovation survey.  
There is a subset with 4,055 establishments for which the correlative Pardon-Rol-
Nui was built from the information above. From this group, a total of 3,890 
establishments had information at the firm level and at the product level for at least one 
single year. Our unbalanced panel is then made by these 3,890 firms, while those firms 
that do not have both ENIA and product-quantity data were dropped and will not be 
used for this study. A preliminary unclean balanced panel of firms that contains firm-level 
and product-level information has 1733 observations in all eight years from 1996 to 2003. 
In the Chilean Industrial Survey, establishments are separated into economic sectors 
disaggregated at the four-digit level ISIC rev2 and ISIC rev3. Whenever an observation 
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has more than one value for one sector variable in different versions (years) of the 
survey, the mode of this variable at the level of establishment will replace the sector of 
multi-sectorial firms whenever the objective of a certain calculation implies locating the 
firm into one specific economic sector. This constraint may be removed in further stages 
of this study to allow for the existence of multi-sector firms where such an assumption 
may seem a more appropriate idea.  
 
Table A3.1 Number of Observations in Firm-level and Product-firm level Data 
 ENIA Form 1 ENIA Form 3 Resulting matching 
Year \ ID Padron Nui Nui Rol Nui-Padron-Rol 
1996 5,466   5,208 3,528 
1997 5,243   5,115 3,603 
1998 4,820   4,740 3,631 
1999 4,004  4,555 4,037 3,431 
2000 4,549  4,403  3,482 
2001 4,651 5,042 4,495  3,597 
2002  5,375 4,808  3,394 
2003  5,353 4,796  3,117 
Note: Firm-level ENIA Form 1 data identified observations with the variable “padron” from 1996 to 2001 and with 
the variable “nui” from 2001 to 2003. Product-firm level data collected with ENIA Form 3 was identified with “rol” 
from 1996 to 1999 and with “nui” from 1999 to 2003. The last column indicates the number of observations for 
which both firm-level and product-firm level information was observed 
 
The 1,020 manufacturing establishments surveyed in the 2003-2004 Fourth 
Innovation Survey can be merged with the respective Industrial Survey and Product 
Survey for the case of most firms that also answered these questionnaires. Additionally, 
the 560 establishments that answered the 2000-2001 Third Innovation Survey can be 
matched to the respective Industrial Survey and Product Survey whenever those firms 
additionally answered one or both of those separate surveys. 
A3.3 Creation of a Firm-Level Panel Database 
A set of firm-level variables was created to incorporate relevant parts of the 
information provided at the product-firm level. Each year of the product-firm level data 
was merged with the ENIA survey at the firm level and product-firm level variables were 
dropped. All years were afterwards appended together to create a panel. All variables 
linearly dependent which contained no observations were deleted. All variables 
containing only 0 values were also deleted. In some years, the variable names from the 
ENIA survey were incorrectly defined in the original files. The variable names were 
corrected in such a way that they all can be matched with the variable definition file that 
was provided separately by the statistical office. A main database was created and all the 
variables were labeled and ordered according to the ENIA Methodological Report 
(2005).  
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A3.4 Measurement of Book Value of Capital  
Our definition of book value of capital is the reported book value of capital in year t-
1 plus the value of net investment in period t. Deflated book value of capital is expressed 
in terms of the first year prices. A detailed disaggregation at the 2-digit industry level may 
be found in tables A3.2 and A3.3. Table A3.2 shows book value of capital net growth and 
finds that, across industries and years, the average capital growth was 9.8% for the whole 
Chilean manufacturing industry. We see in Table A3.3 that investment varied and 
presented the highest values in industries 32, 33 and 37. 
 
Table A3.2 Average Industry-level Yearly Growth of Capital Book Value 
 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 Average 
1997 15.2% 3.9% 10.0% 17.2% 8.6% 21.2% 27.7% 16.9% 19.1% 15.5% 
1998 11.1% 13.9% 7.1% 7.4% 13.9% 6.4% 15.4% 17.% 13.5% 11.8% 
1999 11.4% 7.9% 13.4% 27.2% 18.1% 1.2% -8.3% 5.2% 5.1% 9.0% 
2000 14.1% 10.2% 23.4% 12.9% 13.6% 22.0% 11.9% 11.% 22.7% 15.8% 
2001 8.8% -5.3% -1.8% 2.6% -10.4% 9.0% 2.7% -0.7% 20.4% 2.8% 
2002 5.5% 11.1% 13.8% 1.7% 18.1% 6.3% 10.6% 9.7% -1.4% 8.4% 
2003 5.4% 8.4% 1.7% 11.8% 5.7% -2.3% 1.3% -1.8% 8.0% 5.4% 
Average 10.2% 7.2% 11.1% 11.5% 9.7% 9.1% 8.8% 8.3% 12.5% 9.8% 
Note: (31) Manufacture of Food, Beverages and Tobacco, (32) Textile, Wearing Apparel and Leather Industries, (33) 
Manufacture of Wood and Wood Products, Including Furniture, (34) Manufacture of Paper and Paper Products, 
Printing and Publishing, (35) Manufacture of Chemicals and Chemical, Petroleum, Coal, Rubber and Plastic 
Products, (36) Manufacture of Non-Metallic Mineral Products, except Products of Petroleum and Coal, (37) Basic 
Metal Industries, (38) Manufacture of Fabricated Metal Products, Machinery and Equipment, (39) Other 
Manufacturing Industries. 
 
Table A3.3 Average Industry-level Yearly Capital Investment 
 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 Average 
1997 11.7% 139.6 19.8% 11.7% 16.7% 19.3% 21.8% 10.6% 9.3% 28.9% 
1998 9.6% 8.7% 19.2% 9.7% 16.9% 8.9% 88.4% 12.5% 54.0% 25.3% 
1999 9.0% 5.0% 44.4% 16.3% 11.8% 4.4% 1.5% 6.7% 3.0% 11.3% 
2000 9.8% 7.8% 15.6% 5.0% 10.7% 2.9% 4.6% 4.7% 7.9% 7.7% 
2001 14.8% 5.3% 9.4% 8.9% 10.6% 12.1% 8.1% 11.4% 3.4% 9.3% 
2002 10.7% 9.7% 13.8% 3.7% 11.7% 10.2% 2.8% 13.9% 12.1% 9.8% 
2003 9.1% 6.2% 15.7% 9.5% -6.8% 10.5% 12.5% 6.2% -6.5% 6.3% 
Average 10.7% 26.0% 19.7% 9.2% 10.2% 9.8% 20.0% 9.4% 11.9% 14.1% 
Note: (31) Manufacture of Food, Beverages and Tobacco, (32) Textile, Wearing Apparel and Leather Industries, (33) 
Manufacture of Wood and Wood Products, Including Furniture, (34) Manufacture of Paper and Paper Products, 
Printing and Publishing, (35) Manufacture of Chemicals and Chemical, Petroleum, Coal, Rubber and Plastic 
Products, (36) Manufacture of Non-Metallic Mineral Products, except Products of Petroleum and Coal, (37) Basic 
Metal Industries, (38) Manufacture of Fabricated Metal Products, Machinery and Equipment, (39) Other 
Manufacturing Industries. 
A3.5 Generating Production Function Variables  
A set of variables in levels was first defined summarizing the information of output 
and input in levels. Capacity utilization is defined as the total number of days worked in a 
given year. Advertising represents the firm’s yearly expenditures on publicity and 
advertising through all available channels. Investment is defined as the summation of the 
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firm’s expenses in land, buildings, machinery, and vehicles. Cost variables were also 
defined and grouped into employment costs and intermediates costs.  All these variables 
were computed with the data provided by the ENIA survey (Form 1). A group of 
variables defined the share of costs to output considering investment, employment, and 
intermediates costs. A group of variables defined per-employee ratios of output, inputs, 
investment, and capital. The logs of these variables were generated and the first 
differences of the logs were defined to represent growth rates.  
A3.6 Basic Data Cleaning 
Only firms with five or more employees were kept in the sample; therefore 72 
observations were deleted. 789 observations with zero value of capital were dropped. 144 
observations were dropped for being outliers in terms of per employee ratios of capital, 
output, and intermediates. 275 observations were dropped for being outliers in terms of 
the ratios of labor to output, intermediates to output, and cost to output. Additionally 
1237 observations were dropped for having outlier rates of growth in key variables such 
as output per employee, capital per employee, number of employees, and intermediate 
consumption. Finally, 24 observations were dropped for having reported a value of 
output at the firm level that was incompatible with the summation of the values reported 
at the product-firm level.  In summary, 25,522 observations were reduced by 10% by 
deleting 2,541 undesirable values. The sample was then made using 22,981 observations 
in an unbalanced panel.  
A3.7 Summary of Main Variables and Production Variables Definitions  
Table A3.4 contains the basic descriptive statistics of the main variables of our 
database. Up to this stage, research variables are expressed in nominal terms. Output 
increased steadily during the period except in 1998 and 1999 when an external economic 
crisis affected the Chilean manufacturing industry. On average in 2003, the annual 
production of Chilean manufacturing firms was 5,845 million pesos, equivalent to 
approximately U.S. $10 million. From 1996 to 2003, Chilean manufacturing industry 
firms increased their output on average by 45%.  
Capital increased on average over 35% and did not decrease in 1998 and 1999 when 
output was slightly reduced by the economic crisis. On average in 2003, Chilean 
manufacturing firms had a capital of 2,934 million pesos, equivalent to approximately 
U.S. $5 million. 
The use of intermediate goods increased with output in all years except in 1998 and 
1999 when output also decreased. The average use of intermediates during the 1996 to 
2003 period was around 1,676 million pesos or around U.S. $2.6 million per 
manufacturing firm.  
Employment in the sample varied from a minimum 5 to a maximum of 3,409 
employees over the period 1996 to 2003 for our group of Chilean manufacturing industry 
firms. The average number of employees fell in 1998 and 1999 but recovered to a level 
just above the starting point toward the end of our research period in 2003.  
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Employment cost increased in every year of the period, except in 1999, when 
employment was drastically reduced. During the 1996 to 2003 period, the average Chilean 
manufacturing firm had an employment cost of 357 million pesos or U.S. $600,000. After 
experiencing a drop in 1999, investment grew quickly from 2000 to 2003, with overall 
growth during the whole period 1996 to 2003 of 200%.  
 
Table A3.4 Descriptive Statistics of Basic Production Variables 
Year stats ܻ ܭ ܯ ܮ ܹ ܫ ܥܷ 
1996 mean 3,189,570 1,920,987 1,402,067 80 300,415 179,251 285 
(N=3,005) Sd 13,700,000 12,000,000 5,319,424 159 1,021,622 1,152,835 49 
 Min 18,980 221 2,485 10 5,367 -11,300,000 108 
 Max 310,000,000 422,000,000 133,000,000 3,365 27,600,000 30,500,000 365 
1997 mean 3,357,295 1,908,599 1,444,890 80 327,762 174,511 284 
(N=3,013) Sd 14,500,000 12,800,000 5,817,214 163 1,126,637 1,037,903 48 
 Min 19,611 176 3,303 10 6,508 -3,294,801 101 
 Max 299,000,000 530,000,000 151,000,000 3,409 32,300,000 24,200,000 365 
1998 mean 3,095,934 1,950,763 1,426,847 76 330,774 187,231 284 
(N=3,009) Sd 11,800,000 14,400,000 5,484,636 154 1,139,656 1,604,108 48 
 Min 20,684 491 3,975 10 5,600 -2,512,924 1 
 Max 238,000,000 545,000,000 137,000,000 3,274 32,900,000 64,600,000 365 
1999 mean 2,952,459 2,008,740 1,271,006 68 305,153 134,974 287 
(N=2,633) Sd 20,800,000 26,100,000 5,676,174 147 1,336,742 1,956,719 49 
 Min 19,911 415 4,708 6 4,382 -1,506,842 1 
 Max 923,000,000 1,280,000,00 152,000,000 2,952 39,900,000 95,400,000 365 
2000 Mean 3,506,637 2,280,034 1,520,149 69 329,819 185,389 286 
(N=2,837) Sd 21,700,000 28,200,000 6,440,834 142 1,344,722 2,317,737 47 
 Min 10,260 182 1,567 5 2,592 -10,600,000 1 
 Max 956,000,000 1,440,000,00 163,000,000 2,828 39,000,000 73,000,000 365 
2001 Mean 4,374,042 2,596,638 1,818,061 70 357,040 352,155 284 
(N=2,993) Sd 24,600,000 34,100,000 9,125,874 147 1,393,242 7,551,847 48 
 Min 10,670 190 2,348 5 3,676 -7,768,427 110 
 Max 905,000,000 1,690,000,00 347,000,000 2,918 39,100,000 400,000,000 365 
2002 Mean 5,406,342 3,063,228 2,169,489 78 426,407 304,172 285 
(N=2,878) Sd 25,300,000 36,200,000 7,982,346 168 1,494,770 5,347,354 47 
 Min 12,717 195 2,893 5 3,584 -5,691,304 86 
 Max 859,000,000 1,840,000,00 176,000,000 2,787 49,200,000 277,000,000 365 
2003 Mean 5,845,103 2,934,553 2,417,128 82 491,256 548,614 284 
(N=2,613) Sd 30,300,000 32,800,000 9,170,683 181 1,933,955 15,600,000 47 
 Min 13,475 128 2,209 5 5,083 -7,462,902 50 
 Max 1,170,000,000 1,560,000,00 196,000,000 2,666 67,900,000 789,000,000 365 
Total Mean 3,945,095 2,323,928 1,676,188 75 357,001 255,520 285 
(N=22,981) Sd 21,000,000 26,100,000 7,028,787 158 1,364,514 6,352,681 48 
 Min 10,260 128 1,567 5 2,592 -11,300,000 1 
 Max 1,170,000,000 1,840,000,00 347,000,000 3,409 67,900,000 789,000,000 365 
Note: Firm-level data from Chilean Annual Industrial Survey (ENIA). (Y) is total output, (K) is book value of 
capital including machines, vehicles and buildings, (M) is total cost of materials including raw materials, water, 
electricity and fuels, (L) is the number of employees, (W) is total wages paid. (I) is net investment and (CU) is 
capacity utilization measured by the number of days worked yearly.  
 
Our measure of capacity utilization is the number of days worked during the year. 
The average number of days worked during the year is 284 and presents little variation in 
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time. Nevertheless, this value is higher in 1999 and 2000. This may be due to the financial 
crisis that affected other average values among the variables of the ENIA survey.  
 
Table A3.5 Descriptive Statistics of Basic Production Variables Expressed in Ratios 
Year Stats 
ܹ
ܳ  
ܯ
ܳ  
ܥ
ܳ 
ܫ
ܳ 
ܳ
ܮ  
ܭ
ܮ  
ܯ
ܮ  
1996 Mean 0.16 0.49 0.65 0.03 24,642 11,154 12,290 
(N=3,005) Sd 0.09 0.19 0.19 0.15 43,026 35,047 21,501 
 Min 0.01 0.02 0.06 -5.40 1,036 12.28 139.82 
 Max 0.79 1.17 1.36 3.16 742,724 770,254 348,590 
1997 Mean 0.17 0.48 0.65 0.04 24,898 11,318 12,005 
(N=3,013) Sd 0.09 0.19 0.19 0.24 41,300 36,858 20,023 
 Min 0.01 0.02 0.05 -0.54 1,267 16.00 235.93 
 Max 0.81 1.17 1.46 12.07 819,777 1,108,536 272,506 
1998 Mean 0.18 0.47 0.65 0.04 25,302 12,058 12,574 
(N=3,009) Sd 0.10 0.19 0.18 0.39 40,209 44,619 22,439 
 Min 0.01 0.02 0.06 -1.17 1,379 34.59 188.53 
 Max 0.71 1.15 1.42 19.64 762,092 1,431,972 332,497 
1999 Mean 0.19 0.48 0.66 0.02 24,602 12,055 12,255 
(N=2,633) Sd 0.10 0.19 0.19 0.12 39,227 28,782 22,344 
 Min 0.01 0.02 0.06 -1.01 1,471 21.84 181.08 
 Max 0.80 1.13 1.48 3.66 719,402 610,508 353,018 
2000 Mean 0.19 0.48 0.67 0.02 27,835 14,250 13,728 
(N=2,837) Sd 0.11 0.19 0.20 0.11 42,751 41,786 23,289 
 Min 0.01 0.02 0.05 -1.69 1,610 10.24 156.70 
 Max 0.85 1.13 1.47 2.71 608,736 1,124,483 366,950 
2001 Mean 0.18 0.48 0.66 0.03 32,973 15,263 15,816 
(N=2,993) Sd 0.11 0.19 0.20 0.25 58,830 55,887 27,901 
 Min 0.01 0.02 0.05 -2.20 1,779 11.88 328.22 
 Max 0.84 1.19 1.43 10.02 940,779 1,328,199 383,283 
2002 Mean 0.17 0.48 0.65 0.02 38,412 17,545 18,009 
(N=2,878) Sd 0.11 0.19 0.20 0.09 68,164 59,886 31,511 
 Min 0.01 0.02 0.04 -1.49 1,413 9.85 359.87 
 Max 0.88 1.13 1.48 2.12 894,349 1,046,101 400,267 
2003 Mean 0.17 0.48 0.64 0.02 40,450 16,259 19,562 
(N=2,613) Sd 0.10 0.19 0.20 0.23 66,738 55,135 34,282 
 Min 0.01 0.02 0.05 -3.32 2,243 10.67 277.00 
 Max 0.90 1.16 1.49 9.42 920,789 1,256,201 398,835 
Total Mean 0.17 0.48 0.65 0.03 29,759 13,695 14,466 
(N=22,981) Sd 0.10 0.19 0.19 0.22 51,516 46,000 25,875 
 Min 0.01 0.02 0.04 -5.40 1,036 9.85 139.82 
 Max 0.90 1.19 1.49 19.64 940,779 1,431,972 400,267 
Note: Firm-level data from Chilean Annual Industrial Survey (ENIA). (W/Q) is total wages divided by total output, 
(M/Q) is the materials’ share in total output, (C/Q) is the proportion of variable cost in total output, (I/Q) is the 
ratio of net investment to output, (Q/L) is total output divided by the number of employees, (K/L) is the average 
amount of capital per employee and (M/L) is the average quantity of intermediates per employee.  
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The amount reported to have been spent on advertisement increases more than 
100% from 1996 to 2003. It decreased in 1998 and 1999 but it experienced a fast growth 
afterwards. This information could also suggest an increase over time of the penetration 
of information and communication technologies in the Chilean society. 
A group of variables defined the share of costs to output considering investment, 
employment, and intermediates costs. Additionally, a group of variables defined ratios per 
employee of output, intermediates and capital. Table A3.5 summarizes the results of the 
ratio variables. 
The ratio of labor cost to output was around 0.17 and remained very stable during 
the period 1996 to 2003. The lowest value of this variable on average was 0.16 in 1996 
and the highest was 0.19 in 2000. The ratio of intermediates to output was also very 
stable at around 0.48 on average for the case of the Chilean manufacturing firms included 
in our sample. The highest average ratio of intermediates to output was in 1996 (0.49) 
while the lowest was in 1998 (0.47). The ratio of total variable cost (labor and 
intermediates) to output was on average 0.65. This variable reached its highest level of 
0.67 in 2000 and its lowest level of 0.64in 2003.  
Investment represented 3% of output for the firms in our sample during the period 
covered by this study. Output per employee increased quickly from 2000 to 2003. The 
average value of this variable was 30 million pesos per employee during the period 1996 
to 2003. Capital and intermediates per employee also increased rapidly during the period 
2000 to 2003, which may be the explanation for the per-employee productivity growth 
observed in the same period. 
A3.8 Preliminary Panel Data Production Function Regression 
With panel data on individual firm’s inputs and output, cross-sectional and time-
series estimates can be obtained. In the first place, Total Effects may be obtained by OLS 
without grouping observations into individual firms or time periods. Random Effects 
estimates can be computed by taking into account that the error term is made by a 
random effect specific to the individual and a time varying effect assuming that the 
overall error term is exogenous.  Between Effects regression is based only on the inter-
individual differences of the variables and is performed on the average cross-section 
values. The Fixed Effects regression considers only the intra-individual changes of the 
variables, using each observation in terms of the intra-firm deviation from the mean. 
Under the assumption that the changes in output caused by changes of input levels 
are stable across firms and constant in time, we should see no differences among the four 
different balanced and unbalanced panel estimates shown in Table A3.6. Nevertheless, 
we observe differences in the estimated parameters, especially among Between Effects 
and Fixed Effects estimates. This result leads us to conclude that changes in input levels 
have a determinate impact on output when they occur along a time span within specific 
firms, while these effects are different when calculated across firms and at a specific 
moment in time. The balanced and unbalanced sample results are similar throughout the 
table. We find variations across estimates but we conclude that restricting the sample to 
the balanced panel does not change these basic results in a meaningful way. 
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Appendix 4 Firm-Level Price Growth 
A4.1 Constructing Firm-level Price Growth Rates 
Different deflators were defined for each of the variables of the ENIA survey that 
were originally expressed in nominal terms. One of the most innovative elements of this 
work is the definition of a firm-level output deflator. Industrial data normally provides 
output expressed in nominal terms; this constitutes a restraint when the researcher uses 
panel data and is interested in separating growth of physical output from growth of 
output prices. Using the information provided by Form 3 of the ENIA survey, we are 
able to observe quantities and prices for each product inside firms. This data will be the 
starting point for the definition of a firm-level output deflator variable. 
Other output deflators can be defined at four, three, and two-digit ISIC Rev.2 
industry classification code by taking the industry average price growth. Using 
information from wholesale price index calculations obtained from INE, it was also 
possible to create a three-digit industry level deflator for output. 
When estimating firm-level price growth, as well as when considering the change of 
firms’ product-mix, we require a sample that contains no gaps. Therefore observations 
with leaps will be discarded from the unbalanced panel at this stage. Additionally, the rest 
of this section considers only firms observed at least on three consecutive years during 
the period 1996-2003. 
From the products-quantities data, we have obtained information at the product-
firm level. That is to say, the statistical unit of measure is one product inside one firm. 
Cleaning of the product-firm level data is necessary before statistical computations can be 
done. The data cleaning process will depend on what we are aiming to calculate with the 
data. In the case of the product-firm level information, this study is first of all interested 
in computing a price inflation index at the level of firms. This firm-level variable will be 
merged with the industrial survey ENIA in order to deflate sales and estimate production 
functions that incorporate information on price changes.  
We have calculated the average yearly price at the product-firm level by dividing total 
product sales by the number of units sold. We then have taken logs of the product-firm 
level prices. Finally, the first difference of the log of price gave us the approximate yearly 
product-firm level price growth rate.   
The firm-level price growth rate variable will be merged with the industrial survey 
ENIA in order to deflate sales and estimate production functions that incorporate 
information on price changes at the firm level. Several considerations make it difficult to 
choose the way in which we should represent firm-level inflation rates using product-firm 
level information.  
In the first place, we must consider that there are an important number of outliers at 
the product-firm level that will most likely produce biased means and standard errors in 
our estimated firm-level inflation rates. We are interested in the average behavior of 
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manufacturing industry firms as well as in specific sector average productivity and price 
elasticity. If there is a small group of products that experience huge price variations that 
are not likely to be explained by the information at hand, then we would prefer not to 
consider these observations for the computation of firm-level price growth. 
 
Table A4.1 Descriptive Statistics of Product-level data Coverage over Total Sales 
Year Stats Coverage before cleaning Coverage after cleaning 
1996 Mean 69.9% 69.9% 
(N=1,897) Sd 20.7% 20.7% 
Min 0.2% 0.2% 
Max 100.0% 100.0% 
1997 Mean 70.9% 51.7% 
(N=2,045) Sd 19.9% 32.7% 
Min 0.1% 0.0% 
Max 100.0% 100.0% 
1998 Mean 70.6% 54.8% 
(N=2,117) Sd 19.7% 31.4% 
Min 1.6% 0.0% 
Max 99.9% 98.8% 
1999 Mean 70.9% 57.9% 
(N=2,077) Sd 19.8% 30.2% 
Min 0.9% 0.0% 
Max 100.0% 99.7% 
2000 Mean 72.2% 52.1% 
(N=2,059) Sd 18.9% 33.1% 
Min 0.4% 0.0% 
Max 100.0% 100.0% 
2001 Mean 73.0% 38.1% 
(N=2,071) Sd 18.0% 34.4% 
Min 0.5% 0.0% 
Max 100.0% 100.0% 
2002 Mean 72.9% 56.8% 
(N=1,915) Sd 18.6% 30.4% 
Min 0.4% 0.0% 
Max 100.0% 100.0% 
2003 Mean 73.3% 60.3% 
(N=1,658) Sd 17.9% 28.4% 
Min 0.5% 0.0% 
Max 100.0% 100.0% 
Total Mean 71.7% 54.9% 
(N=15,839) Sd 19.3% 31.7% 
Min 0.1% 0.0% 
Max 100.0% 100.0% 
Note: Coverage is the percentage of total firm sales reported at the firm level in ENIA form 1that has also been 
reported at the product-firm level in ENIA form 3. 
 
Secondly, different products inside firms have different relative importance to sales. 
Therefore, when taking the firm-level average, we should consider weighting each 
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product with its relative importance to total sales. Taking weighted averages would help 
us avoid the possibility of relatively unimportant products determining the estimated 
inflation at the firm level. 
Thirdly, we must take into account that the production reported at the product level 
does not cover all the sales of firms. According to the information provided in Table 
A4.1, product-firm level data covers on average 72% of total sales at the firm level before 
cleaning the product-firm level observations, and 55% of total sales after cleaning. 
The data cleaning was done by the removal of observations that had inflation rates 
that were too high or too low to be representative in the manufacturing industry. Taking 
coverage into account should result in weighting each firm’s inflation by the coverage of 
its product-firm level information and allowing average industry inflation to represent the 
inflation of the products that are not represented in the information provided.  
Different methods were used to calculate the average yearly price growth rate at the 
firm level. First, I have computed the simple average of the inflation rate of all products 
from each firm within each year. This is to say, I have not corrected for the presence of 
outliers or for the coverage and or for products’ relative importance to sales. This 
estimated price growth is not reported due to some implausible values that resulted from 
the presence of outliers. 
The first column of Table A4.2 (inf1) shows a firm-level price growth rate computed 
as a simple average only after deleting from the product-firm data those outliers in which 
the first difference of log of price was higher than log(2) or lower than –log(2). Around 
12.4% of all the product-firm level observations were deleted. The statistics computed 
show much smaller standard errors and a mean that is very close to the median value, 
while the maximum and minimum values are now restricted by the definition above. 
The second column of Table A4.2 (inf2) shows the main statistics of firm-level price 
growth rate that was calculated using the firm-level weighted average of product-firm 
level inflation. This result was also obtained after deleting outliers with the same criteria 
described above. Results do not differ much from the second column but we believe this 
estimated inflation is much more accurate at the firm level because it weights products 
according to their relative importance to the firm’s sales. 
The third column of Table A4.2 corresponds to the estimation of the firm-level 
yearly price growth rate (Firm price growth 3) that takes into account all three of the 
considerations previously mentioned. This firm-level price change rate was calculated 
after deleting outliers using the same criteria as the previous two firm-level price growth 
estimations, correcting by weight and coverage.  
Firm price growth 3 was computed using a weighted average in order to incorporate 
information about the relative importance of each product to total firm sales. The overall 
coverage of product-firm level information was also taken into account, weighting each 
firm’s inflation by the coverage of its product-firm level information and using the 
average industry four-digit ISIC Rev.2 output price inflation to represent the share of 
production that is not detailed at the product-firm level.  
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Table A4.2 Descriptive Statistics of Firm-level Price Growth Rates 
Year Stats Firm price growth 1 Firm price growth 2 Firm price growth 3 
1997 mean 1.9% 1.9% 2.1% 
(N=2,045) Sd 19.7% 20.5% 13.2% 
 Min -68.0% -68.0% -57.4% 
 Max 69.1% 69.1% 58.4% 
1998 mean 3.5% 4.0% 4.0% 
(N=2,117) Sd 18.0% 18.7% 12.0% 
 Min -68.1% -68.6% -57.6% 
 Max 67.9% 69.0% 57.3% 
1999 mean 3.0% 3.3% 3.1% 
(N=2,077) Sd 17.1% 18.0% 11.8% 
 Min -67.6% -67.6% -51.0% 
 Max 69.1% 69.1% 58.9% 
2000 mean 3.1% 3.1% 3.1% 
(N=2,059) Sd 17.0% 17.8% 11.7% 
 Min -69.1% -69.1% -57.1% 
 Max 68.2% 68.2% 59.6% 
2001 mean 1.9% 1.9% 1.9% 
(N=2,071) Sd 19.3% 19.8% 12.3% 
 Min -68.2% -68.2% -56.9% 
 Max 69.2% 69.2% 56.1% 
2002 mean 2.5% 3.1% 3.0% 
(N=1,915) Sd 18.1% 18.8% 12.2% 
 Min -69.3% -69.3% -54.9% 
 Max 69.2% 69.2% 56.9% 
2003 mean 2.8% 3.1% 3.0% 
(N=1,658) Sd 17.0% 17.6% 11.5% 
 Min -68.2% -68.2% -58.3% 
 Max 67.6% 66.8% 56.8% 
Total mean 2.7% 2.9% 2.9% 
(N=13,942) Sd 18.1% 18.8% 12.1% 
 Min -69.3% -69.3% -58.3% 
 Max 69.2% 69.2% 59.6% 
Note: Firm price growth 1 is the simple average of the price growth rate of all products from each firm after 
deleting product observations in which the first difference of log of price was higher than log(2) or lower than –
log(2). Firm price growth 2 is the firm-level weighted average of product price growth after deleting outliers. Firm 
price growth 3 is the firm-level weighted average of price growth after deleting outliers and correcting by overall 
coverage of product-firm level information. 
 
Results show that statistics based on this last computation appear to be the ones with 
lowest standard errors, having mean and median values similar to the ones in the 
previous two columns and in accordance with what we expected for the Chilean 
manufacturing industry in the period 1996-2003. 
A4.2 Computation of the Industry-level Price Index 
One of the objectives of this study is to compare the firm-level output price growth 
indexes presented above with industry-level average price growths, which have been 
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widely used in previous production function estimation studies. Industry-level inflation 
rates were computed as the averages of firm-level inflation. We used ISIC Industry 
Classification at the level of 4, 3 and 2-digits. We have used industry averages of the third 
firm-level price growth presented in Table A4.2 to calculate industry-level output price 
growth rates at different levels of disaggregation.  We used Industry Classification ISIC 
Rev.2 industry classification at four, three, and two-digit level of disaggregation. 
Additionally, we have calculated an ISIC Rev.2 three-digit output price-growth index 
using wholesale price growth information provided by the Chilean Statistical Office.  
 
Table A4.3 Industry-level (ISIC Rev. 2) Price Growth Rates at 2, 3 and 4-digit level 
Year Stats ISIC 2-digit 
(9 sectors) 
ISIC 3-digit 
(27 sectors) 
ISIC 4-digit 
(85 sectors) 
ISIC 3-digit 
(INE 2009a) 
1997 Mean 1.8% 1.7% 1.8% 2.3% 
(N=2,045) Sd 1.2% 1.8% 3.5% 3.7% 
 Min -2.9% -5.4% -9.6% -5.9% 
 Max 4.2% 8.2% 29.5% 13.3% 
1998 mean 3.9% 3.9% 4.0% 3.7% 
(N=2,117) sd 1.7% 2.1% 3.0% 3.6% 
 min -4.1% -8.0% -35.3% -20.2% 
 max 5.5% 14.5% 19.0% 9.6% 
1999 mean 3.1% 3.1% 3.1% 1.0% 
(N=2,077) sd 1.3% 1.8% 3.1% 4.1% 
 min -2.1% -4.1% -14.3% -5.3% 
 max 4.7% 8.0% 19.5% 22.7% 
2000 mean 3.2% 3.1% 3.1% 4.7% 
(N=2,059) sd 1.7% 2.2% 3.8% 7.2% 
 min 1.2% -0.1% -18.4% -0.4% 
 max 7.4% 15.8% 26.0% 48.3% 
2001 Mean 2.0% 2.0% 1.9% 5.8% 
(N=2,071) Sd 2.2% 3.6% 5.7% 7.8% 
 Min -0.5% -6.0% -22.7% -28.2% 
 Max 7.4% 11.5% 19.9% 31.7% 
2002 Mean 3.0% 2.9% 2.9% 4.6% 
(N=1,915) Sd 1.9% 2.3% 3.7% 2.6% 
 Min -4.4% -4.4% -25.7% -0.6% 
 Max 5.7% 12.8% 34.1% 10.8% 
2003 Mean 3.0% 3.0% 3.0% 5.1% 
(N=1,658) Sd 1.9% 2.5% 3.4% 2.9% 
 Min -3.8% -9.0% -9.0% -0.7% 
 Max 8.9% 13.0% 29.7% 12.1% 
Total Mean 2.9% 2.8% 2.8% 3.8% 
(N=13,942) Sd 1.9% 2.5% 3.9% 5.3% 
 Min -4.4% -9.0% -35.3% -28.2% 
 Max 8.9% 15.8% 34.1% 48.3% 
Note: Average price growth of each industrial sector classified at 2, 3 or 4-digits of disaggregation according to ISIC 
Rev.2 Classification. 
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Table A4.3 shows the main descriptive statistics of industry-level price growth rates. 
Results show that the main difference between these inflation rates is the standard errors, 
which decrease when more aggregated industries are considered. Average manufacturing 
industry inflation rates are near 3% per year.  The first column of Table A4.3 contains the 
average price growth across firms at the two-digit level of disaggregation, which divides 
manufacturing into 9 sectors. The mean of this industry-level price growth rate is 2.9%, 
while its standard deviation is 1.9%.  
The second column of Table A4.3 was computed by aggregating firms at the three-
digit level, which creates 27 groups of firm according to their economic industry sector, 
finding a yearly average price growth near 2.8% and a standard deviation of 2.5%. The 
third column of Table A4.3 contains the description of industry-level price growth 
aggregated at the four-digit level, which divides manufacturing into 85 sectors. It results 
in a similar mean value and a standard deviation of 3.5%. A direct conclusion from this 
table is that standard variations are increasing at the higher level of disaggregation. 
Finally, the fourth column of Table A4.3 shows the industry-level average price 
growth at three digits of disaggregation, computed with the wholesale price index data 
provided by the Chilean Statistical Office19. This index has a higher mean value, close to 
3.8%, and a standard deviation of 5.3%, which is also higher than in the case of average 
price growth computed from firm-level information. 
A4.3 Correlation between Firm and Industry-level Price Changes 
Table A4.4 shows the correlation matrix of all different firm-level and industry-level 
price growth rates calculated in tables A4.2 and A4.3. The three main firm-level price 
growth definitions are relatively free of noisy outlier observations and therefore have a 
much higher correlation to the other price growth estimates. The correlation between 
firm-level price growth 2 and firm-level price growth 3 is 94%, while the correlation of 
the latter to firm-level price growth 4 is 89%. 
 
Table A4.4 Correlation of Firm-level Price Growth Rates and Industry-level Inflation 
Rates 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 Firm price growth 1 1.00       
2 Firm price growth 2 0.94 1.00      
3 Firm price growth 3 0.84 0.89 1.00     
4 ISIC 2-digit industry inflation 0.11 0.11 0.16 1.00    
5 ISIC 3-digit industry inflation 0.14 0.14 0.21 0.76 1.00   
6 ISIC 4-digit industry inflation 0.22 0.23 0.32 0.49 0.66 1.00  
7 ISIC 3-digit computed by INE(2009a) 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.24 0.36 0.22 1.00 
 
Industry-level price growth rates are highly correlated to each other. The highest 
correlation, 76%, is between the two-digit and the three-digit industry level inflation. 
                                              
19 This Price Index was obtained from manufacturing wholesale price data provided by Instituto Nacional de 
Estadisticas (INE). 
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Three-digit industry-level inflation estimated from firm-level averages is also highly 
correlated with three-digit industry inflation from wholesale price data provided by the 
statistical office. The correlation of these two last variables is 36%. 
A4.4 Deflated Output and Input Variables at Firm and Industry-level 
In this section, we present the basic results obtained from deflating output using the 
four firm-level options and the four industry-level options defined in the previous 
section. Additionally, we define variable deflators for each of the main inputs and present 
the results of deflating these variables.  
Even though there is no need to focus on the observations of the balanced panel 
only, it is not possible to use firm-level deflators for observations that have missing 
values in one or more periods between years that contain observed values.  This section 
contains only observations with no holes between years that is to say, only observations 
that appear in the unbalanced panel in consecutive years are allowed to remain in the 
sample. Additionally, this section considers only firms observed in at least three 
consecutive years during the period 1996-2003. 
A4.5 Using Industry-level and Firm-level Output Deflators 
There are several differences that may be observed among the varied ways to deflate 
output. Table A4.5 shows how using a different deflation may lead to different average 
values of output levels among manufacturing firms. The first firm-level deflated column 
uses a price growth estimate that was obtained after cleaning the product-firm level 
sample from outliers. It offers an estimated average output that decreases in 1999 as a 
result of a general economic contraction but increases as expected in all other periods. 
We can also see that no firm appears with a negative output value due to an excessive 
deflation.  
The second column was obtained by deflating output with a price index that was 
estimated as the weighted average of products’ price growth. The third uses an additional 
correction for the coverage of reported products on total firm sales. Firm price growth 3 
is used to deflate the third column of Table A4.5; this is preferred because it takes more 
information into account.  
 As Table A4.6 shows, industry-level deflated output appears fairly stable at all 
three different levels of disaggregation with which price growth was computed.  We find 
that standard deviations tend to be larger using the most disaggregated index. The last 
column of Table A4.6 contains output deflated at the three-digit industry level using 
information about wholesale price growth from the Statistical Office, similar to what was 
used by Benavente et al (2006). We find that the standard deviations are slightly smaller in 
this case compared to the previous three columns in which average firm-level price 
growth was used to obtain industry level deflated output. A comparison of the results of 
estimating average price growth from industry level information and firm level 
information is found in figure A4.1. There are significant differences between the two 
estimations which suggest that large intra industry price variation exists.  
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Table A4.5 Comparison between Three Options of Firm-level Deflated Output 
Year Stats Firm-level deflated Firm-level deflated Firm-level deflated 
  Output (inf1) Output (inf2) Output (inf3) 
1996 
N=(1,897) 
Mean 2,177,138 2,177,138 2,177,138 
Sd 7,966,814 7,966,814 7,966,814 
Min 29,966 29,966 29,966 
Max 169,000,000 169,000,000 169,000,000 
1997 
N=(2,045) 
Mean 2,283,282 2,280,269 2,215,559 
Sd 8,603,238 8,531,980 8,228,526 
Min 15,953 17,131 21,658 
Max 201,000,000 201,000,000 175,000,000 
1998 
N=(2,117) 
Mean 2,373,194 2,367,732 2,243,479 
Sd 9,843,151 9,759,177 8,901,117 
Min 13,785 14,570 17,711 
Max 232,000,000 232,000,000 212,000,000 
1999 
N=(2,077) 
Mean 2,909,695 2,892,655 2,558,041 
Sd 27,500,000 27,100,000 19,700,000 
Min 21,014 17,941 22,461 
Max 1,170,000,000 1,160,000,000 808,000,000 
2000 
N=(2,059) 
 
Mean 3,131,308 3,163,571 2,769,146 
Sd 25,100,000 25,400,000 18,800,000 
Min 14,782 11,703 14,362 
Max 1,030,000,000 1,050,000,000 733,000,000 
2001 
N=(2,071) 
Mean 3,408,720 3,452,218 3,040,539 
Sd 21,600,000 21,900,000 16,900,000 
Min 10,583 10,328 10,802 
Max 809,000,000 822,000,000 588,000,000 
2002 
N= (1,915) 
Mean 3,708,043 3,707,998 3,229,091 
Sd 20,700,000 20,600,000 16,000,000 
Min 10,276 10,626 10,675 
Max 701,000,000 696,000,000 498,000,000 
2003 
N=(1,658) 
Mean 4,096,627 4,104,448 3,538,429 
Sd 25,700,000 25,500,000 19,400,000 
Min 8,036 8,352 8,768 
Max 898,000,000 891,000,000 638,000,000 
Total 
N=(15,839) 
Mean 2,984,201 2,991,543 2,700,448 
Sd 19,800,000 19,800,000 15,200,000 
Min 8,036 8,352 8,768 
Max 1,170,000,000 1,160,000,000 808,000,000 
Note: (inf1) is deflated using the simple average of the price growth rate of all products from each firm after deleting 
product observations in which the first difference of log of price was higher than log(2) or lower than –log(2). (inf2) 
is deflated using firm-level weighted average of product price growth after deleting outliers. (inf3) is deflated using 
firm-level weighted average of price growth after deleting outliers and correcting by overall coverage of product-
firm level information.  
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Table A4.6 Comparison between 2, 3 and 4-digit Industry-level Deflated Output 
Year Stats Industry-level 
d fl d
Industry-level 
d fl d
Industry-level 
d fl d
Industry-level 
d fl d  Output (ISIC 
Rev2. 2-digit) 
Output (ISIC 
Rev2. 3-digit) 
Output (ISIC 
Rev2. 4-digit) 
ISIC 3-digit 
(INE 2009a) 
1996 
(N=1,897) 
Mean 2,177,138 2,177,138 2,177,138 2,177,138 
Sd 7,966,814 7,966,814 7,966,814 7,966,814 
Min 29,966 29,966 29,966 29,966 
Max 169,000,000 169,000,000 169,000,000 169,000,000 
1997 
(N=2,045) 
Mean 2,222,442 2,212,828 2,256,408 2,184,587 
Sd 8,326,979 8,200,774 8,435,652 7,950,899 
Min 22,080 21,658 22,060 20,256 
Max 176,000,000 175,000,000 180,000,000 168,000,000 
1998 
(N=2,117) 
Mean 2,181,387 2,169,778 2,177,961 2,144,593 
Sd 8,424,611 8,292,712 8,469,244 7,920,596 
Min 20,059 19,587 19,587 17,984 
Max 191,000,000 190,000,000 192,000,000 174,000,000 
1999 
(N=2077) 
Mean 2,539,444 2,540,056 2,623,346 2,591,366 
Sd 22,600,000 23,000,000 25,300,000 25,100,000 
Min 18,515 18,268 17,776 17,491 
Max 961,000,000 983,000,000 1,090,000,000 1,090,000,000 
2000 
(N=2,059) 
Mean 2,754,160 2,753,232 2,844,053 2,680,596 
Sd 22,800,000 23,100,000 25,800,000 22,000,000 
Min 9,174 9,129 8,988 8,688 
Max 951,000,000 968,000,000 1,090,000,000 924,000,000 
2001 
(N=2,071) 
Mean 3,090,803 3,097,134 3,118,456 2,944,305 
Sd 22,100,000 22,300,000 22,800,000 21,200,000 
Min 9,303 9,325 9,815 8,985 
Max 888,000,000 895,000,000 917,000,000 855,000,000 
2002 
(N=1,915) 
Mean 3,283,500 3,274,635 3,302,143 3,094,997 
Sd 21,400,000 21,200,000 21,500,000 20,000,000 
Min 10,874 10,947 10,993 12,615 
Max 806,000,000 795,000,000 806,000,000 757,000,000 
2003 
(N=1,658) 
 
Mean 3,582,324 3,573,871 3,624,387 3,328,611 
Sd 27,000,000 26,700,000 27,700,000 25,300,000 
Min 11,557 11,435 11,556 13,934 
Max 1,010,000,000 997,000,000 1,030,000,000 955,000,000 
Total 
(N=15,839) 
Mean 2,706,396 2,702,434 2,743,284 2,625,332 
Sd 18,900,000 18,900,000 20,000,000 18,500,000 
Min 9,174 9,129 8,988 8,688 
Max 1,010,000,000 997,000,000 1,090,000,000 1,090,000,000 
Note: Output deflated with the average price growth rates computed at the sector level with 2, 3 or 4-digit 
disaggregation of the ISIC Rev.2 Classification. 
 
Figure A4.1 shows a comparison between average price growth obtained in two 
different ways. The dark bars show average all manufacturing inflation rates using the 
industry-level price growth estimated in this work from the simple averages of firm-level 
price variations within each sector at the 3-digit ISIC rev.2 disaggregation level. This 
measure corresponds to the second column of Table A4.6. In this case the firm-level 
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price growth was obtained from the weighted average of product-firm level price 
growths, nevertheless at the manufacturing level simple all firms had the same weight 
when taking the simple average price growth. The second measure of price growth 
shown by the light bars of the graph was obtained using the wholesale price index 
provided by INE. This information contains the product-level price growth weighted 
averages at the 3-digit ISIC Rev.2 disaggregation level. If we could assume that there is 
very little or no price dispersion among firms in the same 3-digit sectors then the two 
measures would yield a very similar result.  
Figure A4.1 proves that there is significant price dispersion among firms within the 
3-digit disaggregation level. For this reason and as it was explained by Klette and 
Griliches (1996) the results of estimating the production function using sector-level price 
growth could be biased. Therefore this work compares different output deflations and 
their relevance when estimating the production function. 
 
Figure A4.1 Firm-level Price Growth and INE ISIC Rev.2 3-digit Price Growth 
  
Note: Chilean manufacturing firm-level price growth, estimated as the weighted average of the price growth rate of 
all products from each firm after deleting product observations in which the first difference of log of price was 
higher than log(2) or lower than –log(2) and correcting by overall coverage of product-firm level information. INE 
3-digit inflation is the wholesale price index estimated from INE (2009a) database. 
A4.6 Input Deflators 
Different deflators were defined to be used for each of the variables of the ENIA 
survey that were originally expressed in nominal terms. Using information about 
wholesale price growths obtained from INE, it was also possible to create different 
deflators for materials, fuels, land, buildings, machinery, and vehicles. From the average 
deflators of materials, water, electricity, and fuels, we obtained a variable that was used to 
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deflate intermediate goods. Additionally, we used firm-level information on quantities 
and payments for energy services to determine the firm-level price growth of water and 
electricity. In this way, we also defined deflators for these variables.  
Table A4.7 shows the average deflation variable for each of the inputs from 1997 to 
2003. In order to bring values to the 1996 level, prices deflators increase over time, 
because these variables show accumulated inflation from 1996 to 2003. 
A distinction is made between raw and elaborated materials, which show an 
accumulated inflation of 24% and 31% respectively in 2003. Of all inputs, fuels show the 
highest price growth level. From 1996 to 2003, the price of fuel inputs increased more 
than 100%. The price of land did not increase as much as the price of buildings during 
the same period. Land has an accumulated price increase of 15% while buildings have an 
accumulated price increase of 45% up to 2003.  Machines and vehicles also have separate 
deflators. While machines are analyzed using a deflating variable that accumulates to 41% 
in 2003, the value of vehicles is deflated with a variable accumulating to 69% in 2003. 
The general consumer price index serves as a reference for deflation during the period. It 
accumulated to 27% from 1996 to 2003. This variable may be used to deflate inputs that 
are not considered in any of the other specific input categories, such as the value of 
publicity and advertising.  Deflation of basic energy services, water, and electricity has 
been also separated into two variables. Industrial water shows a decrease of its average 
price from 1996 to 2003, accumulating a 9% price decrease over the period, while the 
average price paid for industrial electricity decreased 14% over the same period. 
 
Table A4.7 Estimated Price Growth for Individual Inputs 
Year Raw Materials 
Elaborated 
Materials Fuels Buildings Machines Vehicles 
Price cons 
index Water Electricity 
1997 -10.5% -2.2 1.6 -0.7% 2.8% 1.3% 5.6% 5% 8.9% 
1998 0.2% 5.4 14.2 3.1% 7% 10.7% 4.5% 3.8% -0.2% 
1999 3.8% 2.1 18.2 0.9% 5.7% 13.1% 2.4% 5.1% 16.3% 
2000 10.6% 5 51.7 10.7% 2.4% 7.6% 4.4% 9.3% 1.9% 
2001 7.3% 10.4 6.9 11.4% 9.3% 10.6% 2.6% 0.6% 3.5% 
2002 5.1% 6 1 10.2% 6% 5.7% 2.8% 3.6% 3.7% 
2003 6.9% 1.5 19 2.8% 2% 5.9% 1.1% 17% -1.4% 
Note: Annual estimated price growth of Chilean Manufacturing inputs 1996-2003. Firm-level total sales and quantity 
data used for estimation of Water and Electricity average price growth. INE wholesale price data used for all other 
prices. (Raw Materials) is the average estimated price growth of copper, iron, flour, cellulose, rubber and cotton, 
(Elaborated Materials) is the average of fabric, dyes, processed wood and iron bars. (Fuels) is the average of coal, 
gas, diesel and propane. (Buildings) is the average of glass, bricks, ceramics, cement, plaster, iron bars and concrete 
mixers. (Machines) is the average of heavy machinery and farm equipments, centrifuges and refrigerating machines, 
personal computers, and communication equipment. (Vehicles) is the average price growth of cars, buses, and 
trucks. Price consumer index includes a basket of all main commodities and is estimated by INE (2009b). 
 
Table A4.8 describes the levels of inputs in real terms obtained by deflating the 
nominal variables using input-specific deflators described in Table A4.7. Intermediates 
represent the sum of raw materials, elaborated materials, fuels, energy use, and water 
consumption, all of which were deflated separately. Capital is determined by deflated 
land, buildings, machines and vehicles. For electricity and water, it was possible to 
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calculate firm-level price growth from the available data. For the rest of intermediates and 
capital variables, the Wholesale Price Index (IPM) was used. Gross Investment is deflated 
in the same way as the book value of Capital, by deflating land, buildings, machines, and 
vehicles investments separately. Publicity and Employment Cost are deflated using the 
Price Consumer Index. 
 
Table A4.8 Descriptive Statistics of Deflated Input Variables  
year stats ܯ ܭ ܫ ܹ ܲݑܾ 
1996 mean 1,015,223 1,115,450 127,454 233,899 39,171 
(N=1,897) sd 3,451,556 5,169,301 984,992 820,230 509,130 
 min 8,552 500 -11,300,000 5,367 0 
 max 86,100,000 114,000,000 30,500,000 25,400,000 16,300,000 
1997 mean 1,117,919 1,113,680 90,422 234,914 42,862 
(N=2,045) sd 3,790,977 4,928,681 599,307 799,986 590,475 
 min 6,584 827 -3,092,349 6,108 0 
 max 87,600,000 105,000,000 16,100,000 23,400,000 23,900,000 
1998 mean 1,128,852 1,122,506 106,857 235,156 36,864 
(N=2,117) sd 3,754,263 7,094,857 699,641 808,857 486,918 
 min 4,359 853 -276,946 6,800 0 
 max 77,800,000 264,000,000 20,500,000 24,100,000 19,900,000 
1999 mean 1,173,210 1,555,408 108,620 239,122 41,057 
(N=2,077) sd 5,287,106 23,800,000 1,845,725 1,062,114 642,050 
 min 5,950 347 -1,304,190 3,793 0 
 max 170,000,000 1,070,000,000 82,600,000 34,500,000 27,400,000 
2000 mean 1,238,521 1,675,600 120,824 231,790 44,580 
(N=2,059) sd 5,394,611 26,000,000 1,463,093 972,859 700,110 
 min 3,547 147 -1,079,298 2,106 0 
 max 132,000,000 1,160,000,000 59,300,000 31,700,000 29,900,000 
2001 mean 1,357,345 1,620,910 292,745 230,575 50,748 
(N=2,071) sd 8,336,227 26,400,000 6,961,731 923,259 604,297 
 min 2,081 133 -2,866,206 2,851 0 
 max 308,000,000 1,180,000,000 310,000,000 26,900,000 21,900,000 
2002 mean 1,226,015 1,587,699 185,143 247,349 55,177 
(N=1,915) sd 4,797,535 26,500,000 4,714,204 1,097,194 601,620 
 min 2,843 121 -4,206,765 3,307 1 
 max 89,300,000 1,140,000,000 205,000,000 36,400,000 19,400,000 
2003 mean 1,331,336 1,367,542 437,353 272,992 64,894 
(N=1,658) sd 6,018,332 21,900,000 14,100,000 1,393,966 647,787 
 min 1,913 331 -3,599,795 3,897 1 
 max 145,000,000 878,000,000 573,000,000 49,300,000 20,800,000 
Total mean 1,196,724 1,396,250 177,615 239,893 46,431 
(N=15,839) sd 5,317,337 20,000,000 5,541,863 990,822 600,725 
 min 1,913 121 -11,300,000 2,106 1 
 max 308,000,000 1,180,000,000 573,000,000 49,300,000 29,900,000 
Note: Chilean manufacturing input data deflated with ad hoc price growth for each component. (M) is deflated 
materials including raw materials, water, electricity, and fuels. (K) is capital including machines, vehicles, and 
buildings. (I) is net investment including machines, vehicles, and buildings. (W) and (Pub) are total wage and 
publicity, respectively, both deflated by Price Consumer Index IPC data estimated monthly by Instituto Nacional de 
Estadisticas 
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Appendix 5 Computation of Product Innovation Variables 
This section discusses the creation of a set of variables that are meant to represent 
product innovation at the firm level in the Chilean Manufacturing Industry. The 
availability of product-firm level data offers the opportunity of following products inside 
firms in order to account for products added, products dropped, and yearly total number 
of varieties produced.  
There are two main ways in which a firm can innovate. First, innovations may be 
adopted to ease production of goods by changing the processes that produce these 
goods.  A very simple example is when a machine is introduced to perform an action that 
was previously done by an employee.  
Secondly, innovations may change the products that are being produced. Product 
innovations are alterations to the characteristics of the output and may include adding a 
new product, dropping an existing product, or significantly modifying a product.  Product 
innovations may be either new to a firm or new to the entire market.  
According to the guidelines of the OSLO manual, national innovations surveys 
collect firm-level data that defines these two concepts as process innovations and product 
innovations. This work makes reference to these definitions as we pursue a better 
understanding of the relationship between technological change, market power, and 
efficiency of production.  
One of the objectives of this section is to obtain a measure of product innovation 
based on the manufacturing industry information provided for eight years at the product-
firm level. Because we observe a panel of products within firms, we have information 
that shows whenever a product was added or dropped from a particular firm’s product 
mix. From the data at hand, we can think of several ways in which a product innovation 
variable may be approximated. In this section, we describe the basic statistical 
characteristics of this information. 
Table A5.1 provides an innovative method for measuring product innovation based 
on the panel of product data. It reports descriptive statistics of some basic product 
innovation indicators at the firm level for the balanced panel of manufacturing firms 
included in the database. 
In the first place, we have counted the number of products that each firm produces 
in each year. Table A5.1 shows in its first column the descriptive statistics of the number 
of products reported to have been produced by Chilean manufacturing firms from 1996 
to 2003.  In the balanced panel, the number of products at the firm level varies from 1 to 
23 with an average that appears to be very close to 2.8. The median value of the number 
of products is 2. 
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Table A5.1 Descriptive Statistics of Product Innovation Indicators 
year stats Number of 
Products 
Change in 
N of 
Products 
Increased N 
of prod. 
dummy 
Product. 
innovation 
Rescaled 1 to 4 
Number of 
products added 
or dropped 
1996 mean 2.806537 . . . . 
(N=1,897) Sd 2.706649 . . . . 
 min 1 . . . . 
 max 23 . . . . 
1997 mean 2.748655 -0.02313 0.224939 0.382885 0.6489 
(N=2,045) Sd 2.599376 0.949814 0.417644 0.842604 1.474491 
 min 1 -8 0 0 0 
 max 24 6 1 4 16 
1998 mean 2.75248 0.030259 0.188002 0.287671 0.58479 
(N=2,117) Sd 2.614875 0.761027 0.390806 0.704364 1.416889 
 min 1 -7 0 0 0 
 max 25 7 1 4 24 
1999 mean 2.734714 0.012077 0.142995 0.229177 0.562591 
(N=2,077) Sd 2.588401 0.80618 0.350152 0.651407 1.341775 
 min 1 -7 0 0 0 
 max 25 7 1 4 13 
2000 mean 2.854784 0.094693 0.205925 0.342399 0.949004 
(N=2,059) Sd 2.906511 0.985255 0.404474 0.810406 2.857623 
 min 1 -8 0 0 0 
 max 32 12 1 4 62 
2001 mean 3.327861 0.514063 0.315307 0.64027 1.454853 
(N=2,071) Sd 3.901838 3.142575 0.46475 1.150719 3.871082 
 min 1 -30 0 0 0 
 max 30 27 1 4 47 
2002 mean 3.528982 0.178068 0.153003 0.300261 0.961358 
(N=1,915) Sd 4.203493 2.368625 0.360084 0.838703 2.993474 
 min 1 -27 0 0 0 
 max 30 26 1 4 44 
2003 mean 3.724367 0.191797 0.147768 0.282268 . 
(N=1,658) Sd 4.514513 2.144593 0.354977 0.810276 . 
 min 1 -18 0 0 . 
 max 30 28 1 4 . 
Total mean 3.04028 0.139253 0.19868 0.354469 0.858342 
(N=15,839) Sd 3.321117 1.805802 0.399021 0.85269 2.53038 
 min 1 -30 0 0 0 
 max 32 28 1 4 62 
Note: Number of products is the average total number of products reported each year on ENIA Form 3 at the 
product-firm level data (average number of products within firms). The change in number of products is the 
number of products manufactured in present year (t) minus the same number in the previous year (t-1). The dummy 
for increased number of products takes value one if the change in the number of products is greater than zero. 
Product innovation rescaled takes value 0 if no product was added, 1 if 1 product was added, 2 if 2 products were 
added, 3 if 3 or 4 products were added, and 4 if 5 or more products added. Number of products added and dropped 
is the number of products produced in current year (t) but not present in (t-1) plus the number of products 
produced in (t) but not produced in (t+1).   
 
A basic approximation of product innovation is the net change in the number of 
products manufactured by a firm from one year to the next. This variable was created by 
subtracting at the firm level the number of products reported in year t-1 from the 
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number of products produced in year t.  The yearly descriptive statistics of this variable 
are reported in the second column of table 8.  The median value of the number of 
product net changes is 0, which shows that most firms do not change the number of 
products from one year to the next. The change in the number of products in any given 
year ranges from -17 to 15 with a mean value of 0.16.  
A dummy variable was then defined to take value 1 if the net change of the total 
number of goods manufactured during a one-year period is greater than zero and 0 
otherwise. This variable is reported in the third column of table A5.1. It may be seen that 
12% of the observations show a positive change in the number of goods produced.  
Because product innovation is reported in the Chilean Innovation Survey on a scale 
from 0 (no innovation) to 4 (very high innovation level), a product innovation variable 
was created to be rescaled from 0 to 4 in order to fit in the same categories. Product 
innovation was rescaled using the number of products added, defined as the number of 
products that were produced by a firm in any given period t but not produced in the 
previous year t-1. Based on this number, rescaled product innovation is reported in the 
fourth column of table 8 and takes value 0 for firms that did not add any product in a 
given year. If the number of products added was 1, the variable takes value 1. If the 
number of products added is two, the variable is coded 2. Rescaled product innovation 
takes value 3 if 3 or 4 products were added and it takes value 4 if 5 or more products 
were added in a given year. The mean value of this variable is 0.28 and the median value 
is 0. Because the number of products produced in 1995 is unknown, the net change in 
the number of products, the dummy for increased number of products, and product 
innovation rescaled from 0 to 4 are not observed in 1996. 
If adding and dropping products from the firm’s product mix are both changes that 
represent product innovations, then a possible measure of a firm’s innovative behavior is 
the summation of these two variables. We define the number of products dropped in 
year t as the number of products produced in year t but not in year t+1, and the number 
of products added in year t as the number of products reported in year t but not in t-1.  
The total number of products added and dropped is shown in the last column of table 
A5.1. Because of the way in which this variable was constructed, it cannot be observed 
for the first period or the last period of the database.  
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